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Constitutional Rights in a Common Law World
The Reconstruction of North Carolina Legal Culture, 1865 - 1874
Linda A. Tvrdy
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which 
were ratified in the aftermath of the Civil War, abolished slavery, established national citizenship 
and made equality before the law a constitutional requirement.  These national constitutional 
amendments brought revolutionary change to America’s foundational law, but it was up to state 
and local legal actors to incorporate this change into the law that governed the everyday lives of 
Americans.  
The literature of Reconstruction legal history tends to place federal law, federal courts 
and federal legal actors at the center of the story.  But in the nineteenth century, the federal 
judicial system was limited in its institutional capacity and its jurisdictional authority.  State 
courts, on the other hand, were ubiquitous and possessed of expansive jurisdictional authority to 
hear cases arising under both state and federal law.  Before the end of the nineteenth century, 
most Americans could spend their entire lives without encountering the federal legal system.  On 
the other hand, county courts and the common law legal culture in which they existed were an 
integral part of their daily lives.
This dissertation focuses on the state of North Carolina, examining how the state’s legal 
actors articulated the meaning of freedom and incorporated it into their common law legal 
culture during Reconstruction.  Engaging with recent literature that reconsiders the importance of 
the common as an ideology and mode of governance, this dissertation argues that the common 
law conceptualization of rights stood in contrast to the abstract, individual rights embodied in the 
U.S. Constitution.  Common law rights were contextual, relational, and hierarchical.  Further, 
common law principles centered around creating and maintaining good social order rather than 
protecting individual rights. Because the common law dominated nineteenth century legal 
culture, North Carolina legal actors could not simply impose the principles of the newly 
amended U.S. Constitution onto the existing legal order.  Rather, to ensure their lasting 
legitimacy they had to integrate those principles into the existing common law legal culture.
The process of integration began even before North Carolina ratified the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  At the end of the war, Union army General John M. Schofield oversaw the 
administration of justice and the implementation of freedom in North Carolina through military 
commission proceedings over civilians.  Even in these military tribunals the common law 
provided a common language and ideology through which northern military officials, North 
Carolinian citizens and North Carolina lawyers could contest the precise meaning of freedom.  
Once civilian courts resumed their authority, North Carolinians continued throughout 
Reconstruction to refine the meaning of freedom and to incorporate the new constitutional values 
in the language of the common law.
By focusing on the local implementation of constitutional change, this dissertation sheds 
light on how Americans experienced emancipation and freedom in their everyday lives.  
However, uncovering the common law context in which it developed aids our understanding of 
nineteenth century constitutional doctrine as well.
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The American Civil War and Reconstruction brought dramatic political, social and 
economic change to the entire nation.  They also produced revolutionary legal and constitutional 
change, especially with respect to the rights of individuals.  Before the Civil War, the federal 
government played almost no role in defining or protecting individual rights.1  Instead, states 
regulated the rights of individuals - their legal relationships to one another, their relationships to 
the polity, and their status within the political community - through a common law system of 
judicial rulings, statutes, municipal regulations, and local custom.2  State law determined who 
was a citizen as well as how the rights of citizens would be delineated.  In addition, state 
common law governed the creation and enforcement of contracts, the definition of property, the 
transfer of rights in property, criminal law, and court procedure such as who could serve as jurors 
and witnesses.3
Reconstruction constitutional change interjected federal authority into the legal culture of 
the states in unprecedented ways.  In the antebellum period, states and state law regulated 
slavery.  The Thirteenth Amendment not only abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, but 
also authorized the federal government to enforce the terms of emancipation.  As one of its first 
enforcement measures Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which made all persons 
born in the United States citizens and designated a set of positive rights that all citizens were to 
1
1 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: American Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877, The New American Nation Series (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1988) 23.  Harold M. Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of Civil War and 
Reconstruction on the Constitution, Sentry ed., (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 1975) 8.
2 William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America, Studies in Legal 
History (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996),
3 William J. Novak, "The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America," in The Democratic 
Experiment: New Directions in American Political History, ed. Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2003), 85-119.
enjoy equally.  These rights included the ability to enter into contracts, to hold and transfer 
property and to give evidence in court.  They also included the right to equal “security of person 
and property” and to be free from discriminatory legal penalties or punishments for crime.  With 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the national government further expanded its 
constitutional authority to regulate the conditions of freedom, to define and protect the 
fundamental rights of national citizenship, and to guarantee legal equality.4
Despite this expansion of federal power, states retained much of their traditional, 
common law authority to regulate the rights of individuals for the common good throughout 
Reconstruction and until the beginning of the twentieth century.  The Emancipation Proclamation 
had “transformed a war of armies into a conflict of societies, ensuring that Union victory would 
produce a social revolution in the south.”5  But, the Thirteenth Amendment did not become a part 
of the formal constitutional law of the nation until nearly a year after the end of the war and the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments came even later.  Meanwhile, Union victory required the 
existing legal order to eliminate slavery and to incorporate emancipation in a way that would 
result in lasting legitimacy.  With the obvious exception of the law of slavery, the common law 
that had defined the legal culture of the states since the colonial era provided a shared language 
and ideology among the local legal actors who contended on an intimate, case-by-case basis with 
what it meant that the formerly enslaved were forever free.
 This dissertation engages with recent scholarship that takes the common law seriously as 
a legitimate mode of governance.  Supreme Court Justice and late nineteenth century legal 
luminary, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., taught modern Americans to see the common law as a 
2
4 Foner, Reconstruction, 243-280.
5 Foner, 7.
form of politics, with common law judges “illegitimately usurping the realm of democratic 
politics” (emphasis in original).6  Accordingly to Holmes, the common law was based on nothing 
but history and precedent.  Its foundations were “temporal, . . .contingent, and revisable,” 
making the common law collapse into politics.7  Progressive era reformers picked up Holmes’ 
mantle arguing that the common law’s dependence on precedent and tradition gave it a 
conservative cast, and that its backward-looking perspective made the common law ill-equipped 
to address the rapid societal changes that had accumulated by the beginning of the twentieth 
century.  Legislation - grounded in scientism and expertise - produced democratic justice.  The 
common law - grounded in tradition and the personal predilections of unelected judges did not.
  Legal and intellectual historian Kunal Parker has recently argued that Holmes’s 
modernist critique of the common law grew out of the fact that state and federal courts were 
indeed using common law principles of contract, tort, and property to block necessary reform 
during the Progressive era.  However, the modernist understanding that the common law was 
founded on nothing but historical contingency was not the nineteenth century understanding of 
the common law.  Nineteenth century legal thinkers understood the common law to have a 
temporal component but, to them, the foundations of the common law lay in natural rights and 
reason, custom observed as law, and the ancient rights and traditions of Englishmen.  While 
modernists and Progressives placed their faith in legislation as a source of democratic reform, 
nineteenth century legal thinkers believed the common law’s incremental adaptability ensured 
that reform was guided by time-tested principles of law and reason.  Democracy was suspect in 
3
6 The explanation of Holmes’ and the Progressives’ critique of the common law as politics depends heavily on Kunal 
M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790-1900: Legal Thought Before Modernism, 
Cambridge Historical Studies in American Law and Society (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 5.
7 Parker, 7-8.
the early nineteenth century.  But to the extent that democratic governance was a goal, the 
common law accomplished that goal because it was administered locally with the consent of the 
community.8
 According to Parker the modernist view of the common law as collapsing into politics 
continues to hold sway in the literature of legal history.  The traditional view, that nineteenth 
century judges applied the common law in a consciously instrumental fashion intended to 
promote some favored aspect of public policy, implies that common law “judges. . . were doing 
something deeply political, that democracy was being subverted by law.”9  Parker presents a 
nineteenth century understanding of the common law as a legitimate form of governance that 
many nineteenth century Americans regarded as consistent with, if not superior to, governance 
based on transient legislative majorities.
 Individual rights under nineteenth century common law were conceptually different from 
our modern conception of abstract, individual rights.  William J. Novak in The People’s Welfare 
describes a common law conception of rights “very much at odds with modern conceptions of 
the sovereign state and the rights-bearing individual. . . ”10  Novak’s project is to challenge the 
myth of nineteenth century statelessness and the predominance of liberal individualism. 
However, in the process of doing so he recovers a tradition of common law governance which he 
describes as the “well-regulated society.”11  The well-regulated society has four features that 




10 Novak, The People’s Welfare, 9.
11 Novak, The People’s Welfare, 19-50.
States.  These features are “public spirit, local self-government, civil liberty and law.”  The well-
regulated society distributed and regulated rights in a contextual, relational and hierarchical 
fashion using the common law principles and methods that many Americans believed to be the 
source of their greatest freedom.12
 By taking into account the common law legal culture that pre-existed federal 
constitutional change, this study will provide insight into how existing legal structures affected 
the Republican effort during Reconstruction toward social, political and economic reform.  In 
addition, a close look at how freedom, citizenship, and equality were defined at the local level 
after the end of slavery will provide a new perspective for understanding how those concepts 
developed within the federal legal system, most especially within the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court.
 North Carolina, like the other states, derived authority over its residents from the 
sovereignty it retained within the federal system of the United States.  Common law legal culture, 
of course, was not unique to North Carolina.  In fact, all the former British American colonies 
formally adopted the English common law (with modifications appropriate to local conditions) 
as the basis of their jurisprudence, either during the colonial era (like North Carolina) or 
immediately after the American Revolution.13  Within the federal system of the United States, 
each state has its own legal system.  The common law rules developed by the legislature and 
courts of one state had no direct authority in another.  On the other hand, the legal materials on 
which lawyers, judges, and lawmakers frequently relied described general common law 
5
12 Ibid.
13 James R. Stoner, Common Law Liberty:  Rethinking American Constitutionalism (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press 2003), 14.
principles of universal application.  Lawyers, judges and lawmakers freely borrowed the logic 
and reasoning of the judicial decisions of sister states and England so long as they were 
sufficiently persuasive and conditions were at least arguably similar.  In this way, common law 
practitioners created a shared language and a body of common assumptions.  Yet, because each 
state had an independent legal system, each state developed its own common law dialect and a 
legal culture distinct in its particulars from its sister states.
The common law method of decision-making produced not only a set of legal rules used 
in the courtroom, but a discourse about the nature of the general welfare and good order in 
society.  Even though common law practitioners drew on tradition, custom, and precedent for 
legal authority, the common law was not static.  Lawyers, judges and litigants pushed the 
common law in new directions by applying old principles in novel ways, contending through the 
language of the common law for his or her version of the good society.14
The common law provided a number of tools through which North Carolina, like other 
common law states, could exercise authority to regulate individual rights.  The police power was 
one such important and elastic tool.  The police power encompassed all the power of a sovereign 
to regulate for the safety, morals, health, economic growth and general welfare of its citizens.  
State police power before the Civil War was limited only by the power expressly delegated in the 
U.S. constitution to the federal government.15
While the police power belonged to the states as sovereigns, in the nineteenth century 
state legislatures delegated that power to county and town governments where local officials 
6
14 Novak, The People’s Welfare.
15 Ibid.  See also, Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law: Constitutional Development 
1835-1875, New American Nation Series (New York: Harper and Row, 1982) and Kermit L. Hall, The Magic 
Mirror: Law in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
exercised it in locally specific ways.  State level governments were relatively weak, but local 
governments exerted regulatory authority over almost all aspects of everyday life.
Each county in North Carolina had a county court manned by several justices of the 
peace.  The North Carolina General Assembly appointed justices of the peace from among their 
local elites on the recommendation of the county’s delegation to the General Assembly.  In 
addition to their judicial duties, justices of the peace issued licenses and permits for local 
businesses, oversaw the construction and maintenance of roads, undertook responsibility for the 
poor, regulated weights and measures along with countless other everyday regulatory and 
administrative duties.16  Towns also had governments that regulated every aspect of town life 
from what activities could take place on the Sabbath to imposing curfews on free blacks.  Towns 
established themselves by applying to the General Assembly for incorporation.  The Articles of 
Incorporation for each town specified in detail the areas and extent of the authority town officials 
wanted the General Assembly to delegate to them.  Statewide laws of universal application were 
relatively rare and limited to areas of the law that elite lawyers had managed to formalize such as 
commercial law and the law of property.17
In addition to the police power, the federal system left the regulation of domestic 
institutions in the hands of the states.  The common law of domestic relations, as described by 
William Blackstone in his chapter on the “Rights of Persons” in the Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, provided the general principles of the American law of domestic relations, with one 
overwhelmingly significant exception – slavery.  In the United States, Chancellor James Kent 
7
16 Guion Griffis Johnson, Ante-bellum North Carolina: A Social History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1937). 
17 Ibid., 114-135, Laura F. Edwards, The People and Their Peace: Legal Culture and the Transformation of 
Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
supplemented Blackstone and included the law of slavery in the section on domestic relations in 
his treatise, Commentaries on American Law.  Common law domestic status categories such as 
husband and wife, master and servant, guardian and ward, master and slave, created and defined 
individual rights and obligations that were relational and hierarchical rather than absolute and 
equal.18
For example, while North Carolina law considered marriage to be based in contract, 
which implies a kind of mutuality, it created a status relationship in which wives were obligated 
to submit to their husbands’ authority even where the husband exercised that authority with 
violent force.  Husbands were obligated to provide their wives with bed and board, but wives had 
no corresponding right to use violent force to extract compliance from their husbands.19 A 
husband’s authority to use violence to force his wife to submit was not without limit. It depended 
to a degree on the personal characteristics of his wife.  An unruly wife could be beaten to the 
point of bruising. A dutiful wife could not. The right of husbands to use physical force to gain 
their wives’ submission was contextual as well as relational and hierarchical.20
North Carolina’s experience is particularly apt for this study for several reasons.  First, by  
the mid-nineteenth century North Carolina’s legal system had acquired a reputation for 
intellectual independence and sophisticated development, giving North Carolina’s law and legal 
culture influence beyond the borders of the state.  Thomas J. Ruffin, who became the chief 
justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1829, deserves much credit for the state’s stature 
in antebellum legal culture.  Roscoe Pound, the prominent legal thinker of the early twentieth 
8
18 Kathleen S. Sullivan, Constitutional Context: Women and Rights Discourse in Nineteenth-Century America, The 
Johns Hopkins Series in Constitutional Thought (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).
19 Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. 235 (1858).  
20 Joyner v. Joyner, 59 N.C. 322 (1862). 
century and dean of Harvard Law School, ranked Ruffin among the ten greatest jurists in 
American history.21  Ruffin was famous, among other things, for his 1830 decision in State v. 
Mann, in which he ruled that masters could not be prosecuted for assaults against their own 
slaves.  He explained that if the system of slavery were to function properly the “power of the 
master must be absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect.”  Ruffin’s decision set the 
baseline for the degree of humanity the common law afforded the slave.22 
Second, while Conservative Democrats controlled the legislature after 1870, Unionists 
and Republicans dominated the judiciary from the summer of 1865 - when Unionist Governor 
William Woods Holden repopulated county offices pursuant to President Johnson’s instructions -  
until 1876 - when the first term of elected judges in North Carolina expired.  The Reconstruction 
Act of 1867 gave black men in the former Confederate states the right to vote.  The North 
Carolina constitutional convention of 1868 proposed to change judgeships and justices of the 
peace from appointive to elected.  In 1868 the biracial North Carolina electorate approved the 
change and because of a quirk in the enabling law, the first slate of popularly elected judges were 
to hold office for eight years instead of the six years for subsequent elections.  After 1870, 
Conservative legislators were in a position to pass laws, but Republican judges interpreted 
them.23
9
21 Mark V. Tushnet, Slave Law in the American South: State v. Mann in History and Literature, Landmark Law 
Cases in American Society (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 74.
22 Tushnet, 1.
23 Otto H. Olsen, Carpetbagger’s Crusade: The Life of Albion Winegar Tourgée, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1965) 77-92. 
Finally, if the “twin Reconstruction ideals of racial and economic justice”24 could have 
been achieved in the south, North Carolina was a likely place for it to happen.  In the antebellum 
period, North Carolina’s laws governing slaves and free blacks were reputedly the most liberal in 
the South, although John Hope Franklin attributes that liberality to benign neglect rather than to 
any humanitarian impulse on the part of whites.25  While North Carolina had a powerful, 
slaveholding, landed elite that influenced most functions of government, elite control was not 
complete. Most North Carolina families, as many as three-quarters, owned no slaves. The state 
had a politically significant class of yeoman farmers who had begun to push for democratic 
reform before the Civil War. Throughout the antebellum period, the General Assembly gradually 
reduced, though did not eliminate, the property qualifications for both officeholding and voting. 
Class tensions only increased during the Civil War as non-slaveholding whites came to see the 
war as one to protect their rich neighbors’ slaves.26  North Carolina also had a significant pro-
Union movement that included both elites and yeoman.  Finally, North Carolina’s black 
population was large enough to decide many elections, but not so large as to dominate the 
electoral process.27
This combination of constituencies with conflicting interests permitted no one group to 
dominate the legal or political process, and it allowed no one viewpoint to dominate the state’s 
10
24 William E. Forbath, "Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court and 
Reimagining the Constitution," Stanford Law Review 46, no. 6 (July 1994): 1771-1085. Roberta Sue Alexander, 
North Carolina Faces the Freedmen: Race Relations During Presidential Reconstruction, 1865-67 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1985), 118, describes the Reconstruction North Carolina Supreme Court as being composed of 
men who “were among the state’s most distinguished members of the bar [who] had a profound respect for the law.”  
25 Roberta Sue Alexander, North Carolina Faces the Freedmen, John Hope Franklin, The Free Negro in North 
Carolina 1790-1860 (1943; repr., Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 1-10.
26 Paul D. Escott, Many Excellent People: Power and Privilege in North Carolina, 1850-1900, The Fred W. 
Morrison Series in Southern Studies (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 44-47.
27  Olsen, Carpetbagger’s Crusade, 77-92, discusses the impact of black voters in 1867.
vision for a new legal, social, and political order based on freedom and equality.  While violence 
and intimidation were certainly a problem in the state, those willing to wield that illegitimate 
power, could not permanently impose their vision of social order because too many possibilities 
existed for alliances across the lines of class and race.  Indeed, North Carolina’s political history 
was unique in that a coalition of white and black populists revived Republican power in the late 
nineteenth century.  The resurgence did not last, but the fact that it could occur at all 
demonstrates the latent potential for such alliances.28  Thus, North Carolina’s social history 
opened the door to vigorous debate over the new legal order of Reconstruction.
The first chapter of this dissertation examines in detail the respective roles of the state 
and federal judicial systems and their respective legal cultures.  During the antebellum period, 
state courts exercised vastly more authority over the lives of individuals than federal courts.  
Federal authority increased during the Civil War and Reconstruction, but the increase was 
modest.  State judiciaries remained the primary site for adjudication, and the common law 
provided the discourse, ideology, principles, and method.  Nineteenth century common law rights 
were not the abstract, individual, decontextualized rights that are familiar to us today.  In the 
nineteenth century common law rights were intricately connected to a person’s role and 
reputation within his or her community, relationship to members of his or her household, offices 
a man might hold, and membership in voluntary associations, such as churches, benevolent 
societies and political organizations.29
11
28 Robert C. Kenzer, Enterprising Southerners: Black Economic Success in North Carolina 1865-1915 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997) 1-8. 
29 Novak, The People’s Welfare, Sullivan, Constitutional Context and Edwards, The People and Their Peace.
American common law in the nineteenth century was not simply a set of legal principles. 
It was a form of governance that arose from an ideology that promoted good social order and the 
general welfare.  The common law in the colonies and later the states predated the U.S. 
Constitution by more than a century and it survived the American Revolution largely unchanged.  
For nineteenth century Americans, the common law was a source of liberty.  The administration 
of justice was diffuse and highly sensitive to local knowledge and customs.  Obedience to the 
law was by consent, not compulsion.  While the source of great liberty, the common law also 
reinforced social hierarchy with the force of law.  However, the adaptability of the common law 
allowed for incremental reform where societal will existed.30
In direct contrast to the expansive authority of the state judicial systems, federal 
administration of justice was starkly limited in institutional capacity, jurisdictional authority, and 
by a lack of its own jurisprudence.  The Constitution established only the Supreme Court, 
leaving Congress the authority to create all other federal courts.  The first Congress established a 
minimal system of federal courts.  Federal court authority to hear cases was strictly limited.  In 
1875, Congress first established “federal question” jurisdiction - the general power of federal 
courts to hear cases that raised questions of federal or constitutional law.  Federal question 
jurisdiction is utterly normative today, but for the most of the nineteenth century it simply did not 
exist.  State courts heard cases arising under federal law and the Constitution except where 
Congress expressly provided in substantive legislation for federal courts to hear cases arising 
under the specific statute.31
12
30 Parker, 15, refers to the adaptability of the common law as its “insensibility” because ideally the adapation took 
place over a long enough period of time so as to be imperceptible except in hindsight.
31 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1996) 41-48.
Though the federal judiciary was separate and independent of the state judiciaries, it also 
operated within the culture of the common law.  During the antebellum period, in cases where a 
federal statute or the Constitution authorized federal jurisdiction, federal courts applied the 
common law rules of decision, of evidence, of procedure and occasionally of substance. Because 
of their limited institutional and jurisdictional capacity, however, federal courts could not 
develop a separate, cohesive federal jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding the limited power of the federal judiciary as a whole, the Supreme Court 
was relatively powerful because it was the final interpreter in cases that came before it.  In cases 
where the Supreme Court asserted authority to adjudicate the rights of individuals, the nature of 
those rights were transformed from the contextual and textured rights of the common law to 
something more abstract, more rigid, and more hierarchical.  State courts did not always 
acknowledge the Supreme Court’s claim to being the authoritative interpreter of constitutional 
principles.  The power struggle between state courts and the Supreme Court was joined over the 
issue of fugitive slaves and slavery in federal territory.  Only the Civil War and the 
Reconstruction constitutional amendments resolved the dispute.
Chapter two examines how the Union army administered justice in North Carolina during 
early Reconstruction.  During Presidential Reconstruction, which lasted from the end of the war 
until Congress passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867, the Union army retained jurisdiction in 
cases involving blacks because the state refused to allow them to testify on equal terms with 
whites in state courts.  Union military commissions tried civilians accused of serious crimes and 
applied the law of the state as modified by emancipation and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Even 
though slavery had been deeply embedded in southern legal culture, it was possible for North 
13
Carolinians and northern Union army officials to begin to work out the meaning of freedom in 
the language of the common law.  The abundance of character evidence that military 
commissions agreed to hear and consider demonstrates that the localized, contextual justice that 
existed in the antebellum period persisted in North Carolina during reconstruction even under 
martial law.  While Union army officers and North Carolina lawyers may have shared the 
language and ideology of common law governance, the military commission cases demonstrate 
that they possessed different understandings of the meaning of freedom and where the formerly 
enslaved fit within the new social order.  The Union army’s administration of justice after the war 
presaged the difficulties to come in defining freedom and the status in southern society of the 
former enslaved.
Chapter Three examines how whites exploited the apprentice system to recapture both the 
labor of formerly enslaved children, and to reassert aspects of mastery that emancipation 
destroyed.  During the antebellum period, the household was a foundational social, political and 
legal structure in the South.  In The People and Their Peace Laura Edwards locates two separate 
common law systems in North Carolina, which she identifies as local law and state law.  State 
law defined the relationship of the head of household to the state, the nation and to other 
patriarchs.  The subject matters of state law included property and commercial transactions.  
Local law - locally administered and grounded in older common traditions - governed the daily 
lives of individuals.  The purpose of local law was to maintain the people’s peace.  Courts 
endeavored to restore the peace, not to protect or vindicate individual rights.   The contextualized 
rights of individuals had bearing on whether the peace had been breached, by whom, and how 
14
the peace could be restored.  But courts did not seek to vindicate the rights of individuals for 
their own sake.32
The household was an important structural institution within the people’s peace.  The law 
defined only property-owning white males as capable of maintaining the status of head of 
household.  The law attempted to place everyone else somewhere within a household and under 
the sovereign authority of its head.  Slaves were members of their master’s household.  Except in 
extreme circumstances requiring state intervention, their masters governed their daily lives.  
They could not maintain their own legally sanctioned family structures.  Even free blacks’ ability 
to do so was limited by antebellum law.  
Understanding that determining the status of the formerly enslaved would be one of the 
most important tasks of reconstruction in North Carolina, Union General John M. Schofield, 
commander of the Department of North Carolina, issued an order describing the rules that would 
govern the freedmen until civil government could be restored in the state.  Schofield 
acknowledged the common law rights of black parents over their families on an equal basis with 
whites for the first time.  Schofield, perhaps unwittingly, destablized one of North Carolina’s 
important institutions.
The very existence of families headed by black men, or women in some cases, was an 
affront to former slave owners’ sense of mastery.   In an effort to regain some of their lost 
mastery, whites began to apprentice formerly enslaved children.  Apprenticeship for poor 
children had existed in North Carolina common law from the early colonial period.  But during 
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Reconstruction, whites used the existing legal structure to virtually re-enslave large numbers of 
children and young adults.33
The North Carolina Supreme Court recognized that whites were exploiting the previously 
useful system of apprenticeship in ways that were inconsistent with the freedom of the formerly 
enslaved.  The antebellum apprenticeship legal scheme had not included any consideration for 
the rights of parents or the children about to be apprenticed.  But the Court incorporated the right 
to notice to persons about to be apprenticed, so that they might have the ability to present 
evidence of their own best interests.  The basis for the decision remained grounded in social 
order, but by adding the individual right to notice, the Court adapted the old system to the new 
social reality created by the end of slavery.34
One of the most important aspects of reconstructing the South after the Civil War was 
reconstructing the South’s system of labor.  Republicans intended that the South replace its slave 
labor system with a free labor system.  However, the law that governed the system of free labor 
contained internal inconsistencies that were exacerbated in the transition from slave to free labor 
in North Carolina.  Chapter four is a case study of Haskins v. Royster, an 1873 North Carolina 
Supreme Court case that addressed many of the issues and internal inconsistencies of free labor 
law and ideology.35
The Court that decided Haskins v. Royster was composed of Justices who possessed a 
sincere intent to articulate legal rules that supported free labor in the state.  Yet, the divergent 
views of the justices in the majority and the justices in dissent demonstrated that the future terms 
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34 In Re Ambrose 61 N.C. 91 (1867). 
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of free labor law would be subject to intense debate, one that would take place at both the state 
and federal level.  At the same time that the U.S. Constitution constrained the states in 
developing their free labor law, such law informed the discussion over what rights were 
fundamental and deserving of federal protection under the new Constitutional regime.
Twenty-five years ago in an essay entitled “The Constitution of Aspiration and the 
‘Rights that Belong to Us All,’” which introduced a Journal of American History symposium 
celebrating the bicentennial of the United States Constitution, Hendrik Hartog called on 
historians to take a new approach to constitutional history; one that did not privilege the Supreme 
Court as the authoritative interpreter of the constitution.36  According to Hartog “Supreme Court 
cases should be only one portion of the descriptive detail of American constitutional history.  As 
important would be the small, everyday contests, arguments, negotiations, and understandings in 
which legal rights and constitutional assumptions have been constructed and exercised.”37  The 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments caused abrupt change in constitutional law, change that 
eventually resulted in the federal government and federal judiciary assuming the primary role in 
defining and protecting individual rights.  However that transition took place over half a century, 
during which time the common law provided the dominant legal discourse.
17
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Chapter One
We Live in the Midst of The Common Law1
The Civil War and Reconstruction revolutionized the American legal system, especially 
with respect to the law governing individual rights.  Before the Civil War states, through the 
exercise of sovereign police power authority, regulated the lives of their citizens almost without 
federal involvement.  Beginning with the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the federal legislation passed under their 
authority the federal government assumed direct legal authority over the status and rights of 
individuals as national citizens.  Because the lion’s share of the changes to formal, written, law 
occurred at the federal level, it is perhaps unsurprising that historians have regarded the federal 
arena as the source of the most significant legal change and development during Reconstruction.2
During Reconstruction state law and legal culture also changed and adapted to integrate 
the requirements of freedom and the new constitutional order.  However, that change was much 
more subtle, though no less significant, than that taking place at the federal level.  The change 
was subtle because the structures of state judicial administration remained relatively unchanged. 
To be sure, the former confederate states had to amend their constitutions to conform to the 
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newly amended United States Constitution.  And some states, North Carolina among them, used 
the opportunity to reform aspects of their systems of justice. North Carolina, for example, made 
justices of the peace and judgeships elective rather than appointive and codified much of its 
previously unwritten criminal law.3 Nevertheless, state courts continued to operate as common 
law courts. It is easy to assume that, except where state courts specifically applied new federal 
law, that they applied an unchanged common law. But that assumption misunderstands how the 
common law worked within the federal system during the nineteenth century. 
Looking at the problem of Reconstruction legal change from a state and local perspective 
is important, not only because it remains something of an untold tale, but also for reasons that go 
to the very heart of understanding nineteenth-century law.  State courts exercised far more 
authority than federal courts over the legal issues affecting nineteenth-century Americans, 
including the regulation of individual rights.  This was especially true in the antebellum period, 
but continued to be the case throughout Reconstruction and beyond.  In the nineteenth century, 
federal courts had neither the jurisdictional authority nor the institutional capacity to hear the 
bulk of legal cases that arose in the lives of Americans. Even in cases involving federal law, it 
was far more likely that they would travel through several layers of state judicial administration 
before, if ever, reaching a federal court.  The political ideology of federalism placed limits on the 
kinds of cases federal courts could hear and the law they could apply; limits that did not apply to 
state courts.  Though federal jurisdiction increased during Reconstruction, that increase was 
modest.  During Reconstruction, state judicial institutions implemented and incorporated 
constitutional change in much the same way they had done before the Civil War, which meant 
19
3 Otto Olsen, Carpetbagger’s Crusade: The Life of Albion Winegar Tourgée (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1965) 97-102. 
that Reconstruction constitutional change entered the American legal culture through a common 
law medium.
State courts were common law courts.  The common law they applied was an 
Americanized version of the English common law that British North American colonists brought 
with them to the New World.  After the Revolutionary War, every state in the Union “received” 
the portions of the English common law that were useful and applicable to their local 
circumstances.  The common law legal culture of the states predated their existence as states by 
more than a century and established deep roots.4
The common law has a somewhat undeserved reputation as an institutional impediment 
to the progressive development of individual freedom and right.  But, the relationship between 
the common law and individual freedom is more complex than one of simple opposition.  The 
common law created a conceptually distinct system of individual rights and obligations that was 
relational and contextual.5  The ideological goal of the common law was the well-being of the 
community.  Individual rights were always subordinate to the general welfare.  In fact, individual 
rights, as such, did not exist outside the context of the community in which a person lived.  This 
concept of rights is quite different from constitutionalized conception of the “inherent, natural, 
and absolute rights of individuals” embodied in the Reconstruction amendments and the federal 
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legislation enacted under their authority.6  Neither the situated rights of the common law, nor the 
abstract rights of the postwar U.S. Constitution inherently produced greater individual freedom.  
In fact they both sought to maximize liberty.  But, they differed on both the definition of liberty 
and how best to achieve it.  The common law defined liberty in positive terms.  The greatest 
freedom occurred when self-policing communities organized and regulated themselves for 
stability, safety and the general welfare.  Constitutional liberty was negative liberty.  Negative 
liberty was best achieved by preventing government interference, not by encouraging 
government action.  Indeed, in the antebellum period, the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution 
functioned as a list of rights with which the federal government could not interfere.  It was not a 
list of positive rights that the federal government actively protected.7 The common law 
emphasized peace and good order. Constitutional liberty emphasized abstract, individual right.
To understand what it meant that state courts were common law courts, it is important to 
understand exactly what the term “common law” means.  The common law, as it developed over 
centuries in England, was not simply a body of legal principles or a collection of court decisions.  
It was a form of governance.  Laura F. Edwards describes governance to the “the institutional 
mechanisms, formal and informal, including but not limited to, the legal system, through which 
decisions were made about legal cases and public issues.” English common law principles 
developed out of widely divergent sources, methods, and types of judicial tribunals from 
ecclesiastical courts applying principles of equity, to local tribunals applying customary laws and 
overseen by feudal lords, to royal courts that applied the King’s law.  By around the seventeenth 
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century, legal thinkers began to view these diverse sources as components of a cohesive whole.  
They formulated an ideology around the common law as a mode of governance that promoted 
liberty and good social order.8
Kunal Parker describes the intellectual consolidation of the laws of England into an 
ideology as a means of resisting encroachments of both the monarchy and Parliament.  
Englishmen had to obey the laws of the sovereign.  But common law judges, in the name of the 
rights of the people, could shape and limit those sovereign proclamations through the interpretive 
methods of the common law.  Any particular sovereign or currently constituted Parliament could 
act in a way that was contrary to natural law and reason.  The ancient wisdom of the common 
law operated as a protection against the bad intent, incompetence, or expediency of whomever 
served as the sovereign at a particular point in history.
The common law, on the other hand, stood outside history.  The ahistorical nature or 
“immemoriality” of the common law, coupled with its ability to evolve almost imperceptibly 
alongside changing conditions in society, gave it an authority that neither acts of Parliament nor 
decrees of the monarch possessed.  The common law acquired its authority through the consent 
of generation after generation to the best principles of law articulated by courts, whether those 
principles reflected universally applicable natural law and reason or the idiomatic customary 
practices of a particular location.  In this way, the ancient common law had greater legitimacy 
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than acts of Parliament - which could represent simple expediency - or the will of the monarch - 
which could be mere whim.9
 In resisting the encroachments of Parliament and the monarch, common law courts did not 
contest the legitimacy of properly enacted positive law.  Rather, courts blended statutes, 
regulations and decrees into the logic and assumptions of the common law.  Lawmakers could 
replace common law rules with legislation, but they had to do so with abundant clarity of 
purpose.  If a statute were inconsistent with the common law, common law rules required courts 
to interpret the statute as narrowly as possible consistent with its language.  If a statute were 
consistent with common law principles, it easily assimilated into the fabric of the common law 
and eventually became part of it.  After sufficient passage of time, courts could simply cite the 
ancient principle without necessarily referring to the statute that first embodied the rule.10
Royal common law courts dealt with issues involving landed estates and crimes against 
the peace and dignity of the sovereign.  They used an extremely complex, highly technical 
system of pleading that only trained, experienced lawyers could navigate.  Local courts decided 
most of the issues that concerned the non-landed population.  They operated on a less formal 
basis and relied a great deal on custom and long-standing local practice.11  But the royal courts 
and local courts were part of the same legal system and shared one legal culture.  Legal scholar 
H. Patrick Glenn describes the English common law to be a relational law.  The “common” part 
of the common law consisted of general principles or legal rules of virtually universal 
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10 Stoner, Common-Law Liberty, 11.
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application.  This aspect of the law existed in relation to the “particular,” local, or customary.  
Common law and local law and custom operated in dialogue with one another, exerting mutual 
evolutionary pressure, without either threatening the integrity or existence of the other.12
 The earliest British North American colonists were most familiar with the customary 
laws and practices of local courts.   They practiced a form of English common law that consisted 
of specific, local iterations of the general common law stripped of technical pleading 
requirements down to essential principles.13
In the eighteenth century, the legal system of the British North American colonies became 
more Anglicized, in part because Parliament began to incorporate the colonies more fully into the 
English mercantilist economic system, and in part because increasing numbers of American 
lawyers received training at the English Inns of Court in London.  The legal systems of the 
colonies did not begin to reach the level of complexity of English common law courts, but they 
did become complex enough to make lawyers necessary.14  During most of the colonial period, 
courts operated relatively independently of royal control.  But, as the Crown began to exercise 
greater oversight, colonists bristled at the interference.15
By the time of the American Revolution, the common law had been the law of the 
colonies for more than a hundred years.  The Revolutionary generation overthrew the English 
political system that had governed them during that time period, but they did not overthrow the 
English legal system as it had grown and developed there.  Each of the states that had once been 
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British colonies “received” the English common law into its legal system. Some states did this 
explicitly by statute, some through judicial decisions.  But each, without exception, made the 
common law the foundation of its legal culture.  Each state retained for itself the option to 
include in its reception of the common law only those portions of it that were appropriate to their 
local circumstances.16
Though many of the principles and practices of the English common law survived the 
transformation, Americanized common law contained a critically important distinction compared 
to its English predecessor.  The English common law drew its legitimacy from the peoples’ 
obligation to obey the sovereign, i.e., the Crown and Parliament.  While the common law in 
England in the seventeenth century might have operated to limit the overreach of a particular 
sovereign or a specific act of Parliament, its ultimate legitimacy came from an obedience to 
sovereign authority across the generations.17
In the United States, the common law also derived its legitimacy from obedience to the 
sovereign, but in the states the people were sovereign.   They consented rather than submitted to 
the common law.  Courts transformed from being the instruments of a single, distant, 
authoritative voice, into institutions belonging to the people, and operating by their consent.  
Americans, more than the English, understood the common law to be the product of natural law 
and reason.  In the hands of the people it was no threat to liberty.  On the contrary, the common 
law was a source of liberty.  While the change in the source of the common law’s legitimacy did 
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not perceptibly alter the institutions of the common law, it radically changed their role in society 
and government.18
The common law in the colonies and later the United States was not simply a set of laws 
and procedures.  It was a system of governance, with the county court as its structural edifice.  
Legal authority in the states was diffuse and local.  Rather than enacting abstract laws with 
statewide application, states delegated a great deal of governing authority to local 
municipalities.19  In North Carolina, for example, each county had several justices of the peace, 
appointed by the governor upon recommendation from the legislative delegation from his county. 
A justice of the peace served for good behavior or until he chose to resign.  These men were not 
necessarily trained in law, but they did typically come from the ranks of local elites.20  Each 
county had a magistrates court, a county court, and a Superior Court.  The judges who comprised 
each of these different courts were the same men who served as justices of the peace for the 
county, but in different combinations at each level of administration.
County courts, including magistrates courts, had both judicial and administrative duties.  
The county court was responsible for matters as wide-ranging as deciding where and when to 
build roads, deciding who should receive a license to operate a mill or a tavern, and establishing 
the approved weights and measures for use in county court-approved businesses.  County courts 
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supervised indenture agreements between masters and servants.  They probated wills and 
appointed guardians for orphaned minors, or bound them out as apprentices if they had 
insufficient means to pay for their own subsistence.21
The list of everyday activities over which justices of the peace had judicial authority is 
exhaustive.  It included everything from using profanity in public to appearing drunk in public; 
from working unnecessarily or engaging in sport on a Sunday to killing a deer out of season.  
But, they performed their duties with and within the communities in which they lived, often with 
the participation of residents.  For example, if a person wanted to pay a debt in commodities and 
the creditor thought the commodities were of objectionable quality, the creditor could have the 
county court conduct an inquiry into the fair value.  The justice of the peace relied on the 
opinions of local freeholders to make his determination.  Freeholders also determined whether a 
farmer’s fence was high enough to keep wandering livestock out of his crops.  If the fence were 
high enough, the farmer could recover damages.  If not, the livestock owner could recover for 
injury to his animals for having been chased.22
Justices of the peace were responsible for keeping the peace and good order of the state 
and had wide-ranging authority to listen to any complaint, however framed, by anyone who 
could swear an oath that another person had breached that peace.  Justices enlisted the entire 
community to control and punish such criminal behavior.  They could call on anyone, even free 
blacks and slaves who could not give sworn testimony against whites, to give evidence that 
might help the court learn exactly what had occurred that gave rise to the complaint.  Then the 
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community gathered to hear evidence and decide whether an indictment should issue.  A 
defendant who appealed from a conviction in a magistrate’s court appealed to a jury composed of 
community members rather than to another court.23
County courts applied the common law in a manner that was by highly personal, based 
heavily on local knowledge, and took into account the articulated position in society that the 
accused, the accuser, and witnesses occupied.  Most of the administration of justice never left the 
county in which the underlying incidents occurred.24  Historian William Novak describes the 
goal of nineteenth century local common law governance to be the “well-regulated society.”25  
Within the well-regulated society local and state office holders sought to promote what they 
understood to be the good of the community rather than with the goal of protecting individual 
rights or interests.  The goal to promote the general welfare, according to Novak, was “embedded 
in the practices of local institutions and common laws.”26  Liberty arose out the “order, comfort, 
safety, health and well-being” that effective, fair regulation provided.  The bundle of rights that 
any particular person enjoyed were a function of these regulations and his or her specific place in 
the local social and political order.27  To be sure, the rights derived under the common law were 
not simply relational and contextual, they were hierarchical as well.  Liberty, as defined in 
nineteenth century American common law perpetuated and legitimated the subordination of 
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24 Edwards, The People and Their Peace, 3-10.
25 Novak, The People’s Welfare. 
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women, free blacks, and slaves.  Members of these status categories could claim the protection of 
law only so long as they observed their proper place within the peace of the state.28 
The English jurist William Blackstone devised the most widely accepted definition of 
formal common law status relationships which he conceptualized as belonging within the 
domestic household.  Of all the seventeenth and eighteenth English legal thinkers, Blackstone 
exerted the most influence in the United States.  American courts and legal thinkers adopted 
Blackstone’s categorization of common law domestic relationships into parent and child, 
husband and wife, master and servant.  New York Chancellor James Kent’s Americanized 
version of Blackstone added the category of master and slave.29
Beyond even these formal status relationships, historian Laura Edwards describes the 
local legal system in North Carolina as even more intricately textured.  Edwards’ iteration of 
Novak’s well-regulated society includes the concept of the people’s peace.  The peace and 
dignity of the state required that everyone, including slaves, women, children, free blacks and 
white male householders, be brought within the peace of the community.  Within the localized 
legal systems of the state, the protection and vindication of individual rights was always 
subordinate to the goal of repairing disruptions to the peace. Within the peace, a person’s 
property-holdings (in the case of white men), ancestry, reputation or credit in the community 
further defined his or her status position.  People whose rights were limited, such as women or 
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free blacks, and even people with few or no rights at all such as the enslaved, could nevertheless 
possess sufficient character or credit within the community such that a magistrate might find that 
violence or theft perpetrated against them had disrupted the peace.  For example, the clothing a 
person wore was treated as his or her personal property even if it “belonged” to someone who 
had no legal ability to hold property.  In a case where that person’s property was taken from him 
or her a magistrate might order it returned.  However, the purpose of the order was not to 
vindicate or protect the individual’s right to hold and keep property.  Rather, the purpose was to 
restore the peace.30
As Christopher Tomlins observed almost twenty years ago, law was the “modality of 
rule” in nineteenth century America and courts were the primary institutions of rule.31  
Relocating sovereignty to the people allowed Americans to regard courts to be instruments of 
liberty not oppression as they perceived them to be under British rule.  Common law ideology 
assumed the sovereign possessed plenary authority to regulate any matter of dispute that might 
occur between two individuals or between an individual and the state.  Within the structure 
created by the U. S. Constitution, states delegated some of this power to the federal government.  
However, the Tenth Amendment explicitly reserved to the states and to the people all powers not 
expressly granted to the federal government or prohibited to the states.32
In the early republic state courts articulated the scope of their authority under the Tenth 
Amendment as the authority to regulate according to the common law maxim “salus populi 
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31 Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early Republic, 19-59.
32 Novak, The People’s Welfare, 13-14, describes both the ancient common law origins of the police power and its 
incorporation into American constitutionalism via the Tenth Amendment.
suprema lex est (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).”33  States - and in the context of 
nineteenth century governance that more often than not meant state courts - governed to 
maximize the health, safety and general well-being of the people.  Courts could be creative in 
their application of existing law to new situations so long as the result was the greater welfare of 
the community.  Local courts staffed with judges who were sensitive to the habits and manners of 
the people were in the position to assess what principles would promote the general welfare, and 
could generally be trusted to do so.  If they made mistakes, the common law allowed for the 
correction of those mistakes.  The common law also allowed for changing notions of what was 
the general welfare, although incorporating change came about slowly and incrementally.  The 
common law authority to regulate and adjudicate for the general welfare acquired the legal term 
“police power” during the nineteenth century.  But the ideology had long existed in the common 
law.34
Virtually all matters of daily concern to most individuals fell within state sovereign 
authority and jurisdiction.  Communities policed themselves to an extraordinary level of detail, 
through a system of county courts.  County courts administered the law and distributed 
individual rights and obligations in a situated, contextual way that depended a great deal on local 
knowledge to produce a personalized form of justice and good social order.35  Under the Articles 
of Confederation, state legal systems were largely independent of national control.  By the time 
the states ratified the U.S. Constitution, they had been developing their respective state common 
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law legal cultures without input, much less supervision, from the federal government for just 
over a decade.  But, because they had kept the institutions of common law governance they 
developed throughout the colonial period, it is fair to say that the legal culture of the states had 
been developing for generations.  Under the Constitution of 1787, states delegated some of their 
legal authority but retained almost complete control over the law of property, contract, tort, 
personal status and crime, as well as the power to regulate creatively for the general welfare of 
their citizens.36
Federal court authority operated in stark contrast to the expansive authority of state 
courts.  Throughout the antebellum period and even during Reconstruction, the federal judiciary 
was limited in both its institutional and jurisprudential capacity.  The Constitution established the 
federal judiciary in fewer than four hundred words.  Article III, Section 1 states that “[t]he 
judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior 
courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. . .”  Thus, the only 
constitutionally established court is the Supreme Court.  All other federal courts are creations of 
the U.S. Congress.37
Congress established a skeletal system of federal courts via the Judiciary Act of 1789.  
The 1789 Act created thirteen judicial districts, which roughly corresponded to a single district 
for each state.  Each judicial district had a district court and a circuit court.  District courts were 
trial courts with a single judge to hear each case.  Circuit courts were also trial courts, but were 
staffed by one district court judge and two Supreme Court justices sitting on a panel of three.  In 
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terms of sheer physical capacity to hear cases, state court systems - with at least one court sitting 
in each county, and several magistrates serving each county - dwarfed that of the federal 
judiciary.38
In addition to the relative scarcity of federal courts and judges, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
severely limited federal jurisdiction. The term “jurisdiction” refers to the nature and extent of a 
court’s authority to hear particular kinds of cases.  Jurisdiction can be geographic.  For example, 
two residents of New York contesting ownership of a piece of property in New York could not 
ask a North Carolina court to settle the dispute.  The geographic reach of North Carolina court’s 
jurisdictional authority does not extend to disputes involving parties and matters located entirely 
outside the state.  Jurisdiction can also be defined by subject matter.  A modern example might be 
traffic court.  An eighteenth century example might be a municipal court in a large port city 
whose jurisdiction was limited to disputes involving commercial trade.  Jurisdiction can also 
extend to the status of persons over whom a court has authority.  State courts had jurisdiction 
over their citizens.  But they also had jurisdiction over non-citizens who were physically present 
in the state.  Once the non-citizen left the state, jurisdiction became a more complicated matter 
and might require the consent of the person’s home state to extradite him.39
Throughout the nineteenth century, state courts, though limited by their geographic 
boundaries, exercised plenary subject matter jurisdiction.  So long as the parties bringing the suit 
had the appropriate connection to the court, the court had the authority to hear any claims the 
parties might make, even if those claims were novel.  Federal courts have never possessed 
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plenary jurisdiction.  They have always been limited to whatever jurisdiction the U.S. Congress 
granted by statute.   Indeed, though the U.S. Constitution described federal judicial power as 
extending to all cases and controversies arising under the Constitution, federal laws and 
international treaties, Congress did not grant federal courts general “federal question” 
jurisdiction until 1875.  Until then, federal courts could only hear cases for which Congress had 
specifically authorized the exercise of jurisdiction.40
Under the 1789 Act, Congress gave district courts subject matter jurisdiction over 
admiralty cases and some minor crimes.  Circuit courts had jurisdiction to try federal crimes and 
cases initiated by the United States.  They had appellate jurisdiction for admiralty cases and other 
civil suits tried in district courts.  The Constitution created federal judicial power to hear cases 
between citizens of different, or diverse, states.  The 1789 Act placed jurisdiction for these cases 
in the circuit courts.  However, Congress limited this diversity jurisdiction by requiring that the 
amount in controversy be at least $500, a significant sum in 1789.  Thus, federal courts had 
limited physical and jurisdictional capacity to hear cases affecting the lives of most Americans.  
The limited capacity of federal courts was not just a question of budgetary constraints or 
other practical considerations.  The U.S. Constitution created a novel political structure that 
defined a system of dual sovereignty.  It divided power among the three branches of the national 
government, it defined aspects of the states’ relationships to each other and to the federal 
government, and it listed the areas in which Congress was empowered to act and in which states 
were forbidden to do so.  In keeping with its integrity as a sovereign, the Constitution provided 
that the federal government possess its own court system.  But the federal court system was as 
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novel as the constitution that created it.  Further, the text nowhere indicated how or if the 
Constitution and the laws that would be passed under its authority would fit within the existing 
common law legal system.  In contrast to highly articulated, deeply embedded state common law, 
federal law was sparse, limited and novel.  It had no legal heritage: no inherited jurisprudence 
and no clear guidelines on what should be the sources of law when deciding cases. 
Debate over how the Constitution fit within the existing legal system began immediately.  
If the Constitution stood outside the common law and could only look to itself as a source of 
positive law, then the federal government would be greatly restricted in its ability to act, which is 
precisely what strict constructionists such as Thomas Jefferson advocated.  Others, such as 
Massachusetts Federalist Congressman Harrison Gray Otis, argued that the common law 
provided the context for the U.S. Constitution just as it did for state constitutions and law.  
Historian Kunal Parker describes Otis’s argument to be that the “foundational, interstitial 
presence of the common law at the level of the states. . . necessarily extended to the U.S. 
Constitution.  The common law was the background from which the meaning of the 
constitutional text had to be derived.”41
The debate over whether the common law informed the Constitution had two aspects.  
The first was whether Congress could interpret its authority to legislate in the plenary way of the 
common law within the limits of its enumerated powers; in other words whether the 
Constitution’s express grants of power included implied powers.  The second aspect was whether 
federal courts had common law authority to fill in the gaps left by positive law in the same way 
that state courts did with their own statutes and constitutional provisions; in other words, was 
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there federal common law?  To complicate matters further, at the same time Americans debated 
the relationship of the common law and the U.S. Constitution, they debated whether states 
should do away with the common law and replace it with positive statutory law.42
Americans believed they had both corrected and transformed the common law of England 
when they received it into their legal system and culture.  They corrected it by receiving only 
those parts of English common law that had not been corrupted by Parliament and the King, and 
that were appropriate in a republic populated by free men.  They transformed it by relocating its 
source of legitimacy and authority from obedience to a sovereign to the consent of the governed.  
Some legal thinkers extended this logic to argue that Americans should complete the project by 
enacting the common law principles each state received into statewide codes.  Such codes, if 
written in plain language instead of the technicalities of the common law, would allow the free 
men of each state to understand exactly what they were consenting to.43
In defense of the common law, other American legal thinkers argued that the act of 
reception was an act of consent to the natural law and rights embodied in the common law.  The 
consent of generation after generation to the principles of the common law was both prior-to and 
more forward-looking than the contemporaneous, but ephemeral, consent that legislative 
enactments represented.44
In 1809, in the midst of a debate over abolishing the common law in Pennsylvania, 
Joseph Hopkinson, a Pennsylvania lawyer and judge, published a pamphlet in its defense.  
Critics argued that the common law was too intricate for the average man to understand.  In 
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addition, because each state adopted different aspects of English common law, it was impossible 
for a person going from one state to another to know what laws were in effect.  Hopkinson 
responded that the common law was the “very essence of wisdom and experience” and that its 
basic principles were common to all states.45  A lawyer or a knowledgable layman who 
understood the common law in one state would be familiar with the same common law principles 
in another, because the common law was based on “common sense and common justice 
organized into a system.”46
Critics of the common law argued that its rules and principles were unwritten, making 
them less knowable and determinate than codes and statutes.  Hopkins responded that only the 
origins of the common law were unwritten.  Official public records and the writings of men of 
“acknowledged authority” explained teachings of the common law in plain terms.47  In contrast, 
a citizen reading a statute would have to understand exactly what the drafters of the statute meant 
when they wrote it and be able to anticipate how a court might interpret the language.  The 
indeterminacy of language would introduce a host of uncertainties into a newly drafted code.  
Those uncertainties would only dissipate only after several courts applied the language to 
specific cases, which is essentially what the common law is and does.
Finally, critics of the common law argued that constitutions and codes had already 
superseded the most important parts of the common law.  Each state could easily reduce 
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whatever was left to a code and then be done with the common law.  Hopkins countered that the 
common law contained not only substantive legal rules, but principles for construing and 
applying the law to particular cases.  The substance and the procedure intertwined to make a 
cohesive and relatively predictable whole.  No statute could possibly anticipate all possible 
contingencies, so it would be necessary to constantly update and add to the statute law “until it 
filled unwieldy and incomprehensible volumes.”48  The advocates of the common law ultimately 
prevailed and continued to ward off similar assaults throughout the nineteenth century.49
The relationship of the federal government to the common law was much more difficult 
to resolve because it contained all the issues that the states decided in favor of the common law, 
but also the problem of the dual sovereignty created by the American federal system.  The most 
famous and most vocal opponent of the development of federal common law, Thomas Jefferson, 
argued that if the federal government exercised common law authority through its courts, that 
authority would swallow up the states.
Morton Horowitz, in his classic study of American legal development, argued that federal 
common law did not actually present the danger Jefferson and his adherents proclaimed, because 
federal common law jurisdiction was limited to the subject matters over which the Constitution 
permitted the federal government to act.50  But the Supremacy Clause created an unprecedented 
legal hierarchy where it declared that the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties were the 
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enumerated subjects, but where it acted, it prevailed over state law.  Americans praised the 
common law for its ability to fill in gaps state positive law left open.  However, the same ability 
exercised by a federal court interpreting federal law bound each of the states through the 
Supremacy Clause.  If federal courts had the kind of plenary common law jurisdiction state 
courts had, opponents feared the gaps the federal common law filled would soon overtake the 
positive law it was purportedly supplementing, thus threatening the sovereignty of the states.
An important hallmark of sovereignty is the ability of the sovereign to keep peace and 
good order within its sovereign boundaries.  Crimes are breaches of that peace, so it is no 
surprise that the issue of whether federal common law should exist first arose in a case involving 
federal crimes.  In 1798, Federalist Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, in his majority opinion 
in U.S. v. Worrall, held that the Pennsylvania federal district court could not prosecute a 
defendant for attempting to bribe a federal official because Congress had not acted to make it a 
federal offense.52  Chase rejected the argument that federal sovereignty implicitly included the 
common law authority to prosecute crimes committed against it where no federal law existed to 
create a federal crime.  The controversy over the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 demonstrated 
how easily the peace and dignity of the sovereign could be confused with the peace and dignity 
of the political faction in power.  As a result, Americans quite quickly settled the issue that there 
would be no expansive federal common law authority to prosecute crimes.53
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At the same time, federal courts operated within the context of a deeply embedded 
common law legal culture.  Even when exercising their express authority under the U.S. 
Constitution and federal law, federal courts used the common law procedure, the common law 
rules of construction, and the common law rules of evidence of the state in which the federal 
court physically sat.  In diversity cases, the Judiciary Act of 1789 required federal courts to apply 
the substantive law as well as the rules of procedure and evidence belonging to the state in which 
the case arose.  Simply put, there was no federal jurisprudence independent of the common law.  
At the same time, it was not clear how much federal courts could or should resort to the common 
law to develop a federal jurisprudence. 
In 1824, the American legal theorist, Peter S. DuPonceau delivered an address on the 
“nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the United States.”54  In it he explained that there were 
two aspects to the question of whether there was or should be federal common law.  The first 
question was whether federal courts could assert common law jurisdiction where no other source 
of jurisdiction existed, for example in the case of common law crimes for which there was no 
specific federal statute.  The second was whether the common law provided the rules of decision 
in cases where the federal court had jurisdiction originating from some constitutional source, i.e., 
the Constitution or a federal statute.  According to DuPonceau, federal courts could not use the 
common law to claim the power to hear a case.  However, where federal law or the Constitution 
expressly provided for federal jurisdiction, federal courts were perfectly free to consult common 
law principles in deciding cases.  In that sense, according to DuPonceau, there was a national 
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common law.  This arrangement allowed federal courts some room to develop a separate 
jurisprudence from state courts.  However, federal jurisprudence retained the common law as its 
native language.
What did it mean that both state and federal courts operated in a common law context?  
First, it meant that state courts had jurisdiction to hear the vast majority of cases involving the 
rights of individuals in the new United States, whether those rights involved state or federal law.  
Second, even where a case turned on the interpretation of a federal statute or constitutional 
provision, common law principles and practices provided the rules of decision for both state and 
federal courts to determine their meaning and application.  Thirdly, Americans conceptualized 
individual rights in the way the common law defined and regulated them.  Common law rights 
were not static.  They changed and developed as social and economic circumstances changed and 
developed.  However, such change came incrementally.  In the meantime, the existing 
conceptualizations and legal categorizations of the common law shaped and, in many ways, 
limited Americans’ ability to imagine any other way to make legal (as opposed to political) rights 
claims.  Common law pleading rules required parties to describe their claims and defenses so as 
to fit within an existing common law legal category.  Whatever the nuances of the lived 
experience of the parties to a case, their pleadings had to describe that experience in terms that fit 
the contours of a pre-existing common law writ or cause of action.55
For example, a cause of action for breach of contract required a plaintiff to plead three 
elements: the existence of an enforceable agreement; actions that constituted a breach of that 
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agreement, and damage caused by that breach.  While this may seem simple, it was not.  The 
common law described a wide variety of agreements - executory contracts, illusory contracts, 
contracts that were actually gifts - that were not really contracts at all. A plaintiff had to describe 
the facts in a way that ensured he was describing an enforceable contract.  Similarly with 
damages and causation.  The law drew a logically arbitrary line between causes that were close 
enough and meaningful enough to assign liability to the perpetrator of that causal action, and 
causes that, from a public policy perspective, were too remote from the resulting damage to 
impose liability on the perpetrator.  It was not enough for a party to tell his story to the court, 
even a local court.  Parties had to shape the facts of their lived experience to fit the legal 
categories that existed in the common law.  Common law was so deeply embedded in the general 
culture that the problem was not the difficulty in characterizing events in terms of legal 
categories.  Rather, the problem was the difficultly in thinking outside them.
Nevertheless, for the majority of Americans, common law governance, which allowed for 
local articulation of general principles of governance, produced the greatest liberty within the 
confines of society and culture as it then existed.  The idea that trial by jury was a fundamental 
right arose out of this definition of freedom.  A person should be judged by his peers in his 
community, because local knowledge applied to local norms will yield the greatest justice.  A 
remote authority applying a one-size-fits-all form of justice produced oppression.
Authority within common law governance was diffuse, local, and intricately textured.  In 
the early nineteenth century the institutions of common law governance were not hierarchical.  
Lower courts were not bound to follow the precedent set by higher courts.  Common law 
decision-making required only that a court use the better-reasoned decisions of respected judicial 
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officials or authoritative legal compilers as a guide.  Some areas of law were so thoroughly 
mulled that the rules were exceedingly clear.   With respect to such subjects, a court was bound 
by logic and reason to follow them.  But, regarding subject matters undergoing rapid social 
change, courts could search through legal materials to see how other jurisdictions approached the 
problem.  A court was then free to apply the best-reasoned and most apt approach to the new 
circumstances as those new circumstances manifested themselves locally.56  That is not to say 
that the lower courts did not have to follow the decisions of appellate courts in a particular case.  
In other words, if the Supreme Court of North Carolina ordered a Superior Court to hold a new 
trial in a particular case, the Superior Court would have to hold the new trial.  But if a lower 
court believed the reasoning of the Supreme Court was faulty, the lower court could simply 
ignore it in future cases that raised the same issue.
DuPonceau’s description of the federal government’s relationship to the common law was 
accurate in the abstract.  In practice, however, the dual sovereignty the Constitution established 
created a tug-of-war between the federal government and the states in the areas where their 
respective powers overlapped.  The federal government could expand its reach through the 
powers implied to it by the Necessary and Proper clause of the Constitution, and could trump a 
state’s assertion of authority through the Supremacy Clause.  States expanded their sovereign 
reach under their common law police power and asserted their reserved powers under the Tenth 
Amendment against federal overreach.  While both state and federal legal systems existed in a 
common law context, because of the nature of federal sovereignty, rights located in the 
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Constitution acquired a different texture than rights whose source was chiefly the common law.  
Rights whose origins may have come from the common law, but that came to be enforced as 
constitutional requirements, tended to operate as trumps over other overlapping or competing 
rights claims.  In addition, they tended to ossify once they acquired constitutional status.57
Cases involving the rights of individuals most frequently came before a federal court in 
one of three ways.  The first was when a person committed a federal crime.  In the antebellum 
period, federal crimes were limited to those things included in the Crimes Act of 1790.  The 
Crimes Act included piracy and other crimes on the high seas, treason, murder, manslaughter or 
mayhem committed on federal grounds, and falsifying or counterfeiting federal documents.  The 
vast majority of common law crimes did not fall under this statute.58
The second way cases came to federal court was through diversity jurisdiction. Diversity 
jurisdiction protected the citizen of one state who sued the citizen of another state from the 
potential prejudice he might experience if he sued in his opponent’s home state.  Diversity 
jurisdiction allowed a party to raise essentially any common law or federal claim that he could 
bring in state court, so long as the claim met the $500 minimum amount in controversy.  The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 required federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the common law of the 
state in which the federal court was physically situated.
The 1842 U.S. Supreme Court case Swift v. Tyson, which came to the Court under 
diversity jurisdiction, demonstrates how the common law operated in the antebellum federal 
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system.59   In that case, a man named Tyson bought land from two men, Norton and Keith.  
Tyson signed a bill of endorsement - a kind of promise to pay in the future - to Norton and Keith.  
Commercial paper like this served as a kind of currency in the antebellum economy.  Swift, who 
had no connection to the original transaction or to Tyson, Norton or Keith, accepted the bill of 
endorsement in satisfaction of a debt, that also had no connection to the original transaction.
On the due date, Swift presented the bill of exchange to Tyson.  In the meantime, Tyson 
discovered that Keith and Norton had defrauded him in the original transaction (they sold him 
land they did not own).  There was no question that if either Keith or Norton had presented the 
bill to Tyson, he would not have been obligated to pay it because of their fraud.  But Swift had 
no part in the transaction and was completely innocent of any wrongdoing.  In fact, he had no 
way of knowing there had been any wrongdoing in the original transaction.  In legal terms he 
was a holder in due course.  The question was if Swift could recover payment fromTyson on his 
bill of endorsement.60
In the nineteenth century commercial paper made commercial transactions of all kinds 
much quicker and more easily accomplished.  Rather than conducting commercial transactions in 
gold or silver, businesspeople could accept the promise to pay evidenced by a bill or other form 
of commercial paper.  If the original issuer could avoid paying all or part of the debt reflected in 
the commercial paper to an innocent holder because someone in the chain of custody had 
committed a wrongful act, the commercial paper would be worthless to anyone outside the 
original transaction.  In other words it could not be used like currency.  This was a threat not only 
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to the smooth conduct of future commercial activity, but would cast doubt on any commercial 
paper in circulation at the time of the decision in Swift v. Tyson.61
The case came to the Supreme Court because Swift was a resident of Maine and Tyson a 
resident of New York, giving the federal Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York 
diversity jurisdiction to hear the case.  The judges of the Circuit Court divided over a point of 
law and certified the issue to the Supreme Court.  The issue was whether or not Tyson was 
entitled to assert the fraud defense he would have had against Norton and Keith against the 
innocent Swift.
Justice Joseph Story issued the Court’s ruling.  Story was one of America’s most highly 
regarded and influential legal thinkers. He was keenly interested in the smooth operation of 
commerce in and among the several states.  He was also a tireless advocate of a nationalistic 
federal common law.62  To Justice Story, there simply was no question that an innocent holder of 
a negotiable instrument could collect on the underlying debt no matter whether the original 
debtor could have legally refused to pay the original creditor.  Story asserted that “[t]his was so 
well established, and so essential to the security of negotiable paper, that it is laid up among the 
fundamentals of the law, and requires no authority or reasoning to be now brought in its 
support.”63
The problem was New York court decisions were not at all clear about whether New York 
law recognized this “well-established” principle that needed no authority to support it.  In fact, 
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some lower level decisions directly contradicted this principle.  The question, according to Story, 
was what was the nature of the “local law” federal courts were required to follow?  The answer, 
according to Story, was that “local law” meant statutes and regulations particular to the locality 
as interpreted by local courts, and decisions dealing with real estate or other immoveable matters 
local to the state.  The “general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence” were not 
subject to the vagaries of local particularities.  Thus, federal courts deciding commercial matters 
could apply a federal commercial common law.64
Story emphasized that the smooth operation of commerce required this type of negotiable 
instrument to be payable to a holder in due course.  In support of what he claimed federal 
common law to be he referred to cases decided by the English promoter of the merchant class, 
Lord Mansfield, along with other English jurists and legal writers before turning to decisions in 
American courts.  He pointed out that both Connecticut and Massachusetts specifically endorsed 
the right of a holder in due course to collect on a negotiable instrument.  He also cited the 
absence of any cases in other states as evidence that such transactions were so common and 
accepted that they did not give rise to litigation.65
  In Swift v. Tyson, Story engaged in a process of decision-making that closely resembled 
how a state court might make the same decision.  He followed precedent, but in a selective 
manner.  He consulted many sources, contrary New York decisions, the decisions of neighboring 
states, English decisions and even gave consideration to the meaning of the lack of litigation on 
the issue in other states.  Story used the best principles articulated by other common law thinkers 
to decide the case before him.  Swift v. Tyson allowed the Supreme Court to operate in diversity 
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cases on the same footing as the highest courts in the various states. The Supreme Court, just like 
the highest court of a state, could canvass the common law for the best principles and apply the 
best-reasoned and most apt.
The second way a case involving individual rights might come before a federal court was 
on appeal from a decision of a state's highest court to the Supreme Court, but only in cases that 
raised issues of federal law.  Though these cases might involve the rights of individuals they 
were usually resolved in terms of sovereignty.  In other words, by the time the matter reached the 
Supreme Court, the question would not be the extent of the right at issue, but rather which 
sovereign entity had the power to make that determination -- the federal or state government.  
These cases pitted federal enumerated powers against the states’ common law police powers.  
The Supreme Court has the last word on cases that come to it on appeal from the highest 
court of a state.  But having the last word should not be confused with the concept of judicial 
supremacy.  Judicial supremacy suggests that the Supreme Court is the ultimate authoritative 
interpreter of the U.S. Constitution and federal law, and is a convention the Supreme Court 
acquired for itself in the mid-twentieth century.  The Supreme Court of the nineteenth century 
had no such authority.  The U.S. Supreme Court made the final decision in a particular case, but 
state courts and legislatures, as well as the President of the United States and the U.S. Congress 
frequently asserted their own authority as interpreters of the Constitution.66  In the tug-of-war 
between federal enumerated powers and state reserved police powers, the U.S. Supreme Court 
generally showed little reluctance to acknowledge the authority of state police power, especially 
as it related to the status and rights of individuals.
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In New York v. Miln, the Supreme Court described state police power over the status and 
rights of individuals in the broadest terms:
That a state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and 
things within its territorial limits as any foreign nation where that jurisdiction is not 
surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, 
it is not only the right but the bounden and solemn duty of a state to advance the safety, 
happiness, and prosperity of its people and to provide for its general welfare by any and 
every act of legislation which it may deem to be conducive to these ends where the power 
over the particular subject or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained in 
the manner just stated. That all those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, 
or what may perhaps more properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or 
restrained, and that consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, 
unqualified, and exclusive.67
 In Miln, New York City required all ships entering its ports to provide a list of 
passengers and specific information about each of them.  The purpose of the requirement was to 
prevent poor and contagious people from entering the city and becoming a burden on its 
resources.  The captain of a ship, the Emily, refused to provide the required information and the 
Corporation of the City of New York fined him.  The city later sued the consignee of the ship in a 
New York City court in a debt action on the unpaid fine.  The defendant removed the case to 
federal court, which he was able to do because he was a foreign national.  The New York circuit 
court divided over the case and certified it to the U.S. Supreme Court.68
The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the federal commerce clause, an 
enumerated power, preempted New York’s regulatory authority over its ports.  The court decided 
that New York was not engaged in regulating commerce in this instance.  It was simply 
exercising its pre-constitutional sovereign authority to govern its own borders.  This exercise of 
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authority fell squarely within the state’s police power to regulate for the health and safety of its 
people.
The Supreme Court showed an equal willingness to defer to state court authority in the 
1833 case Barron v. Baltimore.  In that case a corporation owned by a man named Barron had 
been operating a wharf in Baltimore, Maryland.  The city of Baltimore, in the process of paving 
its streets and performing other infrastructure improvements, diverted some of the water courses 
in the city’s harbor.   The changes in the water courses made Barron’s wharf unusable.  He sued 
the city in state court for depriving him of his property without due process of law.  Barron lost at 
Maryland’s highest appellate court and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  At the Supreme 
Court, Barron argued that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution should apply to actions taken by states against its citizens as well as to actions taken 
by the federal government.69
  The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, and by implication the entire Bill of Rights, was solely a “limitation on the 
exercise of federal power” and not a positive grant of regulatory authority that could reach into 
the states to protect individuals.  Each of the states had its own bill of rights for the protection of 
its citizens, and that is where a citizen of a state had to look for redress.  The Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the case did not raise a federal question.
In Miln and Barron v. Baltimore, the Supreme Court deferred to the authority of states, so 
the full potential effect of the Supremacy Clause was not evident.  While Swift v. Tyson overrode 
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state authority by creating and applying a federal common law of commercial transactions, 
unless parties to such transactions lived in diverse states, state courts would decide cases arising 
out of them.
The Supreme Court’s deference to state authority did not extend to controversies over 
fugitive slaves.  Although the Supreme Court still turned to the common law in deciding these 
cases, the operation of the supremacy clause changed the situation-specific, relational, rights 
embedded in the common law into something quite different.
Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from 
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such 
Service or Labour may be due.70
  Article IV describes the states’ relationships to each other, the admission of new states to 
the Union and guarantees the existence of a republican government in each state.  Article IV does 
not appear from its structure and location in the text of the Constitution to be a source of 
enumerated federal power.  It made sense that the Fugitive Slave Clause appeared in Article IV 
of the Constitution because even before the Constitution existed states managed the problem of 
fugitives, whether from justice or slavery, through the process of extradition, as a matter of 
comity among themselves.
After northern states began to abolish slavery, southerners wanted reassurance that their 
slaves would not become free upon reaching a jurisdiction that outlawed slavery.  The Fugitive 
Slave Clause purported to solve that problem by declaring it to be national law that slaves would 
not become free if they escaped to free states.  That language could have been limited to 
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confirming the pre-1787 practice of extradition, but in 1788 Pennsylvania and Maryland clashed 
over Pennsylvania’s request that Maryland extradite three fugitives from justice whom a 
Pennsylvania court had indicted for kidnapping free blacks.  Maryland refused.  The two states 
appealed to President George Washington, who turned to Congress.  In response, Congress 
enacted the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.  Though it was in no way clear that the act fell within the 
enumerated powers of Congress, its passage was uncontroversial at the time.71
Free blacks in the North faced a constant threat of being kidnapped and sold into slavery 
in the south.  The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 increased that threat.  The Act required that a slave 
catcher obtain a certificate of removal to transport an alleged runaway slave from a free state to a 
slave state.  Any justice of the peace or city official could issue such a certificate.  The law, 
however, provided no procedural protections for the alleged fugitive to demonstrate that he or 
she was free.  Thus, it was rather easy for a slave catcher to find an obscure local official to 
collude in kidnapping free blacks.  In the 1820’s free states began enacting personal liberty laws 
that erected procedural protections to individuals accused of being fugitives.  These states 
intended to prevent kidnapping, but they also necessarily provided procedural protection to 
people who were, in fact, fugitives. 72
Personal liberty laws were a quintessential exercise of state police power.  They sought to 
prevent the commission of a common law crime - kidnapping.  They did so by giving a local 
resident the opportunity to establish his or her status as a free person.  The most common way to 
prove one’s free status was by one’s reputation in the community for being free.  Indeed, a 
manumitted slave might have court orders proving his freedom, but someone born free might 
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have no way prove it except to demonstrate his free status by his own reputation and personal 
history or the personal history of his parents.  Local courts relying on local knowledge were 
uniquely suited to hear and evaluate evidence of personal status in no small part because the 
local community constituted the personal status of its members.
Pennsylvania had an especially difficult time protecting its free black citizens from 
kidnapping.  The state shared its borders with three slave states.  Increased cotton production in 
the south increased the demand for slave labor at the same time that the 1808 national ban on 
slave importation eliminated an important source of supply.  In 1820, Pennsylvania passed “An 
Act to Prevent Kidnapping” which increased the penalty for kidnapping free blacks.  It also 
placed authority to issue certificates of removal in the hands of state judges and removed it from 
justices of the peace and town alderman.  This made it somewhat more difficult for slave 
catchers to obtain certificates of removal.  But under the common law no rights were absolute.  
Pennsylvania did not deny the right of slave owners to reclaim their slaves.  Rather, the state first 
reasonably offered people accused of being fugitives, the opportunity to prove his or her free 
status.73
In response to Maryland’s complaints, Pennsylvania changed its law in 1826 to expand 
the cohort of state officials who could issue certificates of removal, but required claimants or 
their agents to provide more than just their own assertion that the person to be seized was a slave. 
The 1826 revision also gave the person accused of being a runaway time to gather evidence to 
prove that he or she was either not the person claimed or was free. 
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In 1837, Edward Prigg and two others came to the Pennsylvania home of Margaret 
Morgan in the middle of the night while her husband was away and forced her and her six 
children to travel to Maryland.  Prigg had been unsuccessful in acquiring a certificate of removal 
for Margaret Morgan and her children, so he took matters into his own hands.  Pennsylvania 
indicted Prigg and the two others and requested Maryland to extradite them for trial.  Maryland 
refused.  Instead the governor sent a representative to Pennsylvania to negotiate the return of the 
three indicted kidnappers.  The two states reached an impasse, but agreed to present the conflict 
to the U.S. Supreme Court for resolution.74
Margaret Morgan was at least arguably free.  She had been a slave to a Maryland resident 
named Ashmore, who had permitted her to live as a free person nearly her entire life.  Margaret 
married a free black Pennsylvanian named Jerry Morgan and moved to the state with him about 
five years before Prigg came to retrieve her.  So long as Ashmore lived, he never claimed 
Margaret as his slave.  After he died, however, his niece sought to claim Margaret as her 
inherited property.
Most free northern states followed the English common law rule that one’s physical 
presence in free territory conferred free status on a person formerly held as a slave.  However, as 
a matter of comity, free states in America acknowledged an exception to this rule, allowing slave 
owners to “sojourn” with their slaves without risking their emancipation.75  Margaret’s long 
residence in a free state with the consent of her putative owner took her out of the category of 
“sojourner” and in all likelihood would have resulted in Pennsylvania finding her to be free.  But 
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whatever a court might have ruled with respect to Margaret’s status, Jerry and Margaret had six 
children together, at least one of whom was born in Pennsylvania.  Any of her children born in 
Pennsylvania were inarguably free.
Margaret Morgan’s fate is lost to history, but we do know that she and her children were 
never reunited with their husband and father.  In all likelihood they lived out the rest of their 
lives enslaved.  Pennsylvania law, which sought to avoid these tragic consequences would seem 
to balance the equities quite reasonably.  The risk to Ashmore’s heir was that she would have to 
wait for her inheritance of slave property, if she were due such property.  This, weighed against 
the utter destruction of the Morgan family and at least one free child being sold into slavery, 
would not seem to have made for a difficult case.76
Prigg’s fate, on the other hand, is part of Supreme Court history.  Justice Story used the 
case as an opportunity to promote his preference for strong national power and a federal common 
law.  In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Story essentially argued that the Fugitive Slave Clause 
constitutionalized the common law of recaption.  Recaption allowed the owner of property that 
was capable of wandering the right to self-help to reclaim the property so long as it could be 
done without breaching the peace.77  Story could have decided the case leaving the state 
procedural protections in place.  Instead, he wielded the Supremacy Clause and declared the 
subject matter of fugitive slaves to be within the sole authority of the federal government.  The 
decision in Prigg attempted to convert the common law right of recaption into an absolute, 
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individual, constitutional right that trumped other rights claims, even the fundamental right to 
freedom.  Northern states continued to resist what they considered unwarranted federal 
encroachments over state sovereign authority to regulate and protect the individuals within their 
borders.  Wisconsin and the Supreme Court held a stand-off over the state’s authority to release a 
federal prisoner, Sherman Booth, who had been accused of unlawfully freeing a runaway slave in 
violation of the Fugitive Slave Clause of 1850.  Only the Civil War and emancipation resolved 
the conflict.78
Slavery was a constitutional impossibility.  The Constitution protected both the liberty 
and property of persons.  But it also indirectly acknowledged that persons could be property.  No 
portion of the text of the document indicates which value - liberty of person or liberty of property  
- prevailed when they conflicted.  Nowhere was the conflict between liberty of persons and 
liberty of property more stark than in federal territories.
The Constitution limited federal sovereignty and jurisdiction where it overlapped with the 
states.79  In federal territories, however, the federal government was the only sovereign.  In the 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the U.S. Congress banned slavery in federal territory known as 
the Northwest Territory, without controversy.  Equally uncontroversial was Congress’s 1790 
Ordinance permitting slavery in the American Southwest.  Throughout the antebellum period, 
Americans tried to solve the unsolvable problem of slavery in the territories through one tenuous 
political compromise after another.  The Supreme Court attempted to accomplish through law 
what the American political system could not.  In Dred Scott v. Sanford Chief Justice Roger 
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Taney, writing in what was generally deemed the majority opinion, first declared that blacks had 
no rights white men were bound to respect; meaning there was no conflict between liberty of 
persons and liberty of property at issue in the federal territories.  Secondly, Taney declared that 
federal sovereign authority was no more expansive in federal territory than it was where states 
existed; meaning that the federal government had no power to abolish slavery in the territories.  
The Supreme Court’s efforts to end the controversy arguably had the opposite effect, driving the 
nation closer to Civil War.80
The constitutional revolution that followed the Civil War fundamentally changed the 
balance of federalism by creating a national citizenship where previously there had only been 
state citizenship and by attaching federal protection to the rights of citizenship.  Despite the 
change in fundamental law, however, the institutions that would iterate the precise meaning of 
the change remained embedded in a common law context.  As William Novak has argued:
In many ways, the postwar amendments only started an elaborate and still ongoing 
process of drawing constitutional lines, determining which rights in particluar were rights 
of citizens of the United States guaranteed by the national government and which were 
still susceptible to local, state, and associtional regulation and discrimination.81
 The Civil War ended in the spring of 1865.  Though the United States did not ratify the 
Thirteenth Amendment until December of that year and did not ratify the Fourteenth Amendment 
until the summer of 1868, it was clear that slavery had been defeated along with the 
Confederacy.  In the meantime, southerners and the Union military that provided temporary 
governance in the former confederate states began the contest to define freedom in terms of their 
shared common law culture. 
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Chapter Two
The Union Army and the Common Law
The Civil War reversed the balance of federalism with respect to the protection and 
regulation of individual rights. Federally mandated, uncompensated emancipation injected the 
national government into the lives of individual Americans in an unprecedented way.  The 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments extended and further defined the new role the 
federal government assumed over the status and rights of individuals.1  But as with the War of 
Independence, Americans overthrew their political system without necessarily overthrowing their 
existing legal culture.  During the earliest years of Reconstruction, the Union army administered 
justice in parts of the former Confederacy, including all of North Carolina.  Without specific 
orders or positive law to define freedom, Union army officers charged with administering justice 
in the state looked to the common law for direction.
The Union army operated its own system of judicial administration in areas of the 
Confederacy it occupied during the war.  The army had direct jurisdiction over its soldiers and 
employees, of course.   However, it also had jurisdiction over civilians in occupied areas.  The 
Union army’s jurisdiction over civilians arose out of the common law of nations, to which both 
the Confederacy and Union adhered.
At President Lincoln’s request, Francis Lieber, an important nineteenth century legal 
scholar and public figure, drafted a code for military justice, which Lincoln issued as General 
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Orders No. 100 on April 24, 1863.2  Lieber canvassed the international common law of war for 
what he considered its most advanced and humane principles.  The first thirty articles of Lieber’s 
code describe martial law and military jurisdiction.  According to Article VI of the code, martial 
law and jurisdiction existed by virtue of military occupation or conquest.  However, martial law 
did not mean military oppression.  In the conduct of Lieber’s humane war, the law of war 
required an occupying army to apply local law to civilian matters to the extent it was consistent 
with military objectives.3
The Union army occupied parts of North Carolina’s eastern seaboard as early as 1862.  In 
North Carolina, Union army commanders assigned provost officers to make arrests, conduct 
investigations, and enforce local laws.  The provost officers also functioned as a supervisory 
police force supplementing the efforts of local law enforcement officers.  Provost courts tried 
less serious cases involving civilians and even performed mundane legal tasks such as recording 
the transfer of property.4  They functioned much like sheriffs, constables and other county 
officers who served under civilian North Carolina justices of the peace. The wartime 
administration of justice served as the model for the immediate post war period.5
Near the end of March, 1865, the armies of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston and 
Union General William T. Sherman fought the last major battle of the Civil War at Bentonville, 
North Carolina.  On April 26, Sherman’s men marched into the state capitol of Raleigh where 
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General Johnston surrendered his army.  The Civil War in North Carolina was over, and the 
process of Reconstruction began.6
North Carolina’s economy and civil institutions lay in ruins at the end of the Civil War.  
A significant number of North Carolinians had remained loyal to the Union, which created an 
internal civil war between Confederates and Union loyalists.  Their enmity persisted long after 
official hostilities ceased and continued to wreak havoc throughout the state.  More North 
Carolinians served the Confederacy than any other state, and they suffered more deaths from 
battle and disease than any other state.  Soldiers from both the Confederate and Union armies 
provisioned themselves by foraging among the civilian population both during and after the end 
of the war.7  They so thoroughly stripped the state of tools, stock animals, and agricultural 
products that economic recovery was to be long and difficult.8  After Johnston’s surrender, state 
and local officials left their offices and waited for instructions from the Union army or federal 
officials.9
General Sherman placed General John M. Schofield, who had been the head of the 
Department of North Carolina during the war, in command of the state.  President Lincoln had 
been assassinated just two weeks before Schofield assumed command.  Lincoln’s death threw 
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open the question of how the former confederate states would be reconstructed and readmitted to 
the Union.10  In April 1865, federal officials in Washington were preoccupied with apprehending 
and trying Lincoln’s assassins and had not given any instructions to department commanders 
regarding reconstruction.  Schofield held his command for only one month, but he met the 
enormous challenge of restoring order with great energy.11    
Schofield had very clear ideas about how reconstruction should proceed.  He believed 
that the federal government should leave the internal affairs of the states, including determining 
the status of the newly freed slaves, to the states.  To do otherwise, would require a large military  
presence for an indefinite term, which he believed the North would not support.  He further 
believed the President should appoint a military governor to oversee the transition to civilian 
government, and he hoped to be that official.12
In the absence of specific orders, Schofield was able to act with remarkable autonomy 
implementing his ideas for reconstruction in North Carolina.  Schofield issued his first set of 
orders on April 27, 1865 placing the entire state under martial law.  He next declared that the war 
was over and slavery no longer existed.13   He organized a civilian police system in each county, 
requiring members of the county police to swear a loyalty oath to the United States.  He 
furnished them with captured arms and ammunition, but they remained under military 
supervision.  The civilian police could make arrests, but had to bring the individuals to the 
nearest military post for trial by military commission. Schofield permitted justices of the peace 
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of known Union sympathies to maintain their offices and perform some of their antebellum 
functions, but only after they swore their allegiance to the Union.14
Until civilian government was restored, however, the Union army retained responsibility 
for maintaining the social order of the state, including the administration of justice.  The Union 
army’s command structure grouped states into varying command and military units throughout 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, but at all times respected each of the states’ geographic 
boundaries and political integrity.  Because the geographic and political boundaries stood, so did 
the legal system of each state.  The army could and did follow North Carolina’s system of 
judicial organization in its own administration of justice both during and after the war.
On May 29, 1865, a month after Schofield assumed command of the Department of 
North Carolina, President Johnson issued two proclamations setting forth his plan for 
Reconstruction.15  Johnson believed that North Carolina would be an easy case for 
reconstruction, in part because of its history of pro-Unionism, and in part because its civilian 
leaders had expressed their eagerness to do what was necessary to rejoin the Union.  Thus 
Johnson addressed his second proclamation specifically to North Carolina with the expectation it 
would be a model for the remaining unreconstructed former confederate states.16
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Johnson’s North Carolina proclamation appointed William W. Holden provisional 
governor of the state and directed him to develop a plan for holding a convention to amend North 
Carolina’s constitution so as “to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the Federal 
Government and to present such a republican form of State government as will entitle the State 
to the guaranty of the United States therefor and its people to protection by the United States 
against invasion, insurrection, and domestic violence.”17  Johnson’s proclamation left the details 
of reconstruction almost entirely to the white men of North Carolina.
 Schofield, disappointed that Johnson had appointed a civilian military governor, asked for 
a transfer of command.  Meanwhile, Holden was eager to reconstruct the state as quickly as 
possible.  He appointed civil officers at a furious pace beginning in June 1865.  Schofield was 
not particularly concerned with the fate of the freedmen or how the courts of North Carolina 
would treat them.  In his remaining weeks in North Carolina he supported Holden’s appointment 
efforts and assured the Governor that once the state’s judicial offices had been filled, he would 
turn over all civil cases to state courts.18
 As Schofield prepared to transfer out of North Carolina in late June, Eliphalet Whittlesey 
arrived in North Carolina to serve as the Assistant Commander for the Bureau of Freedmen 
Refugees and Abandoned Lands, known more commonly as the Freedmen’s Bureau.  Congress 
created the Freedmen’s Bureau in March 1865, as a department within the Union army.  
Whittlesey was an army officer who had been a college professor before the war.  He had served 
under the Freedman’s Bureau Commissioner Oliver O. Howard before he came to North 
63
17 Johnson’s Proclamation reprinted in Walter L. Fleming, ed., Documentary History of Reconstruction: Political, 
Military, Social, Religious, Educational & Industrial 1865 to the Present Time (1906; repr., Whitefish, Montana: 
Kessinger Publishing 2006), 1:171-173.
18 St. Clair, 31.
Carolina.  Upon his arrival he announced that the Bureau would have four responsibilities: aiding 
the destitute of both races, assisting freedmen in obtaining employment, encouraging education 
and protecting freedmen from injustice.19
 The Freedmen’s Bureau assisted the regular army in the administration of justice.  The 
Bureau had jurisdiction over petty crimes and minor civil disputes.  Though the Bureau’s legal 
jurisdiction was limited, it served a crucial role in resolving disputes over labor arrangements 
and perceived assaults on the social order before they escalated into violence.  While Bureau 
agents could arrest civilians accused of more serious crimes, they did not have jurisdiction to try 
them.  That responsibility belonged to the military commissions of the regular army.20  
 General Thomas Ruger replaced Schofield on June 25, 1865, at about the same time 
Whittlesey arrived.  By that time, Holden had reconstituted most county governments and state 
courts had begun to hear cases, although martial law remained in effect.  Ruger was not as 
willing to turn jurisdiction over to civilian courts as Schofield had been.  Ruger was concerned 
over the level of white violence toward blacks and the unwillingness of state courts to investigate 
these crimes and bring the perpetrators to justice.  Their overlapping claims to jurisdiction 
eventually provoked a clash between Holden and Ruger over the administration of justice in the 
state.21 
 In late July 1865, Holden began asking Ruger to turn over several white men the army 
had arrested for violence against former slaves.  Holden pointed out to Ruger that the trials 
would be held in counties where civil law was in force and where competent judges would 
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preside over the cases.  Ruger refused, asserting his authority under martial law.  He reminded 
Holden military tribunals still had jurisdiction over all matters that involved the preservation of 
order, including the arrest and trial of those accused of violent crimes.  While the military was 
available to assist Holden and the state in maintaining order, Ruger did not have to wait for civil 
authorities to request assistance.  Ruger described for Holden several incidents in which blacks 
were mistreated by whites, yet civil authorities did nothing to investigate or punish the crimes.22
 Holden asked President Johnson to intervene on his behalf, but Johnson ignored him.  In 
September 1865, Ruger and Holden met to reach an understanding on their respective claims to 
jurisdiction.  Ruger pointed out that North Carolina would not allow blacks or other people of 
color to testify against whites in their courts.  Without that right, they could not expect justice.  
Until North Carolina began to admit black testimony on an equal basis with that of whites, the 
army would retain jurisdiction over all cases involving black persons.  Holden eventually agreed 
to those terms.  The North Carolina General Assembly stubbornly refused to admit black 
testimony until Congress enfranchised black men in the Reconstruction Act of 1867.23  As a 
result, military commissions retained jurisdiction over all cases involving black persons 
throughout 1865 and early 1866, even as the civilian courts began to hear cases involving white 
North Carolinians. 24
 Though some North Carolinians complained about the oppressive rule of military courts, 
many more accepted the necessity of the Union army administration of justice at least until the 
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state achieved social, political, and legal stability.  Although North Carolinians and Union army 
judicial officials did not always agree on which principles should apply and what outcome they 
should produce in any given case, the shared language of the common law allowed the Union 
army to administer justice that North Carolina civilians considered legitimate amidst the chaos 
that existed at the end of the Civil War.
 Military commissions were composed of about six officers who heard testimony as a 
panel.  One officer served as the judge advocate to prosecute the case.  Civilians frequently hired 
North Carolina lawyers to represent them before these commissions.  While there were important 
differences between military commissions and civilian trials – the most significant of which was 
the lack of a jury in the military commissions – the presentation of the law and evidence was 
roughly the same as in a civilian proceeding.
 The Union Army initiated cases against civilians by issuing special orders from the 
commanding general’s office.  The special orders called a military commission to sit and hear 
either a particular case or all cases brought before it during a specified time period, much like a 
session of a North Carolina county court.  The special orders contained a charge that stated the 
crime the defendant allegedly committed, and a specification that described the events 
supporting the charge.  The charge and specification functioned much like an indictment in a 
civilian court.  This shared understanding of legal rules and procedure not only allowed North 
Carolinians and Union officials to understand one another, it also enabled them to begin to 
reconstruct the state’s legal order in the absence of federal guidance.
States in both north and south shared the “common” aspect of the common law, so many 
of the general tenets of North Carolina law were already a part of the legal culture Union officers 
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carried with them to the state.  Where North Carolina law was distinct, the local lawyers who 
appeared before military tribunals diligently pointed out those distinctions.  Where possible, the 
Union Army enforced those distinctive aspects of North Carolina law.
The military commission specifications contained an array of common law descriptions 
of crimes such as larceny, embezzlement, burglary, assault, rape, murder.  Further, crimes were 
described as offenses against the peace and dignity of the state of both North Carolina and the 
United States.  The common law defines a crime as a breach of the peace and dignity of the 
sovereign.  Using this language suggests that the Union army sought to legitimate its judicial 
actions through associations with the common law at the same time that it derived the power to 
act through military authority.
The military commission trial transcripts are steeped in common law language and 
assumptions.  When either civilian lawyers or Union judge advocates cited specific sources of 
law, they almost invariably cited English or American casebooks or general common law 
treatises.  To be sure, North Carolina law contained both common law and statutes, but during 
the antebellum period statutory law did not predominate over common law the way it does today.  
Most statutes dealt with specific, frequently local, issues rather than providing universal 
principles or regulations for the entire state.25
Even where a North Carolina statute did exist, the common law provided a more familiar 
common language for both North Carolina lawyers and Union army officials.  Thus, in a case for 
embezzlement, the defendant’s attorney cited the North Carolina Revised Code provision for the 
elements of the crime.  The judge advocate referred to the common law instead, but said it didn’t 
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really matter which one he referred to because the North Carolina code provision merely 
reiterated common law principles.26
The military commissions also suggest that knowledge of the common law and legal 
procedure was diffuse among commissioners, North Carolina lawyers, and lay people alike.  
Witnesses as well as lawyers exhibited knowledge of common law terms and ideas.  For 
example, a woman testifying in her own rape case stated that “another boy” who “had a spite 
against her” “instigated” the defendant’s attack, “or in other words [he was] an accessory before 
the fact.”27  Lawyers, judge advocates and witnesses often referred to the law without citing any 
source for it, as though the terms of “the law” were generally known and its source and 
legitimacy understood.
One might expect to find that the Union army attempted to reconstruct North Carolina’s 
legal order by enforcing the individual rights of the newly free.  Although in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, emancipation was a fact not yet expressed in law, abolitionists and 
adherents to free labor ideology had been describing freedom in terms of abstract individual 
rights for decades.28  But the Union Army, like antebellum North Carolina state courts, sought to 
restore order rather than to enforce individual rights, although northern Union army personnel 
had a very different understanding of where free blacks fit within the new social order. Where 
social order is the goal, justice is not so much blind as detail-oriented.  Restoring local social 
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order required military commissions to examine the particular circumstances of each of the 
participants, which in turn, determined the kind of evidence the commission deemed relevant to 
deciding a case.29  The military commission case files demonstrate that local knowledge, 
especially character evidence, had a significance in resolving cases in the nineteenth century that 
has no contemporary parallel.  Nearly every trial in the military commission case files has at 
least one witness who testified to the character of the defendant or to the character of one of the 
prosecutions witnesses.  Many trials had far more character witnesses than fact witnesses.  The 
sheer volume of character evidence suggests that it had a significance then that it does not now.
As Laura Edwards has established, a person’s character or “credit” played an important 
role in antebellum legal proceedings.  A person’s character affected his or her credibility, of 
course.  But it also partly determined how much personal protection one could expect from the 
law.  A person legally proved his or her character through the testimony of his or her neighbors 
and acquaintances based on their long observation.  Character evidence did not just provide a 
court with general background information.  It was sufficiently important to the outcome of case 
that the North Carolina Supreme Court readily reversed decisions in cases where character 
evidence was either admitted or refused improperly.30
Generally, a party or witness could not introduce evidence of his good character unless 
his character was challenged.  However, there were many exceptions.  For example, any criminal 
defendant could introduce character evidence in support of his innocence.31  In a slander case, a 
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plaintiff could introduce evidence of his good general character even though the defendant 
offered no evidence challenging the plaintiff’s good character.32  Even where a party’s memory 
rather than character was challenged, the court allowed him to present witnesses to testify about 
his impeccable character for truth to rehabilitate himself before the jury.33  And in cases where a 
party’s character was challenged directly or by implication that party was assured the chance to 
offer evidence of his or her good character.34
Character was not simply about status, although that was certainly one aspect of 
character.  People of all statuses had a general character, which could be either “good” or “bad.”  
One could also have a character for truth, for being peaceable and law-abiding, for high temper 
or fussiness, for kindness to servants or faithfulness to masters.  Coming from a “good” or 
respectable family gave one “high” character.  One could even be too young (at age seventeen) to 
have formed a character.35
Witnesses didn’t always offer character evidence to prove positive character traits.    For 
example, an R. Baugus was charged in Lexington County with stealing a government mule in 
August of 1865.  He claimed he intended to buy the mule but became too drunk to remember 
whether he paid for it before he took it from the corral.  He offered the testimony of a childhood 
friend that he had a good general character, but was a “wild, reckless and dissipated young man” 
to support that he was drunk on the occasion in question.36
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Character evidence most strongly affected cases where intent was a central element.  For 
example, when one person kills another the killer’s intent determines what crime, if any, 
occurred.  Murder is an intentional killing without legal justification.  Manslaughter is a killing 
with some sort of mitigating circumstances that the law recognizes.  Justifiable homicide is a 
killing that the law completely excuses, for example in self-defense.  Likewise with attempted 
murder, versus assault with intent to do great bodily harm, versus simple assault.  All these 
crimes depend on the intent of the accused.  Military commissions heard an extraordinary 
amount of character evidence, especially in cases where intent mattered.  Character evidence 
provided the context and local knowledge necessary to the situated form of common law justice 
that both northerners and southerners understood.  The murder trial of Temperance Neely in July 
1865 provides an example.37
Providence Neely was a white widow who had run Davie County plantation on her own 
since her husband died in about 1842.  Her 28-year-old daughter, Temperance, lived with her on 
the plantation.  Temperance had a close relationship with a woman named Galina, who had been 
a slave on the plantation her entire life.  Galina had five living children including a 9-year-old 
daughter, Ellen. 
! The day Temperance shot and killed Galina, Ellen had been harvesting wheat in the field 
with the other hands.  They finished about four in the afternoon, after which Ellen came to the 
plantation house.  Providence repeatedly called for Ellen, but she did not answer.  Providence 
sent another child to retrieve Ellen.  When Ellen approached, Providence asked her why she had 
not answered and why she had not come directly to the house from the field.  Ellen grumbled and 
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Providence kicked her and threatened to withhold Ellen’s supper. She then ordered Ellen to 
“fetch” a bucket of water.   Ellen picked up a bucket and headed for the spring, but called back 
that she would have her supper and Providence wouldn’t stop her.  Providence promised to whip 
Ellen and Ellen replied “no you won’t whip me.”  While Ellen was gone, Providence left the 
house for the garden where she cut a switch from a peach tree and sat in a chair outside the house 
waiting for Ellen to return. 
Upon Ellen’s return, Providence began beating her with the switch.  Galina, who was 
outside heard the commotion and ran into the house.  Temperance, who was in the house, told 
Galina to stay out or she would shoot her.  Galina pushed Providence away from Ellen and took 
her outside.  Temperance fired a shot in the air as Galina was leaving with Ellen.  Providence 
followed Galina and Ellen out of the house and continued to try to whip Ellen’s legs.  In 
response, Galina wheeled around to face Providence.  Temperance ran between the two of them 
and shot Galina in the breast.  Galina died within a few minutes.
There was no question that Temperance shot Galina.  The only question was intent.  
Temperance’s attorneys cited an English common law treatise that the intent necessary for 
murder was a “heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief.”38  They introduced 
one relative and neighbor after another to testify to Temperance’s gentle, feminine nature to show 
that “there is no plausible ground for the charge of murder – as the criminal and malicious intent 
– that characterizes this heinous crime, never did and never can find a lodgement in a shrine so 
pure, and nothing but the strongest array of proof could establish so improbably a proposition as 
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that a lady such as the Prisoner is proven to be  - could be guilty of so awful and atrocious a 
crime of deliberate, malicious murder.”39
At the same time, the defense also tried to paint the only other eye witness to the events 
as having a bad character for truth even “among her own color.”  Sallie, a former slave who 
continued to work on Providence Neely’s plantation after she became free testified that Galina 
had not threatened Providence.   Temperance simply ran up to Galina and shot her.  The defense 
suggested that perhaps Sallie’s jealousy that Temperance held Galina in such favor “warp[ed] her 
and caused her to testify in the extraordinary manner she has done.”40
The defense used character evidence not only to establish Temperance’s subjective intent 
at the moment she fired the gun, but also to describe a context and a community of actors that 
made a finding of intent untenable, whatever the objective facts seemed to be.  The judge 
advocate simply argued that when one person kills another, malice is presumed unless there is 
some evidence of provocation.  In Temperance’s case there was none.  He attempted to 
rehabilitate Sallie’s character explaining that there was no support to the claim made by 
Temperance’s brother-in-law that Sallie’s reputation for truth was bad.  The commission found 
Temperance guilty of manslaughter, not murder, and imposed a sentence limited to a fine of 
$1000.  It is unclear how the commission reached its decision because the commissions did not 
issue written opinions.  However, Sallie offered eyewitness testimony of an intentional shooting 




guilty of the much less serious offense of manslaughter suggests character evidence was 
persuasive.41
Character evidence clearly affected the outcome in the murder case of Wesley Moore.  
On October 16, 1865 Willis P. Moore, a Robeson county planter, shot and killed a black man, 
Wesley Moore, on the defendant’s plantation.  The day of the murder, the defendant had hired a 
number of men to shuck his corn.  In the evening, they had all gone to dinner.  After dinner, the 
defendant left the kitchen and went outside.  He later claimed to have seen a man carrying a 
basket of corn toward the road.  He shot the man in the back claiming he did not know whether 
the victim was black or white.  The victim turned out to be one of the men he had employed to 
help shuck his corn.  Wesley Moore died the next day.
The facts were largely undisputed.  The defendant clearly killed a man.  The question was 
whether any aspect of the law excused that killing.  The defendant’s lawyer introduced a number 
of witnesses, both black and white, to testify about different aspects of Willis Moore’s character.  
One aspect was how he treated his slaves and his “servants” now that they were no longer his 
slaves.  Most of the testimony suggested that he fed and clothed them rather well.  One of his 
former slaves, Patrick Barnes, said that he had done more for the freedmen than anyone else.  
Other testimony suggested that Willis Moore’s character “as a citizen” was law-abiding.  The 
defendant made some effort to discredit Wesley Moore, but most witnesses said he was a good 
worker whose character had never been called into question.  Finally, the defendant offered 
testimony to show that there had been much lawlessness in the area since the end of the war, with 
robbers and murderers patrolling the highways.
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Defendant’s counsel argued in closing that the law (the “law” to defendant’s counsel 
consisted of the English treatises Hawkins Pleas of the Crown and Foster’s Reports, the laws of 
ancient Rome and Athens and “our constitutions”) excused a homicide committed to prevent a 
felony.  The judge advocate agreed that the law excused a homicide to prevent a felony, but the 
defendant’s belief that a felony was being committed could not be subjective.  It had to be 
reasonable.  Killing someone in the mistaken belief that they were committing a felony would be 
manslaughter.
To decide this case, the commission would have had to determine not only whether the 
defendant was truthful in testifying that he believed the victim was stealing his corn, but whether 
his honest belief was objectively reasonable.  This required the commission to determine the 
character of both killer and victim.  Wesley Moore was carrying a basket of corn toward the road. 
But does that mean it was reasonable to believe he was stealing it?  The case turned entirely on 
whether the commission believed the defendant was a law-abiding, peaceable man who treated 
blacks fairly, and who wouldn’t have shot a man without justification, and whether Wesley 
Moore was, in all likelihood, stealing the corn.  The only evidence that Wesley Moore was 
stealing the corn was that he was carrying it in the direction of the road.  The commission could 
not decide the case without making implicit assumptions about the victim’s propensity to steal.  
The commission decided in favor of Willis Moore and found him without criminal responsibility.
The importance of restoring order and the significance of character evidence in 
nineteenth century litigation are not simply historical curiosities.  Emancipation required 
southerners to incorporate freedom into their new social order.  It is not possible to understand 
freedom as an abstract constitutional value without understanding how Americans defined 
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freedom at the local level.  Historian William Wiecek has described the divergent understandings 
of freedom that developed in northern versus southern law in the antebellum period.
Prior to 1820, northern and southern states followed the English case Somerset v. Stewart, 
which stood for the principle that slavery was so contrary to nature and law that it could only be 
supported by positive law, and could not be supported by the general principles of the common 
law, which were consistent with natural law.  According to Wiecek, “[i]t would logically follow 
from the first point that if a human being’s natural state was freedom, and slavery an unnatural 
condition imposed by positive law, then when the unnatural condition was removed, the person 
became not only free but capable of claiming rights like those enjoyed by freeborn people.”42  
The Somerset case became part of the common law of the colonies and later the United States 
because it was decided before American Independence.  However, after the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820, southerners became deeply fearful of slave insurrection and started to 
rethink Somerset.  Because it was a more frequent problem for them, southern courts gave a great  
deal more thought about what should be the civic and political status of freed slaves.
 Southern states began to develop a theory of manumission that diverged from the 
principle of Somerset.  They envisioned a racialized status for freed slaves in which manumission 
conferred no rights, capacities, or privileges except possibly the limited right to locomotion – 
limited in most cases to leaving the state.  States could and did legislate to provide a limited set 
of rights and privileges that free blacks could exercise, but any such rights or privileges were 
absolutely subject to regulation even to the point of abolishing them.  The common law that 
governed the status of individuals was contextual, relational, and subject to reasonable regulation 
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to be sure.  But for white people, especially white men, natural law provided them with certain 
rights and privileges that the common law could not regulate away.43
 According to Wiecek, northerners had less experience with manumission than 
southerners.  They simply assumed, without considering exactly what those rights would be, that 
once free the formerly enslaved would possess the natural rights and obligations of all free 
people.  While northerners may have believed all free people regardless of race were entitled to 
certain basic rights - to life and liberty, due process, and the ability to sue and be sued, perhaps -  
they still considered many other rights of blacks subject to regulation in ways that the rights of 
whites were not.  Northerners may have believed natural law principles contained in the common 
law set some limits on how much the rights of blacks could be regulated.  But race – like gender 
and immaturity – was a legal category that could be regulated even in the North.44  Union 
military commissions brought the northern and southern understandings of freedom into direct 
contention.
 For example, on October 8, 1865, a Caswell County, North Carolina planter named 
Archibald Baynes shot and killed a freedman named “Manuel.”  Manuel had been Baynes’ slave 
for ten years.  After the war he agreed to work for Baynes for wages.  Manuel worked for several 
months without receiving any pay.  When he asked Baynes to pay him, Baynes ordered Manuel 
off the property, warning him not to return or Baynes would kill him.45
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Manuel went to the local Freedmen’s Bureau agent, Captain William C. Mills, to 
complain.  Mills gave Manuel written orders directed toward Baynes.  Manuel returned to 
Baynes’ plantation where he stayed the night with a former co-worker.  In the morning, Baynes 
found Manuel sitting in the workers’ cabin and asked him what he was doing there.  Manuel 
answered that he was “there for his rights.”  Baynes started a scuffle with Manuel.  Manuel ran 
off toward the road away from the property before anyone was hurt.  Baynes followed Manuel 
with a gun provided to him by his wife who had heard the trouble outside.  Baynes caught up 
with Manuel and killed him.
At Baynes’ military commission trial in November 1865, his attorney presented his view 
of how emancipation affected North Carolina’s common law.46  Baynes’ attorney first argued that 
Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which required federal courts exercising diversity 
jurisdiction to apply the law of the state in which the court sat, also required the military 
commission sitting in North Carolina to apply North Carolina law.  This was an uncontroversial 
position given that the Lieber Code also required the commission to apply local law where 
possible.  Presumably, Baynes’ attorney emphasized the Judiciary Act because its emphasis was 
on faithful adherence to the host state’s law, while the Lieber Code explicitly excepted local law 
that did not comport with the military goals.
After ensuring the commission understood its obligation to follow North Carolina law, 
Baynes’ attorney explained why both North Carolina law and the U. S. Constitution legally 
excused Baynes’ killing.  Baynes’ attorney cited two antebellum North Carolina Supreme Court 
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decisions to explain the applicable North Carolina common law provisions.  The first case held 
that evidence of a slave’s insolence and impertinence towards whites excused the murder of that 
slave.  The second case held that insolence in a free black toward a white man excused a battery 
against the free black.  He then argued “surely it cannot be contended that a freedman made so 
by proclamation has more rights and privileges than a negro born free of free parentage.  The 
effect of the [emancipation] proclamation is nothing more than to release the negro from slavery 
and confer on him the rights of a negro born free.”47
Slaves were so degraded in North Carolina law that they could be killed for insolence, but  
even antebellum free blacks could be assaulted for their impertinence.  In the attorney’s opinion, 
North Carolina law permitted whites to use violence against free blacks for their impertinence.  
Now that the slaves were free their place in the social order was no better than a black person 
born free.  When a black man and a white man engaged in a scuffle, the black man was guilty of 
an assault against which the white man was legally permitted to defend himself with violence.  
Further, the Article IV privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. Constitution permitted this 
obvious double standard.  Northern states had discriminatory laws, which the Constitution 
apparently did not prohibit.  He concluded “[i]n short, our American institutions both north and 
south have drawn the distinction between the African and Caucasian race. . .”  In other words, if 
the free North could continue to order itself in a racially discriminatory way under its own 
antebellum common law, so could North Carolina.
The judge advocate representing North Carolina and the United States argued that the 
common law of North Carolina had been changed by emancipation.  He said the “law [excusing 
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violence against blacks for their insolence] was created to keep the Free colored population in a 
state of subjection and it was deemed necessary for the safety of the institution of slavery. . .” 
With emancipation, the reason for the law no longer existed.  “[It] is admitted on all hands that 
where the reason of a law has ceased to exist – the Law itself ceases.”  The judge advocate 
couched his response not in terms of the freedom rights of the formerly enslaved.  Instead, he 
argued that the previous law supported an institution that no longer existed.  With the demise of 
the institution, the law supporting it ceased to exist as well.48
 The military commission convicted Baynes of murdering his former slave, and sentenced 
him to death.  General Ruger, recommended a reduced sentence of 10 years hard labor.  But 
Baynes was a highly respected member of his community and his many prestigious supporters 
petitioned President Johnson for a pardon or clemency.
Pardon petitions served as a kind of appellate proceeding within the military system of 
justice.  Laura Edwards describes pardon petitions serving the same purpose in the early national 
period in North Carolina civilian courts.49  The pardon petitions contained in the military 
commission case files show that both defendants and the Union army were concerned with the 
restoration of good order, but the Union Army and North Carolina elites (who typically signed 
the petitions, because their status lent them greater weight) had a very different understanding of 
what the good order should look like and where the formerly enslaved fit within that order.
Baynes’ pardon petition stated the defendant “lived a long life in a social system and 
under a code of laws, which would not tolerate insolence in a slave to his master.”50  Some 
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allowances should be made by the United States government under such circumstances.  People 
could not be expected to immediately accommodate themselves to “the new order.”51  Baynes’ 
execution for killing a negro would shock the community so horribly they “would not soon 
recover.”  In other words, executing Baynes for something that would have been excusable his 
whole life would be more disruptive to the social order than the crime of murder when 
committed against a former slave.
In his report to President Johnson, Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt argued 
strenuously that the original sentence should be carried out.  “It is painful to think of the state of 
society, in a community like that of North Carolina where such crimes as have recently been 
reported by the [Freedmen’s] Bureau can not only be regarded by the people with indifference, 
but can bring out hundreds of its educated and influential classes to sue at the feet of the 
executive for the release and pardon of their blood-stained perpetrators.”52  To Judge Advocate 
General Holt, the murder was the greater injury to society and the community’s indifference was 
appalling.  Restoring good order meant teaching North Carolinians to treat violence toward 
blacks as the crime it was.53  President Johnson eventually approved Ruger’s reduction of 
Baynes’ sentence from death to 10 years hard labor.54
Similarly, after a military commission convicted Elizabeth Ball in November of 1865 for 
killing a black man, she filed a petition for pardon with President Johnson.  Ball had employed 
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off the property.  Thomas left behind some belongings and wanted them back.  He obtained a 
letter from the local Freedmen’s Bureau agent ordering Ball to allow Thomas to retrieve his 
belongings.  Ball greeted Thomas at her gate with shotgun in hand and refused to allow Thomas 
on the property.  A scuffle ensued.  Ball shot and killed Thomas.  Though charged with murder, 
the commission convicted Ball of the lesser included offense of manslaughter.  The commission 
sentenced her to three years, but the Department Commander reduced it to one year 
imprisonment.55
Several prominent Raleigh area citizens signed a pardon petition on Ball’s behalf.  They 
argued, among other things, that Elizabeth Ball was a woman of good character who supported 
several children and her bedridden husband.  On the other hand, “the freedmen Thomas, who 
was killed, was a depraved character . . . and further that your petitioners believe that the course 
of good will and kindly relations between the colored and white races will be materially 
[improved] by the pardon of the said Elizabeth Ball by your executive clemency.”56  A reporter 
for the North Carolina Standard, who had recorded the trial proceedings for his newspaper, 
wrote to President Johnson “whatever the technicalities of the law . . . the animus of the evidence 
clearly showed that she really believed she was acting in self-defense in shooting the deceased.  
And this opinion is entertained as the writer of this has opportunity for knowing universally in 
the neighborhood where the event occurred.  This opinion is concurred in by the colored as well 
as the white population.”57  Finally, both former and future Governor Holden, and recently 
elected Governor Jonathan Worth submitted pardon petitions for Elizabeth Ball.  They reassured 
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President Johnson that all citizens, both black and white, would agree that Mrs. Ball should be 
pardoned.
The Ball petitions demonstrate two things.  The first is that North Carolinians considered 
local knowledge and reputation to be at least as relevant as the “technicalities of the law.”  The 
second is that the petitioners understood that the “colored” population had to be at least 
nominally included in the community’s opinion on the case.  However small - and no doubt 
disingenuous - this effort to include blacks within the peace of the state, if the Union army did 
not consider their inclusion an essential aspect of freedom, it is very unlikely prominent white 
North Carolinians would have considered the opinions of local blacks to be at all relevant in a 
case where a white woman killed a black man who came onto her property against her wishes.
 During the Fall and Winter of 1865-1866, a number of former Confederate states, 
including North Carolina, enacted codes defining the status and rights of freedmen.  These 
“Black Codes” attempted to create a legal status for the freedmen that replicated the authority 
and control whites had over the freedmen that they had possessed over slaves.58  In April 1866, 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment 
in response to the Black Codes.  The Civil Rights Act made the freedmen citizens and prohibited 
the states from discriminating against blacks with regard to certain fundamental rights, such as 
the right to contract, to sue and be sued, to inherit property, and to be secure in their persons and 
property.59  According to Eric Foner, the Act represented “continuity and change.”  “[I]t honored 
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the traditional presumption that the primary responsibility for law enforcement law with the 
states, while creating a latent federal presence, to be triggered by discriminatory state laws.”60 
 Despite the opportunity to apply this new and potentially radical federal law, the Union 
army continued to decide cases in terms of common law governance and social order.  In an 1868 
case, a military commission tried a planter for assault and battery for beating a mother and her 
son.  The planter beat the young boy for allowing a cow into the planter’s orchard.  Finding the 
planter beating her son, the mother pushed aside the planter telling him “no white man could 
whip her boy.”   The defendant was accused of violating the “peace and dignity of the State and 
of the United States of America,” not of violating the rights of either the son or the mother.  The 
military commission conceptualized the case as a disturbance of the peace and social order rather 
than a violation of individual right.61
The federal government and constitutional rights simply did not dominate the operation 
of military judicial administration during reconstruction.  Other principles and values stemming 
from the states’ shared common law legal culture were at least as important as the constitution 
and abstract rights enforcement.  Common law concepts of the general welfare and the people’s 
peace contained a different way to understand rights than that contained within the abstract 
individual rights embedded in the U.S. Constitution.  Neither the common law nor the 
Constitution produced better quality or quantity of rights, but they did produce different 
outcomes.
Common law rights are different from the abstract, individual rights the Constitution 
would come to embody after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The following case 
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provides an example of the common law concept of social order giving the Union army the 
ability to provide protection to blacks as a group - something that would be conceptually difficult 
under the constitutional conception of rights as belonging to individuals standing alone.
On September 21, 1865, a large number of blacks gathered around a well in the town 
center of Concord in Cabarrus County, North Carolina.  The town well was typically a place of 
public gathering in North Carolina towns.62  The white voters of Cabarrus County were in town 
to vote for delegates to the state constitutional convention that would reconstruct the state 
according to President Johnson’s plan for Reconstruction.  The black people of Cabarrus could 
not vote in the election, but they came to town to hear an agent of the Freedmen’s Bureau speak.
A man referred to as “Yankee Smith,” a former Union soldier who had settled in Cabarrus 
County after mustering out of the Army, and a local former Confederate soldier named Williford 
decided the freedmen had had possession of the well long enough.  Williford pushed his way 
through the crowd, filled a bucket with water and threw it at one of the freedmen.  Smith shot his 
pistol into the crowd and, with a stick, struck a black man named Henry Phiffer over the head, 
seriously injuring him.
Nicholas Cook, an acting justice of the peace under the provisional government, was in a 
local general store administering the amnesty oath to voters when he heard a commotion.  He 
went outside to discover a group of angry whites chasing the black people of Concord with 
sticks, rocks and at least one firearm.  He tried to order the people to keep the peace.  Someone 
said if Cook tried to stop them he was no better than a negro.  When he ordered them to keep the 
peace the crowd closed in further.  Cook thought better of it and went into the Sherriff’s office 
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where he stayed the rest of the day.  That evening he made an application for a military force to 
preserve the peace.  Another justice of the peace, upon hearing Williford threaten to “clean out” 
the freedmen, deemed it was not safe for him and left town.
It would be easy to fashion claims of individual rights on behalf of the freed people of 
Concord, North Carolina; for example, their right to assemble in a public space to hear a political 
speech, their right to liberty, their right to security in their person, the right to the equal 
protection of the law enforcement officials who made themselves scarce in the face of white 
violence.  Instead, the Judge Advocate brought charges against the leaders of this melee for 
assault and common law riot “to the great terror of all good citizens and the damage of the public 
peace.”
In their closing arguments, defendants’ counsel and the Judge Advocate each painted a 
picture of the law as it should exist under the new conditions of freedom.  Each relied on the 
common law governing riots.  The defendants cited an English treatise, Archbold’s Civil 
Pleading, for the elements of the crime.  The Judge Advocate merely referenced the common law 
generally stating “we have no doctrine of riot in North Carolina on the subject which is not 
common to all the states and to England.”  According to the Judge Advocate, common law riot 
requires an unlawful assembly and terror and violence with the object to redress a private wrong.  
The defendants’ lawyer argued that there was no riot because the election day assembly was 
lawful.  He also argued that the white men acted individually, not in concert.  If they did act in 
concert it was because they perceived the black crowd as menacing and acted on their duty to 
preserve the peace by dispersing it.
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The Judge Advocate answered that the original assembly of both blacks and whites may 
have been lawful as defendants claimed.  But later the prisoners “formed themselves into a party 
as white men with the intent to stand by each other, and in that party character, they made an 
affray with the freedmen and violently attacked them.”  He compared the partisanship of whites 
and blacks to the violence raised by one of England’s famous rivalries stating “no disturbance 
between Orange men and Catholics is more distinctly marked with this characteristic of a riot, 
than that which occurred in Concord.”  If the Orange men and Catholic rivalries constituted riots, 
then the violence by the white people against the black people of Concord fit just as well within 
the definition of the crime.
Both the defense attorney and the Judge Advocate deployed the common law method of 
knitting new ideas into old doctrine through the use of analogy, though the defense counsel’s 
move was more subtle.  Before the Civil War, whites possessed the right and duty to control 
blacks.  Non-slaveholders were socialized into this order through racially discriminatory laws 
such as those excusing a white man’s assault if provoked by a black man’s “insolence.”  Whites 
who didn’t own slaves also manned slave patrols to protect white society from black 
insurrections and any lesser crimes wandering black persons might commit.63  In this case, the 
white defendants were accused of a crime for doing what they previously had the responsibility 
to do.  The defendants’ attorneys attempted to weave this responsibility into the new legal order 
by claiming the white men of the town had the duty to disperse a large crowd of blacks, which 
was a potential menace almost by definition.
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The Judge Advocate attempted to accomplish the same thing; that is, weaving new legal 
principles into the old cloth of the common law.  By comparing the white and black factions with 
the Orangemen and Catholics, he moved everyone onto an equal plane in the civic sphere.  In 
fact, in terms of “loyal obedience to the laws . . . decent respect to civil authority and regard to 
the peace of society,” the black people of Concord surpassed the whites.  Six of the eight accused 
ringleaders of the riot were found guilty.  They received relatively light sentences, ranging from a 
fine of $30 to a prison sentence of four months.  However, civilian courts would most likely have 
punished the black participants if they had done anything at all because the black participants 
would not have been able to testify.64 
Perhaps it is unsurprising that defendants’ counsel would rely on antebellum principles 
that gave whites control over blacks, but the judge advocate mined English history and common 
law to support his case as well.  He did not argue, even though he was before a Union Army 
tribunal, that the Union won the war, the slaves are now free, and freedom implies the right to 
assemble in the town center on an equal basis with whites.  Rather, the Judge Advocate argued 
that the white defendants were guilty of disturbing the peace and order of Concord, while the 
blacks worked to preserve it.
None of this is to suggest that the United States Constitution was not a source of legal 
authority or rules of decision, or that the language of rights was not used by the people of North 
Carolina or the Union army.  But, it is to say that even where the language of equality and rights 
was spoken, it was not the language used to decide legal cases.  Instead, the Union army and 
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North Carolinians began the reconstruction of the state’s legal order using its existing common 
law legal culture, most of which northern Union officers understood and even shared.
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Chapter Three
Children and Apprentices in Reconstruction North Carolina
 During General John M. Schofield’s short-lived, but important command of the post-war 
Department of North Carolina, he regarded the problem of the status of the newly free as one of 
the thorniest problems North Carolina would face during Reconstruction.  When he felt he could 
no longer wait for the instructions he thought federal government officials in Washington would 
provide, he issued orders to reorganize the state under his own authority.  To begin the process of 
integrating free blacks into the North Carolina social, political and legal order, Schofield opted to 
organize them into households based on kinship, i.e., families.
 Thus, on May 15, 1865, General Schofield issued General Orders No. 46 in which he 
promulgated the rules “for the government of the freedmen in North Carolina until the 
restoration of civil government in the State.”  Among other things, General Orders No. 46 gave 
black parents common law rights and obligations to their children, rights and obligations that had 
not belonged to the enslaved, and had not fully belonged even to free black parents under 
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antebellum North Carolina law.1  While this may seem a rather uncontroversial, conservative first  
step, it nevertheless radically altered North Carolina’s social and political order.2
 The family in the nineteenth century was North Carolina’s foundational political, social, 
and legal unit, as it was throughout the South. The southern household was not simply a private 
organization of individuals related by blood, as it increasingly came to be in the North.  Southern 
households consisted of extended kinship networks, dependents, apprentices, laborers and slaves 
headed by a white, propertied male or patriarch.  The head of the household possessed the sole 
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I. The common laws governing the domestic relations, such as those giving parents authority and control over 
their children and guardians control over their wards, are in force. The parents’ or guardians’ authority and 
obligations take the place of those of the former master.
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money, they ought to be contented with a fair share in the crops to be raised. They have gained their personal 
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VII. All officers, soldiers, and citizens are requested to give publicity to these rules, and to instruct the freed 
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VIII. All officers of the army, and of the county police companies, are authorized and required to correct any 
violation of the above rules within their jurisdiction.
IX. Each district commander will appoint a superintendent of freedmen—a commissioned officer—with such 
number of assistants—officers and non-commissioned officers—as may be necessary, whose duty it will be 
to take charge of all the freed people in his district, who are without homes or proper employment. The 
superintendents will send back to their homes all who have left them in violation of the above rules, and will 
endeavor to find homes and suitable employment for all others. They will provide suitable camps or quarters 
for such as cannot be otherwise provided for, and attend to their discipline, police, subsistence, &c.
X. The superintendents will hear all complaints of guardians or wards, and report the facts to their district 
commanders, who are authorized to dissolve the existing relations of guardian and ward in any case which 
may seem to require it, and to direct the superintendent to otherwise provide for the wards, in accordance 
with the above rules. United States War Department, GO No. 46, Dept NC, May 15, 1865, The War of the 
Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
2 Mark L. Bradley, Bluecoats and Tarheels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina (Kentucky: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 30-35.
legal authority to interact with the state on behalf of the members of his household and the 
absolute legal authority to organize its economic, status, and affective components as he saw fit.3
 According to historian Peter Bardaglio, “the [southern] household, embedded in networks 
of blood, marriage, and kinship, provided the key source of order and stability in southern 
society.”4  In addition to extended networks of blood relatives, Southern plantation households 
included unrelated dependents and even slaves.  Bardaglio describes how, in the nineteenth 
century Northerners moved toward a conception of family based in affection, increasing 
egalitarianism, and an individualistic notion of contractual consent in marriage.  They 
conceptualized the family unit as more or less limited to the nuclear family with a rather sharp 
separation between the private domestic sphere and the public commercial sphere.5
 In contrast, the southern concept of family remained hierarchical and patriarchal despite 
pressures from the same trend toward affectionate family relationships that was taking place with 
more success in the North.  Southern plantations also remained the site of both domestic and 
productive activities so that the demarcation of “separate spheres” was less clear than was 
increasingly the case in the North.  Further, the notion that slaves were part of the plantation 
family was not simply part of a “proslavery propaganda campaign designed to mask the 
exploitative character of bondage, for these beliefs underscored the southern commitment to 
organic hierarchy as the basis for social order.”6
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 The concept of the family as an organizational unit was deeply embedded not only in the 
social, economic, and political organization of the state, but also within the law and legal culture.  
In antebellum North Carolina, and in the south generally, the head of household had the sole 
authority to assert rights claims against the state and against other white, male heads of 
household on his own behalf and on behalf of the members of his household.  Dependent 
members of the household could seek redress on the grounds that the harm done to them 
disrupted the peace and good order of the community, but not on the basis of individual right.7
 As Stephanie McCurry has demonstrated, even yeoman farmers enjoyed and fiercely 
defended their status (and the rights that came with that status) as heads of household.  Though 
her study focused on the lowcountry of South Carolina, the family structure in North Carolina 
was similar.  Farmers with small landholdings and perhaps a slave or two could claim political, if 
not social or economic, equality with their plantation-owning brethren because they commanded 
both land and the dependents that made it possible for them to make a living from that land.8
 In The People and Their Peace, Laura Edwards has identified two separate legal systems 
operating in antebellum North Carolina, which she calls “state law” and “localized law,” 
respectively.  The law Edwards identifies as state law was formal, nominally equalitarian, 
professionalized, rights-oriented, and primarily applied to  real property and commercial 
transactions.  State law roughly corresponded with the activities of the patriarch as the head of 
his household as he engaged with other patriarchs, his state government, and the federal 
government.  Localized law, on the other hand, was informal, contextual, relational, and dealt 
93
7 Edwards, “The Marriage Covenant Is at the Foundation of All Our Rights,” 83.
8 Stephanie McCurry, Masters of Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender Relations, and the Political Culture of 
the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
with domestic relations, crimes, and disputes defined as disruptions of the peace and good social 
order; all matters of local concern.9
 The head of household sat at the nexus of these two systems of law.  Looking outward 
from the plantation, he stood in equality with other patriarchs.  He protected his position vis-a-
vis the state, the national government, and other patriarchs in the language of rights and equality.  
Looking inward onto his plantation household, he protected his position through status, hierarchy 
and dependence.  The state extended its reach onto the plantation only to regulate a deviant 
(usually excessively violent) patriarch if necessary to the goal of maintaining the peace and good 
social order, not protecting or vindicating the rights of the patriarch’s dependents.10
 In some ways the state’s reach was pervasive and inclusive.  Any dispute that constituted 
a breach of the peace or good social order was appropriate for a county court to adjudicate.  
Edwards describes how in investigating these disputes, local courts sometimes acted on the 
statements of women and even slaves, who could not offer sworn testimony in court.  In other 
ways, the state’s reach was quite limited.  Disputes that did not constitute a breach of the peace 
were private matters for the patriarch to handle without outside interference.
 North Carolina Supreme Court cases dealing with masters accused of using excessive 
force in disciplining a dependent household member demonstrate how North Carolinians 
conceptualized the family or household within their legal culture as a kind of sovereign 
institution that was co-equal to the state, with the authority to maintain its integrity against 
encroachments by the state.  The case of State v. Mann is famous, or rather infamous, for the 
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definition of slavery North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Thomas Ruffin offered; “[t]he power 
of the master must be absolute, to render the submission of the slave perfect.”11  To reach his 
bleak assessment of the nature of slavery, Ruffin incidentally had to describe the nature of the 
relationship of the patriarch to the state versus the relationship of slaves and other household 
dependents to the state.
 In claiming that the power of the master must be absolute, Ruffin meant not only the 
master’s power over the slave, but also his power to resist interference by the state.  The slave 
had to submit to the patriarch’s judgment and authority, but so did the state.  In Ruffin’s view, the 
state had no authority to regulate the relationship of master and slave, but must defer to the 
master.  Ruffin conceded the state’s right to regulate against excessive discipline of other 
domestic dependents - children, pupils, apprentices - because they had a kind of incipient 
relationship with the state and would eventually take their place as freemen in society.  As Ruffin 
suggests, a subordinate who did not accept his training and his subordinate position was better 
“[left] . . . to his own headstrong passions, and the ultimate correction of the law, than to allow it 
to be immoderately inflicted by a private person.”12  In other words, the state would prevent the 
patriarch from using excessive force against an insubordinate non-slave dependent, in exchange 
for the promise of dealing with him through the criminal law once he became of age.
 On the other hand, according to Ruffin, slaves had no relationship with the state and 
never would.  The slave’s absolute submission and the master’s authority were necessary to the 
institution.  “They cannot be disunited, without abrogating at once the rights of the master, and 
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absolving the slave from his subjection.”13  Any acknowledgement that a slave had any 
relationship to the state impinged on the rights of the master, and was inconsistent with the 
existence of slavery.  Ruffin elided or perhaps chose to ignore the fact that female children and 
wives did not ever graduate beyond the subordination of the patriarch.
 Indeed, the North Carolina Supreme Court wrestled with how complete was the 
sovereign authority of a husband over his wife on several occasions. In 1862, in the case Joyner 
v. Joyner, the Supreme Court examined the question of how much physical correction a husband 
could administer to his wife before his behavior became grounds for divorce.14  The wife in that 
case alleged that her husband had “manifested great courseness and brutality,” for example, 
striking her with a horse-whip on one occasion and with a switch on another occasion so 
forcefully that it caused bruises on her body. She also described herself as having been a dutiful, 
affectionate and faithful wife at all times in the marriage.  The trail court in Northampton County  
granted Mrs. Joyner a divorce with alimony, but the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed.
 The Supreme Court said that the pleadings were insufficient because Mrs. Joyner did not 
describe the circumstances in which Mr. Joyner hit her with the horse-whip and the switch.  The 
Court explained that a “wife must be subject to the husband.” The Court speculated that Mrs. 
Joyner might have deserved the physical punishment she received.  If for example, Mr. Joyner hit  
her in an effort to curb her “unruly tongue” Mr. Joyner would not only have been acting within 
the law, he would have been performing his duty to govern is household.  According to the 
Court, a man who cannot control his wife loses self-respect, the respect of his family members 
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and the respect of his community.  Thus, the “law gives the husband power to use such a degree 
of force as is necessary to make the wife behave herself and know her place.”15 
 Stephanie McCurry has argued that to enlist farmers who did not own slaves into the task 
of protecting the institution of slavery, planters advocated a definition of the household that 
bound up wives as thoroughly as it did slaves.  If a “self-working farmer” could not rest his 
claims to independence on the ability to command the labor of slaves, he could so so on the 
ability to command the labor of his wife and other household dependents.  Thus, according to 
McCurry, it was not possible to disentangle domestic laws regarding slaves from domestic laws 
regarding wives.  Householders without slaves had to protect the prerogatives of slave owners if 
they wished to protect their own prerogatives over their non-slave dependents and their position 
in civic society as independent and equal men.16  Both Stephanie McCurry for South Carolina 
and Victoria Bynum for North Carolina have noted that the laws giving the head of household a 
kind of sovereign authority over their slaves similarly granted a kind of sovereign authority over 
their wives, and that both forms of authority were mutually reinforcing.17 
   Ruffin’s opinion in State v. Mann was so extreme regarding the definition of slavery that 
it threatened to isolate slavery from other domestic dependencies making it conceptually easier 
to abolish the institution without disrupting the rest of North Carolina’s social order.  It is 
perhaps for that reason that five years later the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected Ruffin’s 
view of slavery in an opinion written by Justice William J. Gaston in the case State v. Will.  
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Gaston placed slaves back within the domestic hierarchy, a grade below apprentices.  According 
to Gaston, both apprentice and slave relationships were grounded in service.  They differed in 
degree of dependency and status, but not in the nature of the authority the master had over them.  
Gaston protected the lives of slaves from abusive masters by bringing them within the domestic 
hierarchy.  However, even in Gaston’s view, slaves had no direct relationship with the state.  
They did have, however, at least the same mediated relationship that other household 
dependents, including wives, possessed.  The state had an interest in preserving good social 
order.  A master or husband who “corrected” a dependent with excessive severity or abused a 
dependent outside the context of administering discipline breached good social order, which 
justified the state to step in. Slaves and servants, wives and children, did not possess affirmative 
rights, but their lives and bodily integrity were of sufficient interest to the state for the state to 
protect them from outright abuse.18
 The limited authority of the state to protect the lives and bodily integrity of domestic 
dependents did not arise out of any rights they might possess.  Rights belonged to the head of 
household, not to the dependent members of that household.  In State v. Hussey, a woman 
accused her husband of assault.  The husband’s lawyer argued that a husband had the right to 
administer moderate correction to his wife and he was the judge of what was appropriate.  The 
North Carolina Supreme Court was uncomfortable with the husband’s characterization of his 
authority to discipline his wife as a legal right to strike her and explicitly declined to answer the 
question.  The Court decided instead that in this particular case, the injury the wife alleged was 
slight, and in such a case, the Court would uphold the rule of spousal immunity.  Of course, a 
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wife who cannot testify against her husband cannot invoke the law to protect her from his abuse.  
While the Court declined to extend the rights of a head of household to include the explicit right 
to violent action, it did not even conceive of the wife having a right to be free from violence 
visited upon her by her husband.  The issue was instead whether the violence that was 
perpetrated disrupted good order sufficiently for the Court to take cognizance of it.19
 In the postwar case of State v. Rhodes the North Carolina Supreme Court confirmed that 
the conception of the household as a sovereign political unit survived the changes brought about 
during the war and early Reconstruction.  In Rhodes, decided in 1868, a husband had assaulted 
his wife in a manner the court referred to as a “moderate correction,” although it would have 
constituted an assault and battery if done on someone other than his wife.  The Court first 
pointed out that “the courts have been loath to take cognizance of trivial complaints arising out 
of the domestic relations - such as master and apprentice, teacher and pupil, parent and child, 
husband and wife.”  The Court conceded that the old law allowing a husband the power to 
control his wife through physical chastisement had been repudiated in England and most of the 
United States.  Because of the changing state of the law in the United States and England, the 
Supreme Court decided it was important to clearly express its view of the law in North Carolina.  
According to the Court:
Our conclusion is that family government is recognized by law as being as complete in 
itself as the State government is in itself, and yet subordinate to it; and that we will not 
interfere with or attempt to control it, in favor of either husband or wife, unless in cases 
where permanent or malicious injury is inflicted or threatened, or the condition of the 
party is intolerable.
It will be observed that the ground upon which we have put this decision is not that the 
husband has the right to whip his wife much or little; but that we will not interfere with 
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family government in trifling cases. . . We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of 
raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.20
The family or household remained “complete in itself” after emancipation as it was in the 
antebellum period.  However, the composition of the family had changed dramatically with 
Schofield’s order recognizing the legal existence of the families of the formerly enslaved.
 Slaves had no right to form legally constituted families.  There was only one head of 
household on a farm or plantation with slaves and that was the white male master, husband and 
father.  Thus, while slaves frequently lived together as husband and wife and had children whom 
they loved and cared for, the affectionate families they formed had no legal status and could 
claim no legal protection.  Masters frequently controlled who their slaves “married” by 
determining whether or not the couple was allowed separate living arrangements and the 
resources such as a plot of land, some pieces of furniture, or more rations, that went along.21  But 
those marriages were exceedingly vulnerable.  Enslaved husbands could not protect their wives 
from the sexual assault of white men.  And the omnipresent threat of sale meant that enslaved 
families could be torn apart at any time.
 The integrity of slave families was further threatened because of the complicated 
relationship between the masters and parents of enslaved children.  When enslaved children were 
young, masters cultivated their loyalty and affection by offering them treats and attention that 
their parents could not provide.  It was an increasingly important aspect of mastery, as proslavery  
ideology began to pervade the slave south, that masters be able to command their slaves by 
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instilling a sense of affection and loyalty in them from a young age, rather than applying undue 
force or violence.  The parents of enslaved children experienced a double bind.  The 
slaveowner’s positive interest and attention to their children could help them survive the harsh 
circumstances of slavery, but encouraging their children to see the masters as the heads of the 
plantation household undermined not only their parental authority, but divided the affection of 
their children.22
 Because their relationships could not exist within the law, they were also not bound by 
the law governing marriage and bastardy.  As a result slaves could constitute their family 
relationships differently from whites.  Slaves acknowledged more gradations of legitimate 
attachment in their adult sexual relationships than simply married or not married.  For example, a 
couple could “sweetheart” which meant they engaged in a non monogamous sexual relationship.  
They also “took up” with each other, which was something akin to a trial marriage.  Slaves 
acknowledged committed relationships resembling marriage, but they entered and ended these 
relationships at will and frequently without any formal ceremony.  Community acknowledgment 
defined the relationship as something more than  sweethearts or “taking up.”  Recognition by the 
community came with the expectation that the couple would care for each other over a long term. 
However, the community was also able to acknowledge that the relationship had ended when the 
couple behaved in ways that demonstrated their relationship was over.  Slave communities also 
apparently tolerating polygyny to some degree.23
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 In the antebellum period, the legal head of household was a white man.  Slave fathers 
could not  claim the rights and privileges of head of household at all.  But even free families that 
were not properly constituted - because they were headed by a woman or a free black - presented 
a challenge that had to be addressed.  One important way North Carolina sought to manage and 
control these improperly constituted households was by apprenticing the children into properly 
organized households headed by a white patriarch.
 North Carolina elites began forcibly apprenticing both black and white children as early 
as 1715.  Involuntary apprenticeships must be distinguished from voluntary apprenticeships.  
Voluntary apprenticeship involved an agreement between a child or the child’s parents and a 
master who would provide room, board, and usually training in a specialized field of work.  
Generally, the child had sufficient means to compensate the master for providing the education 
and lifestyle that accorded with the child’s station in life.  Courts supervised these agreements to 
prevent abuse, but otherwise treated them as contracts between private parties.  The involuntary 
apprenticeship, on the other hand, was a tool for maintaining social order.  Orphans - defined as 
any fatherless child - and children whose parents could not support them were a problem for the 
community generally.  North Carolina law dealt with this problem by forcing these children to be 
apprenticed into a properly constituted household.
 Forced apprenticeship existed to ensure that all orphans or impoverished young persons 
came under the care of an independent patriarch.  County courts could, if they deemed it best for 
the community and/or best for the orphan, apprentice a child without the consent of, or even 
notice to, their mothers or the children themselves.  Masters signed contracts, but not with the 
apprentice or with the apprentice’s mother.  Rather, the rights and duties of the legal relationship 
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ran between the master and the county court.  County courts retained jurisdiction over the 
apprentices to exercise oversight of the master-apprentice relationship.24   Because 
apprenticeships were about maintaining good social order, individual rights did not play a role in 
the process. 
 In 1762 the North Carolina colonial assembly formalized the custom of forcible 
apprenticeships by passing An Act for the better Care of Orphans, and Security and Management 
of their Estates. This law, with modification over time, governed apprenticeships until 
apprenticeship was abandoned altogether in 1919.  The 1762 law required that children be bound 
out if their estates were so small that no one could afford to maintain them on the profits of that 
estate.  It also required all “free base born children” (children born out of wedlock) be bound in 
apprenticeships.  Further, it required that all female (but not male) children of mixed race be 
bound until age 21.  White female apprentices were released at age 18, while all other 
apprenticeships lasted until the child was 21.25
 Apprenticeships certainly involved the labor of children, which could be quite valuable, 
but the rationale behind the laws involved issues of social order, specifically ensuring that all 
children lived within a male-headed household.  The laws were not primarily about the labor the 
children could provide.  Thus, even children who inherited substantial property were forcibly 
apprenticed, if no provision for a guardian appeared in his or her father’s will,  Although the law 
provided protection for their inherited property and assurance that they would be educated 
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“according to their Rank & degree.”26  Poor and propertyless children had to earn their keep.  
They were placed with masters who would feed, clothe and train them for some suitable 
occupation in exchange for their labor and obedience.
 Both black and white children were subject to forced apprenticeships, but as time passed 
the law regarding apprenticeships became more racialized.   Apprenticing black children became 
an important method for controlling North Carolina’s expanding free black population 
throughout the antebellum period.  In 1826 the North Carolina General Assembly expanded 
apprenticeship laws to include black children whose parents did not “habitually employ his or 
her time in some honest, industrious occupation” the definition of which was left to the 
discretion of the court.  The 1826 law also reduced the education requirements for black 
apprentices.  North Carolina strengthened the social control aspects of the apprenticeship scheme 
in 1837.  According to the revised statute, the county court was to collect the names of 
“apprenticeable children” by requiring wardens of the poor to report all fatherless children who 
applied for poor relief and by requiring justices of the peace to report the names of orphans, free 
children of color in families “where the parents with whom such children may live, do not 
habitually employ their time in some honest, industrious occupation,” and all illegitimate 
children.27
 There is no question that North Carolina deployed apprenticeships for the purpose of 
social and racial control as both Bynum and Zipf argue.  But historian John Hope Franklin 
convincingly argued that the system offered some benefits to the black children who participated 
in it.  North Carolina’s antebellum apprenticeship system created a class of literate free blacks 
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because in the first half of the nineteenth century the law required masters to teach apprentices to 
read and write.  Whether the system was benign or malicious, the presumption underpinning the 
provisions of apprentice law was that blacks were unsuitable parents and could not properly 
occupy the status of head of household.  Black families, even free black families, required 
supervision by the white community.28
 General Scofield, acting on the fly and with a northern conceptualization of family likely 
did not appreciate how deeply embedded within North Carolina’s social order was the belief that 
black parents could not practically, morally or legally possess the status of head of household.  
Nor did he likely anticipate the impact it would have on North Carolina’s social order to allow 
black families to form legally constituted households with all the common law rights and 
protections that entailed.
 As an initial matter, acknowledging black parents’ common law rights and duties toward 
their children created a pathway through which black parents could make direct rights claims 
against the state.  Secondly, Schofield reversed the legalities in the contest between blacks and 
whites over the formerly enslaved children of North Carolina.  Whereas, prior to emancipation, 
slaves could only claim an inchoate familial bond in attempting to claim their children as their 
own, under Union military governance, black parents could invoke the law in contending that 
their children were dependent members of their own legally established, independent, 
households subject to the authority of the head of that household.  Likewise, prior to 
emancipation, the master’s claim to authority over slave children was fully supported by law as 
well as culture and custom.  While the former masters of enslaved children were loathe to cede 
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their authority over them, even to the parents of these children, the former masters’ claim of 
authority depended to a great extent on a pervasive sense of mastery rather than a well-defined 
legal status category. 
 Slave owning whites were unaccustomed to having their authority over black children 
who lived on their property challenged, especially by black adults.  The fact that black parents 
could invoke the authority of the state to back their challenge to white authority raised the stakes 
even further. Their frustration at having their authority challenged frequently provoked former 
slave owners to deadly violence, as in the case of a former slave, Minerva Sprewell.29
 In July, 1865, Minerva Sprewell lived and worked on the same Washington County 
plantation owned by the Calhoun family where she had been a slave. Minerva’s 13-year-old 
daughter, Annie, was living with the Calhoun’s adult daughter and her husband, Benjamin 
Hassell, where she had been enslaved the previous four years.  After emancipation, Minerva 
began asserting the modest claim that she was entitled to visit her daughter.  Mrs. Hassell put 
Minerva off until one day when Mrs. Hassell was visiting her parents’ plantation.  Minerva 
confronted Mrs. Hassell about when Annie would be allowed to visit her.  Mrs. Hassell 
responded by telling Minerva she had never promised that Annie would be allowed to visit her 
mother and that Annie would be staying with the Hassells always.  Minerva allegedly responded 
by telling Mrs. Hassell that she should go home because Minerva would no longer cook for her 
and that Mrs. Hassell would no longer have peace in the Calhoun’s house.  Mrs. Hassell left the 
house in tears and went to a neighbor’s house.
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 The next day Benjamin Hassell, Mrs. Hassell’s husband, came to the Calhoun plantation 
with another man named Ben Godfrey.  Hassell kicked down the door to Minerva’s room and 
threatened to have Godfrey shoot her if she did not comply with their orders.  Hassell chased her 
at gunpoint about a half mile, stripped off her clothes, tied her to a tree, said to her “you damned 
bitch, I have been owing you a whipping for a long time,” and beat her brutally for over an hour.  
When he was done, he untied her and sent her back to her house.  Her employer, Calhoun, saw 
Minerva about fifteen minutes after she returned, but he made no effort to assist her.
 Minerva was bedridden for two days with her injuries.  When she recovered sufficiently, 
she walked four miles - carrying her youngest child - to the nearest Union army post to report the 
assault.  Hassell admitted the beating to the investigating officer.  Indeed, he was proud that he 
had properly handled the matter and asked the officer in charge to “adjust” his case by, 
presumably, dropping the charges.  A military commission found Hassell guilty of assault and 
sentenced him to a $300 fine and 6 months in prison.  The fine was later dropped upon review by 
the commanding general.  Though the legalities all supported Minerva’s parental right to at least 
have access to her child, Benjamin Hassell retained a sense of patriarchal right so surely that he 
expected a Union military commission to accept his assault on Minerva as an appropriate 
response to her insolent claims over her daughter.  Neither Minerva nor the Hassells seem to 
have understood their changed relationship to the child, Annie, in terms of specific legal 
catergories.  But Minerva knew enough to understand she had some legally enforceable right to 
see her child and not to receive a beating for pressing to do so.
 Mrs. Hassell seemed to understand that Minerva’s requests to see her daughter had a new 
legitimacy because she became so upset during her visit to her own parents’ home that she fled in 
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tears to a neighbor’s house.  Mr. Hassell reasserted his authority over Annie and Minerva by 
beating Minerva with the belief that his actions would receive legal sanction.  Though he was 
given a light punishment, he learned that the law no longer supported his unfettered authority 
over the child, Annie.30
 Even under Schofield’s General Order No. 46, a black parent’s claim over his or her child 
was not an uncomplicated claim of right, particularly when both parent and child continued to 
labor for their former master. For example, in the summer of 1865, a man named “Reuben” lost 
his life in a battle over the right to control the labor of his son.  Rueben had been a slave for 
many years on the Lee plantation in south central North Carolina, and continued to work on the 
plantation after the war.  The male head of the Lee plantation was drafted into the Confederate 
army leaving his wife and teenaged son behind.  Rueben, though a slave, was the head worker.  
He successfully managed the plantation for Mrs. Lee while Mr. Lee was at war.  Reuben had two 
sons, John and Louis who had lived on the Lee plantation all their lives, but not apparently with 
their father.  Their mother was another slave named Mary, but Reuben lived with a woman 
named Sallie who referred to herself as Reuben’s wife of 12 years.
 The white adults living and working on the plantation took turns ordering the young 
Louis around.  They maintained the right to do so because Louis was underage and still living on 
the plantation.  But Rueben also claimed the right to control Louis’s labor because Louis was his 
son.  Tension over who had the ultimate authority to control Louis’ labor grew over time.  The 
situation was further complicated by Mrs. Lee’s young adult son, Stephen Lee, who was 
beginning to assert his patriarchal authority, so much so that Rueben’s wife, Sallie, expressed her 
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fear that Stephen Lee would kill her husband.  Eventually, Reuben and Mrs Lee made a trip to 
the Wadesboro to speak to a Union officer “to see what their rights were;” that is to see who had 
the authority to control the labor of a minor child who lived and worked on the same plantation 
as his father and on which the child had been a slave.
 The day Stephen Lee shot Rueben, Lee tried to order Louis and his brother John to do 
some work on the plantation.  The boys refused and their mother backed them up.  Mrs. Lee 
summoned Stephen Crump, a nearby relative, to settle the dispute.  One witness suggested that 
Stephen Lee was embarrassed at having his authority to order the underage workers challenged 
by the boys’ mother, a woman.  In any event, Stephen Lee did as his own mother told him and 
consulted Stephen Crump.
 Stephen Crump sent Stephen Lee to retrieve Louis so that Crump could order Louis back 
to work.  Crump had told Lee to leave Rueben alone because Rueben was of age.  When Lee 
retrieved Louis, Rueben followed after him.  Rueben did not have the opportunity to assert his 
parental authority over his son before Stephen Lee shot and killed him.  The testimony conflicted 
as to who was the aggressor, but Lee was armed and Rueben was not.  A military commission 
tried Stephen Lee and found him guilty of murder.
 The very act of Rueben’s seeking the intervention of Union officials was an assertion that 
he had a direct relationship with the state, in this case the federal government, that allowed him 
to petition for his rights on some sort of parity with Mrs. Lee.  Numerous historians have 
documented the outrage white men felt at having to answer to the charges of black complainants 
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before the Union army and the Freedmen’s Bureau.31  However, it is important to understand that 
the source of that outrage was not only that the Union army’s administration of justice injected a 
northern influence into North Carolina political and legal culture.  It was that it created the kind 
of direct relationship to the state for blacks that only patriarchs possessed before the war.  Not 
only were white North Carolinians hauled before what they considered to be a foreign tribunal.  
They also had to appear there on equal footing with people who had never before had the right to 
appeal to the state under a claim of right.  In June of 1865, David Schenck, a prominent North 
Carolina planter complained  “ . . . ‘a negro’s testimony is as good as a white man’s and every 
complaint he lodges against his employer or former master, subjects such person to the 
annoyance and disgrace of going before the Yankee commander to answer said negro’s charge 
and there to have no more dignity or respect than is shown the Negro.’”32
 In Reuben’s case, his ability to petition for his rights was unfortunately of little use.  Not 
only did he lose his life in the effort to give effect to his rights, but his killer escaped full 
responsibility for his crime.  In September, 1865, the commanding officer of the Department of 
North Carolina reduced Stephen Lee’s conviction to manslaughter and set him free.33
 Families and households in the south were not only about who controlled the labor of its 
members, but also who had the right to command the loyalty and love of its members.  Catherine 
Jones explains how kinship creates what ethicists call “associative obligations;” i.e., “moral 
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duties that do not depend on consent for validity but are instead generated by particular 
relationships.”  According to Jones, the moral obligation kinship creates is ideally independent of 
economic concerns.  To be sure, the southern plantation household was an important political and 
economic unit, but it was also the site of the affective ties that gave rise to ethical obligations to 
provide economic as well as emotional support.  Thus, the southern household had both affective 
and economic dimensions that could and did sometimes conflict.34
 Schofield’s order anticipated some of that conflict.  General Orders No. 46 harnessed the 
associative obligations of kinship to ensure that dependents came under the care and supervision 
of a household that could support them and that the labor of able-bodied young people could be 
harnessed to help, at least until such young people reached the age of majority.  Specifically, 
Schofield’s order stated: “the common law of domestic relations, such as those giving parents 
authority and control over their children and guardians control over their wards, are in force.  
The parents’ or guardians’ authority and obligations take the place of those of the former master.” 
Further, “young men and women, under twenty-one years of age, remain under the control of 
their parents or guardians until they become of age, thus aiding to support their parents and 
younger brothers and sisters.”  Only those who were of age and who did not have obligations 
toward dependent family members were permitted to leave their homes and obtain employment 
wherever they could.35
 But Schofield’s General Orders No. 46 also harnessed another associative obligation to 
ensure that dependents were subsumed within a household capable of supporting them; the 
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relationship of former master to former slave.  His order required that former masters be “the 
guardians of minors and of the aged and infirm in the absence of parents or other near relatives 
capable of supporting them.”  He further required that “former masters of freedmen may not turn 
away the young or the infirm, nor refuse to give them food and shelter . . .”36  While it is more 
typical and perhaps more comfortable to think of the newly reunited and newly legitimized black 
families in terms of their affective dimensions and the relationships between the formerly 
enslaved and their former masters in terms of their economic dimensions, the more complicated 
view is that both kinds of relationships contained both the affective and economic elements.  The 
justifications of proslavery ideology created associative obligations from masters to slaves that 
even a Northern Union general could exploit to ensure North Carolina society provided support 
for as many dependent freedpeople as possible.
 In addition, because black families developed the definitions of their kin relationships 
outside the legal definitions of white society, those relationships did not fit within existing legal 
categories.  White society considered marriage to be a bedrock civic institution that could not be 
entered into or ended without legal sanction.  The institution itself, rather than the happiness of 
the individuals within a marriage, were more important to good order and the welfare of society.  
Black communities, on the other hand, “believed that harmonious relationships, not the sanctity 
of the institution of marriage, promoted the public good.”37
 Rueben’s family relationships offer an illustration.  When asked who were his parents, 
Reuben’s son, John, responded “Mary is my mother and they say, Rueben, that was killed, is my 
father.”  Even though they lived on the same plantation with Rueben all their lives and 
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understood from their community that Rueben was their father, John and Louis could not answer 
with a simple “yes.”  Their mother was not whom whites would recognize as Rueben’s wife, 
which may explain the boys’ hesitation.  The witness, Sallie, testified to having been “married” 
to Rueben for about 12 years.38  The record does not indicate John and Louis’ age, but they were 
children.  It is possible that Reuben fathered his sons with Mary at the same time he considered 
himself married to Sallie, or that he ended his relationship with Mary and took up with Sallie 
when his sons were young children.
 It was by no means self-evident how postwar plantations households should or would be 
reconstructed.  Historian, Catherine Jones explains that households in the Reconstruction South 
as easily could have been reorganized around optimizing the economic well-being of the 
household members as around the kind of moral obligation that arises from kinship ties.39  
Organizing around purely economic considerations was too reminiscent of the slave economy, 
but organizing around kinship obligations was problematic as well.  Children complicated the 
problem of household organization because they represented both a “vulnerable class to protect 
and a labor source to command.”  On the one hand, Schofield’s order recognized the associative 
obligations of masters toward their dependent former slaves.  On the other hand, allowing blacks 
to form families and households of their own removed an important aspect of the mastery former 
slave owners had possessed before emancipation.
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 The murder of the former slave Galina, described in Chapter Two provides an example of 
how intertwined were the economic and affective components of the relationships that existed 
across the racial and generational divide on southern plantations.  This case also aptly 
demonstrates the destabilizing effect on both the affective and labor components of these 
relationships Schofield’s decision to legitimize black households had on North Carolina’s social 
order.40
 Before emancipation Galina had been a slave on Providence Neely’s plantation in Davie 
County in the piedmont region of North Carolina her entire life.  Providence’s 28-year-old 
daughter, Temperance, had never been married and was childless.  Davie County is a relatively 
remote area bordering on the western mountain region of the state.  It is very likely that 
Temperance’s opportunities for socializing off the plantation were limited.  Galina was about the 
same age as Temperance.  But Galina had five children ranging in age from an infant to nine 
years old.  The children had different fathers and there is no indication in the record that Galina 
sustained any kind of relationship with the fathers of her children.
 It is impossible from the trial record to know Galina’s feelings toward Temperance, but 
apparently Temperance felt a strong emotional connection with Galina and her children. 
Temperance reportedly showered Galina and her children with gifts and trinkets, and showed her 
other kinds of favor over the other slaves on the plantation.  When in May of that year 
Providence ordered Galina and her children to leave the plantation, Temperance intervened.   As 
Galina was preparing to leave, Temperance took Galina’s infant into her own lap, gathered up 
two of Galina’s other small children near her and told Galina to continue her work in the garden; 
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that she would not be turned out.  Temperance importuned her mother not to “turn these poor 
children away.”
 The trial record does not show why Providence ordered Galina and her children off the 
property in May, but given that Schofield issued General Orders No. 46 at just that time, it is not 
hard to imagine Schofield’s order to have played a role.  Perhaps Galina began to assert her 
parental authority over her children with the added expectation that Temperance would shield her 
from the worst of Providence’s wrath.
 Providence had been running a large planation on her own for the preceding 20 years.  It 
is unlikely that open defiance by a pre-adolescent slave was something she regularly experienced 
in that twenty years.  Providence was held in esteem in her community for her kindliness toward 
her slaves and the orderliness of her plantation.  Ellen’s defiant and even aggressive behavior 
toward Providence suggests the dynamic of the household had changed.
 Temperance tried to talk her mother out of whipping Ellen, saying she would talk to her 
and “shame” her instead. When Ellen returned Temperance tried to intervene, but as Ellen passed 
Providence, Providence grabbed her by the hand.  Ellen drew Providence’s hand to her mouth in 
an attempt to bite Providence.  Providence pinned Ellen’s hands behind her back and dragged her 
into the dining room to whip her.  Ellen partly freed herself from Providence’s grip and ran out of 
the house with Providence still holding one hand and continuing to whip her as they both moved 
out of the house.
 When Galina, who was outside the house in the “piazza,” saw Providence whipping Ellen 
she laid down her infant child and went to Ellen’s rescue.  The testimony differs a bit on whether 
or not Galina pushed Providence, raised her hand to her, or simply stood in defiance of her, but 
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there is no question that she retrieved and shielded her child from Providence’s whipping hand.  
At some point during the commotion, Temperance fired a warning shot over the heads of Galina 
and Providence.  When that didn’t end the confrontation, Temperance fired again; this time 
shooting Galina in the chest and killing her.  Temperance claimed during the trial that she only 
meant to frighten Galina into backing down from her mother and was overwrought at what she 
had done.
 Temperance’s lawyers argued either that Temperance meant to scare - not kill - Galina or, 
alternatively, that she was justified in shooting Galina.  The lawyers’ characterization of the facts 
has a purposeful bias.  However, it nonetheless demonstrates how normative it was for 
southerners to think about southern households in terms of black and white and love and labor.  
The defense based the claim that Temperance did not intend to kill Galina in the affective 
relationships that existed within the extended household.  The defense characterized 
Providence’s family as having both white and black members.  One lawyer asked Temperance’s 
sister to “state who compose your mothers (sic) white family;” suggesting by implication that her 
family also contained black members.  Another stated that Temperance was “the friend and 
protector of Galina in the family,” and that “this was well known by both white and black in Mrs. 
Providence Neely’s family”41
 Nathaniel Boyden, one of Temperance’s lawyers, emphasized how emotionally attached 
Temperance was to Galina.  In addition to describing Temperance as her known friend and 
protector he rhapsodized their shared childhood on the plantation, describing the joyful romps 
they no doubt shared growing up together as young girls.  Temperance’s lawyers argued that 
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given the powerful, lifelong, emotional bond that existed between the two women from birth, 
which remained unbroken even to the day of Galina’s death, Temperance could not have formed 
the malicious intent necessary for murder or even manslaughter.  While the defense’s argument is 
certainly self-serving, it is probably not far from the truth of Temperance’s experience.  She and 
Galina had lived on the plantation together since birth and were approximately the same age. 
Temperance was a no-longer-young, unmarried, childless woman living in a remote area on a 
plantation with her mother.  Galina, no doubt, provided Temperance with both companionship 
and the opportunity to nurture children when she was increasingly unlikely to have any of her 
own.
   On the other hand, and seemingly without any sense of being inconsistent, 
Temperances’ lawyers were very careful to establish the master-servant relationship between 
both Providence and Ellen and Providence and Galina.  The defense sought to establish that 
Galina and Ellen had lived on Providence’s plantation as “servants” from birth and remained 
servants on the planation even after emancipation.  Whatever the legal categorization of their 
relationship, Providence had a right to chastise the impudent child and did so with an appropriate 
instrument, i.e., a peach tree switch. Whether the relationship was that of a parent over a child or 
a guardian over his apprentice or a schoolmaster over his pupil the right to chastise and punish is 
made without distinction of color.  No one, apparently not even the child’s parent, had a right to 
interfere unless Providence carried the chastisement to an unreasonable degree.  As someone 
who had been taught from a child that a servant had no right to raise a hand to a master, it was 
natural for Temperance to rush to protect her mother after having earlier seen Galina push her to 
the ground.  So long as Temperance only intended to frighten Galina, not kill her, it didn’t even 
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matter whether Providence was right or wrong in punishing Ellen.  Given Temperance’s affection 
for Galina, the defense argued, Temperance could not have intended to shoot her.
 Temperance’s attorneys’ arguments contain all the assumptions of the antebellum social 
order undergirded by the extended family structure.  While Providence was a woman she had 
functioned as the head of household on her plantation with the apparent approval of her 
community for decades.  Temperance’s lawyers defended Providence’s right and obligation to 
discipline and control the members of her household without interference from the state so long 
as she did not exceed the bounds of humane practices. They failed utterly to consider what right 
Galina might have had as Ellen’s mother to prevent Providence from beating her, instead, 
claiming Galina was interfering with Providence’s proper management of her plantation.  
Temperance’s lawyers also assumed that hierarchy and affection could comfortably co-exist 
within these extended family relationships.  Temperance could harbor both intense affection for 
Galina and horror at the idea she would stand up to Temperance’s mother even in defense of her 
own child.42
   The legal right for black families to exist destroyed part of the legal underpinnings of 
white mastery.  Elite whites sought to regain some of that mastery and legitimize it by deploying 
North Carolina’s antebellum apprenticeship system to regain legally legitimized control over free 
black children.
 Involuntary apprenticeship may have been a part of North Carolina law and social 
practice for over a century, but it was not a widespread phenomenon.  After the war, however, 
elite whites sought to re-establish at least some part of their lost labor and mastery by 
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apprenticing able-bodied young people in great numbers.  Laura Edwards explains that 
emancipation removed whites’ ability to compel free black adults to live within a household 
headed by a white, propertied male.  But few could accept that blacks could form legally 
legitimate households.  They believed that “many, if not most, black children belonged within the 
households of white, propertied men, preferably those of their ex-masters.”43
 The Freedmen’s Bureau became involved in apprenticeships because the apprentice 
relationship was created by an indenture, which was similar to a contract.  The Bureau was 
responsible for overseeing all contracts involving freedmen.  The Assistant Commissioner of the 
Freedman’s Bureau for North Carolina, Eliphalet Whittlesey, initially supported apprenticing 
black children even to their former masters.  Whittlesey recognized the potential for abuse, but 
believed with proper supervision, apprenticeships would provide comfortable homes and 
education to children who would otherwise have to live in poverty.44  Freedmen sought to keep 
black children within their communities to the extent possible.  Freedmen’s Bureau agents tended 
to agree, so long as the adult seeking custody of the child was the child’s parent, preferably the 
father or stepfather.  However, when an extended family member or “fictive kin” claimed the 
child should live with him or her, Freedmen’s Bureau agents were less sympathetic.45
 County courts in North Carolina began apprenticing young blacks as soon as they started 
to operate during the summer of 1865.46  Elite whites argued that the sustenance and nurturance 
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they invested in the children they formerly held as slaves gave them the right to apprentice them.  
The blood ties of parents and other relatives alone did not override this claim.  They also claimed 
the right to forcibly apprentice black children because of their deeply embedded assumptions that 
black parents were incapable of properly maintaining a household or raising children to be 
contributing members of their communities.47
  Orphaned and destitute children were a real problem in the black community in post-war 
North Carolina.  Complicating blacks’ desire to care for black children within their extended 
kinship networks as they defined them was the fact that whites’ claims to having stronger 
emotional ties with the children than was not entirely without basis.  Slave families were always 
precariously constituted.  Individual members were frequently sold to far-away places.  It was 
not uncommon after the war for parents to go to great lengths to find and reclaim children who 
had only the barest memory of them.  And not every relative had the interests of the child in 
mind.  The Freedmen’s Bureau records contain instances of black adults claiming kinship with 
children for the purpose of hiring them out and keeping their wages.  Further, even loving 
parents frequently had no choice but to hire out or voluntarily apprentice their older children to 
help support themselves and the family.48  In such cases, the parents’ affective relationship with a 
particular child had to give way to economic needs of the family.  Older children, who could 
command good wages, were asked to honor their affective obligations at the expense of their 
economic benefit.
 Though the apprentice system could have theoretically provided a humane and sensible 
solution to the very real problem of impoverished, family-less, formerly enslaved children, in 
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practice the system was fraught with abuse.  The apprenticeship system quickly became a thinly-
veiled attempt by whites to give legal legitimacy to the virtual re-enslavement of children.49  
Freedmen’s Bureau agents began receiving complaints from parents during the summer and fall 
of 1865.  Children were frequently bound out without their own or their parents’ consent.  Some 
“children” who were forcibly apprenticed were older teenagers capable of earning good wages 
and supporting themselves.50  Eric Foner cites an example of a North Carolina “‘orphan’ working 
at a turpentine mill and supporting his wife and child.”51
 From the summer of 1865 to March of 1866, the Freedmen’s Bureau policy on 
apprenticeships was ambivalent, which served to encourage county courts to apprentice black 
children by the thousands.  Local Freedmen’s Bureau agents disagree over whether parents 
should always have the better claim where the children’s former masters could better support and 
educate them.52  County courts relied on North Carolina’s antebellum common law system for 
forcible apprenticeships, which openly discriminated against blacks.  Courts were authorized to 
apprentice black children if their parents were not engaged in an industrious occupation, but 
courts frequently ignored that provision of the law, apprenticing children of even relatively well-
to-do families.53
 Black families came to the Freedmen’s Bureau for help getting their children returned to 
them.  Bureau agents recognized the discriminatory way county courts were apprenticing black 
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children.  Bureau agent Allan Rutherford complained that “no one presumes to assert that the 
courts would dare to force a white child away from its parents . . . when the parents were willing 
and able to support it.”54  However, they were limited to helping black parents challenge the 
apprentice indentures in county courts.  The Bureau succeeded in reducing the number of 
illegitimate apprenticeships in this way.
 In March 1866, the North Carolina General Assembly passed an apprenticeship code as 
part of their Black Code.  The statute had three explicitly discriminatory provisions.  Former 
masters had first preference in apprenticing children.  Black, but not white, children could be 
apprenticed without the consent of their parents if the court determined the parents were not 
engaged in an industrious occupation - an amorphous and subjective standard.  Black girls’ term 
extended to age 21 in contrast to white girls’ terms, which extended to age 18.55  The law 
essentially codified the discriminatory practices of county courts, which followed antebellum 
law.  By the time the North Carolina General Assembly passed its discriminatory apprentice law, 
it had become clear that Congress would pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which it did in April 
of that year.  The Civil Rights Act gave Whittlesey and his successor, John C. Robinson, the legal 
backing to cancel apprenticeships made without notice or consent.56
 In 1867, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the state’s system of 
apprenticeship in the era of emancipation.  The case of In Re Ambrose was a particularly 
egregious example of apprenticeship law being used as a shallow pretext for outright kidnapping. 
The case prompted the North Carolina Supreme Court to integrate existing state common law 
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with the protection for individual rights required by the newly amended United States 
Constitution and federal law.57
 In December of 1865, a Robeson County planter named Daniel Russell obtained an 
indenture from a Robeson county court to apprentice Harriet Ambrose, aged 15 and Eliza 
Ambrose aged 13.  The two girls were living with their mother, Hepsey Saunders, and their 
stepfather, Wiley Ambrose.  The Ambroses had been fending off Russell’s efforts to apprentice 
their children since the end of the war.  Russell had apprenticed 20 children in the years 1865 and 
1866, sometimes by simply kidnapping them, then asking a court to bind them to him as 
apprentices.   With respect to Harriet and Eliza Ambrose, Russell sent his son and two others to 
the Ambrose home where they seized the two girls and took them to Russell’s plantation.
 Harriet and Eliza’s parents began a legal battle in state court.  In the summer of 1866, 
they asked the Freedmen’s Bureau for help.    The local Freedmen’s Bureau agent gave the 
Ambroses an order for Russell to return their children to them, which he did.  However, in 
September, 1866, Russell obtained another set of indentures for the two girls and seized them 
from the Ambroses once again.  This time the Ambroses went to the Russell plantation without 
an order.  Russell threatened to have them arrested for unlawfully seizing the children.  
 The Ambroses returned to the Freedmen’s Bureau where Assistant Commissioner 
Robinson took up their cause.  He obtained permission from Bureau Commissioner Howard to 
make an example of Russell for his violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  Robinson hired 
local North Carolina legal counsel to help prosecute the Ambrose’s case.  Robinson first sought 
the help of Federal District Court Judge, George W. Brooks.  In November of 1866, the North 
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Carolina General Assembly had amended the state’s apprenticeship laws so that they were 
facially neutral.  Judge Brooks informed Robinson and the Ambrose legal team that because 
North Carolina apprentice law did not discriminate on its face, there was no violation of the Civil 
Rights Act and he could do nothing for them.58
 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an extremely important piece of legislation because it 
guaranteed citizenship to blacks born in the United States.  It delineated the basic rights attached 
to free status, and it introduced the concept of racial equality before the law into both federal and 
state law as a necessary part of extricating from the common law those aspects that had 
supported slavery and racial control.
 However, as a tool for litigation, the Civil Rights Act was limited by the same federal 
jurisdictional and institutional incapacities that existed generally within the federal legal system 
throughout the nineteenth century.  The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided only removal 
jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction.  Federal district courts could only hear cases that had begun 
in state court where there appeared to be a violation of the substantive rules of the Act. Litigants 
could not bring their claims to federal court at the outset.  Even if the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
had given federal courts original jurisdiction to hear cases alleging violations of the Act, there 
was only one federal district court in the entire state of North Carolina, although it met in three 
different cities. The Ambroses were fortunate to have caught the attention of the Freedman’s 
Bureau as an attractive test case to address the apprenticeship epidemic and were able to access 
the federal court, although they were ultimately turned away.  But most people would have found 
traveling to one of the three cities that convened the federal district court to be impossibly 
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burdensome.  If a solution to the apprenticeship problem was to be found, it was most likely 
going to be found in the state court system.
 The Ambroses, assisted by the Freedmen’s Bureau, sought a writ of habeas corpus of the 
county court in Lumberton county asking for the return of their children.  The Lumberton court 
determined that it had no authority to second guess the validity of the Robeson county 
apprenticeship papers and remanded the Ambrose children to Russell.  The Ambroses appealed 
to the North Carolina Supreme Court claiming the apprentice papers the Robeson county court 
issued were invalid because there was no notice to the parents or the children.
 The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed.  While the Court never relied explicitly or 
directly on any basis other than its own state law, it imported the U. S. Constitutional 
requirement that persons who might be deprived of their liberty or property have the right under 
the Constitution and the laws of the state to notice and an opportunity to be heard.  The Court 
acknowledged that the statute regarding apprentices did not require notice and that previous 
North Carolina Supreme Court cases held that notice was not necessary.  However, the Court 
acknowledged that emancipation had changed the legal landscape in the state:
The proceedings of our county courts have been in a summary way in binding out 
apprentices . . . and have guarded the rights of the apprentices and given satisfaction to 
society . . . We have had hitherto but few orphans to bind out. Of course, we did not bind 
out slaves, and there were but few free negroes, and indigent white children usually found 
friends among their relations to take care of them; and in the few instances where binding 
was necessary, care was taken by the friends of the children, and by the court itself, that 
the best that was possible should be done for them; and, besides, apprentices were never 
looked to as profitable, and were seldom taken except by those who felt some interest in 
their personal welfare, so that there were no inducements to frauds upon the courts.
But now a very different state of things exists. The war has impoverished the country and 
made wrecks of the estates of orphans; its casualties have greatly increased their 
numbers; and one-third of the whole population are indigent colored persons. So that the 
exceptional cases which we formerly had must be greatly multiplied, and the 
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responsibilities and duties of the county courts must be increased in proportion. It is, 
therefore, of great importance that their duties and the rights of both apprentices and 
masters, in the proceedings for binding, should be defined and understood. We have no 
hesitation in saying that in all cases of binding apprentices whether white or colored, it is 
the right of the persons to be bound to have notice. . . and it is, to say the least, prudent in 
the court to require that the persons should be present in court.59
 The court acknowledged that the war and emancipation had dramatically changed the 
nature of apprenticeships by introducing an explicit economic incentive.  Thus, making it 
necessary to clarify the state’s policy and procedure.  Though the opinion does not mention the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, passed by Congress under the authority of the 13th Amendment, the 
reach of that act provides the backdrop of the decision.  The Freedmen’s Bureau was one of the 
federal institutions with authority to enforce the terms of that Act.  North Carolina agent John C. 
Robinson, cited the portion of the Civil Rights Act that prohibited racial discrimination in custom 
as well as law to argue that North Carolina custom prohibited binding out white children over the 
age of 14 without the parents’ consent because they could either labor for their parents or their 
own support by that age.60  Though the Court did not base its decision on the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, the Court did inject the concept of individual rights into a legal scheme that previously had 
been based entirely on considerations of social order and racial hierarchy, and explicitly 
acknowledged that black children as well as adults were entitled to assert rights on their own 
behalf in court.
 It had not been the antebellum practice to give notice to a prospective apprentice.  The 
Court in Ambrose imposed a new notice requirement so that a potential apprentice could have 
“intelligent friends” present to protect his or her interests.  The Court purported to rest its opinion 
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on an 1827 case requiring “that no freeman shall be divested of a right by the judgment of a 
court, unless he shall have been made a party to the proceedings in which it shall have been 
obtained.”61  However the status of “freeman” had never previously applied to children, let alone 
black children, as a basis for making rights claims in court. 
 At the same time, the Court instructed lower courts on the parameters of the new social 
order the apprenticeship laws ought to support, parameters that extended the customary practice 
of not apprenticing white children once they were capable of benefitting from their own labor:
The petitioners are females, respectively thirteen and fifteen years of age, ages when they 
stand most in need of the oversight of their parents and friends. They are industrious, well 
behaved and amply provided for in food and clothing.  They live with their mother and 
step-father, who are of good character and are well to do. What interest had society in 
having these relations broken up, and themselves put under the care of strangers, with no 
affection for them nor any other interest, except gain from their service? Now, if these 
persons or their friends had been present when the application was made for their 
binding, would any court in the State have bound them out? Of course not. It would have 
been a gross outrage if they had. A court ought not to, and will not, bind out an orphan 
unless it appear that its condition will be improved. It is a high duty of the court, and one 
which they perform with pleasure, to protect these helpless children, and not only to 
prevent oppression and fraud, but to act as friends and guardians, and improve their 
condition.
 Justice Reade reminded North Carolinians that the purpose of apprenticeships remained 
the protection of helpless children, and that it would be outrageous to bind them out for the 
purpose of exploiting their labor.  The Court countered the white elite’s efforts to re-enslave 
black children by integrating common law principles based in hierarchy, status and social order 
with the individual rights concepts of the newly amended Constitution in such a way as to make 
it appear the principles flowed naturally out of old law applied to new circumstances.  Rather 
than simply applying the newly enacted Civil Rights Act and resting on its authority, the Court 
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opted to knit longstanding local laws with the new federal law - with the strongest emphasis on 
local law - to fashion a new apprenticeship scheme.
 The court’s seemingly small move in the direction of protecting the apprentice’s right to 
notice produced a significant effect.  Freedmen’s Bureau agents across the south interpreted the 
decision to require parental consent, not simply notice, and used it as authority to cancel 
indentures where parents had not given consent.62  The apprenticeship system in the South fell 
into disuse as a result.63
 In Ambrose, the North Carolina Supreme Court created new law to re-integrate the 
antebellum system of involuntary apprenticeships into North Carolina’s legal culture to make it 
was consistent with the new constitutional regime.  The Court did this by importing the anti-
discriminatory intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and imposing due process notice 
requirements.  It took action even where the federal district court in the state claimed to have no 
legal power to act.  The North Carolina Supreme Court continued to assert social order as the 
primary goal in deciding the case, but the court introduced the individual rights required by the 
Civil Rights Act as a new component of the good social order.  While this change may seem too 
subtle to be significant, incremental change was one of the hallmarks of common law legal 
culture.  At a time when legislation retained the whiff of factional or class expediency, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court’s use of common law methods and principles allowed it to introduce 
revolutionary constitutional change in a way that the state’s citizens could accept as legitimate.
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Chapter Four
The Liberty to Be Unfree
 In 1868 the state of North Carolina, pursuant to the Reconstruction Act of 1867, held its 
first set of elections in which black men could vote.  Voters selected delegates to a state 
constitutional convention that, among other things, ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.  The voters of the state also elected a slate of Republican officeholders, which 
included four of the five Justices of the state Supreme Court who would hold office until 1876.  
As early as 1869, the state began to experience widespread Ku Klux Klan violence.  In 1870, 
Republicans lost some of the political gains of 1868 to Conservatives running on a white 
supremacist platform.  Republican Governor William Woods Holden was re-elected in 1870, 
only to be impeached in 1872 for declaring martial law to restore order in portions of the state 
where the Klan was most active.  The dramatic political upheaval and violence that took place 
during Reconstruction understandably overshadowed a quiet revolution in the law and legal 
culture of labor organization taking place in the civil courts in the state.
 In January, 1871, in the midst of violence and political turmoil, a Granville County, North 
Carolina, plantation owner named John R. Haskins hired a group of workers to farm a portion of 
his land.  The group of workers consisted of a white man named Thomas Eastwood, a black man 
named Sam Wilkerson, and a black family headed by a man named Jim Wilkerson.  Haskins 
drafted two sets of agreements setting forth the terms of his employment relationship with the 
workers.  The first agreement Haskins wrote described the relationship between Haskins on one 
side and Eastwood and Sam Wilkerson on the other.  The second was nominally between 
Eastwood and Sam Wilkerson and Jim Wilkerson and his family, but its purpose was to establish 
a chain of command that placed Eastwood and Wilkerson in charge of Jim Wilkerson and his 
family while they worked for Haskins.  
  The agreements required the workers to labor for an entire year for shares of the crops 
they produced.  Haskins provided the tools, horses, and equipment necessary to cultivate the 
land.  The workers had to furnish themselves with food and clothing throughout the year even 
though they were to receive no pay until they harvested the crop and Haskins divided it 
according to the terms of the two agreements.  Haskins agreed to advance the workers the money 
and provisions they were sure to need throughout the year.  He would deduct the value of 
whatever he advanced to them from their shares.
 Haskins’ year-long agreement with Eastwood and the Wilkersons, which exchanged 
agricultural labor for shares of the crop, was by no means an unprecedented arrangement.  
Similar arrangements had long existed in both North and South.  However, the agreement 
Haskins drafted contained additional provisions that set it apart from its antecedents.  Haskins 
gave himself the sole authority to discharge any of the workers if they did not perform to 
Haskins’ expectations.  But Haskins’ expectations under the agreements were not limited to how 
the workers performed their labor.  Haskins also required the workers to behave in a respectful 
manner at all times toward Haskins and each member of Haskins’ family.  If Haskins decided 
that a worker had not performed satisfactorily, or had behaved with disrespect or insolence to any 
member of the Haskins family, Haskins could turn that worker and his or her entire family off the 
plantation.  Further, the workers would forfeit the full value of their labor, with the shares that 
would have been paid to them being paid to Haskins instead.
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 Before the agricultural season began in earnest the entire group - Eastwood, Sam 
Wilkerson, and the Jim Wilkerson family - left the Haskins plantation and began working for 
Fabian Royster instead.  Haskins sued.  But he did not sue the workers for breach of their 
employment contract.  Instead, he sued Fabian Royster, claiming Royster had unlawfully 
“enticed” and “harbored” his “servants” and that he was entitled to damages for his loss.  The 
trial court judge, Albion Tourgée, ruled that the provisions requiring deference and punishing 
“insolence” with forfeiture were so harsh as to make the agreement unenforceable under North 
Carolina law and policy.  Albion Tourgée was a northerner who moved to North Carolina after 
the Civil War.  He held strong convictions in favor of a free labor ideal and was one of the few 
white advocates of true equality between blacks and whites.1  Haskins appealed the decision to 
the North Carolina Supreme Court in the case captioned Haskins v. Royster.2
   The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution forced North 
Carolina to dismantle its existing slave labor system and re-constitute it under the conditions of 
freedom.  Haskins v. Royster was a pivotal event in this process.  Although the case reached the 
Supreme Court at the same time Conservatives were ascendant in state politics, this was not a 
Redeemer court bent on thwarting Reconstruction legal change.  Four of the five Justices sitting 
on the court that heard Haskins v. Royster were Republicans.  The fifth, Edward G. Reade, had 
been a Unionist slaveholder who supported the Confederacy, but moved toward the Republican 
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Party during Reconstruction.3  Rather, this case represented a sincere effort by the state’s highest 
court to incorporate free labor principles into the state common law. 
 Haskins v. Royster is a particularly apt case study because it required the North Carolina 
Supreme Court to consider every aspect of the labor contract: creation, performance, and 
enforcement.  The case also demonstrates that, even though prompted by the requirements of the 
Reconstruction Amendments to the United States Constitution, state courts continued late into 
Reconstruction to incorporate change into their legal cultures using the traditional common law 
method of borrowing and adapting pre-existing common law legal principles to fit the changing 
circumstances within their own states.  The developments taking place at the state level provided 
the context for the debate over the legal interpretation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
amendments.  At the same time that the U.S. Constitution constrained the states in developing 
their free labor law, free labor law informed the discussion over what rights were fundamental 
and deserving of federal protection under the new Constitutional regime.
 While Haskins v. Royster presented the North Carolina Supreme Court with a case of first 
impression, the issues in the case did not arise in a vacuum.  Indeed, courts in free states had 
been working out the law of free labor for at least three quarters of a century.  To understand the 
context in which the North Carolina Supreme Court performed its analysis, it is necessary to 
understand something of the history of free labor contract law in the United States generally.
 During the colonial era and into the nineteenth century, labor in the United States was 
organized almost exclusively around the household headed by a propertied, white, man.  The 
head of a household controlled the labor of his wife, children, servants, apprentices, slaves and 
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unrelated dependents through various hierarchical status relationships.  Most people who found 
themselves in a dependent domestic status category arrived there involuntarily.  Children and 
slaves obviously had no choice in their status.  Apprentices and wards frequently acquired their 
status through tragedy or hardship.  Wives, servants, and voluntary apprentices entered into their 
domestic relationships by choice, but exercising that choice was the last act of volition the law 
allowed.  No household member could opt to leave the relationship except at the expiration of a 
term of service or, for male children, when they reached majority age.4
 The common law of domestic relations constituted and regulated each of these 
relationships within a single conceptual framework.  The head of the household, whether in his 
capacity as husband, father or master, derived his authority over his dependents from the 
property interest he possessed in the person of his wife, children, servants and slaves.  The 
property interest the common law created permitted the head of household to keep third parties 
from interfering with his property interest in persons in essentially the same way all property 
laws erect a barrier of protection against outsiders.5
 Highly skilled craftsman and professionals fell outside household organization, and more 
importantly, outside the law of domestic relations.  Contracts, whether oral or written, defined 
and governed the relationships these workers had with those who hired them.  The relationship 
between the hirer and the hired in these cases was relatively equal and voluntary.  The common 
law still filled in the details of the relationship; how the work should be performed if the parties 
weren’t sufficiently specific, what remedies were available in cases of unsatisfactory or non-
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performance, or who was responsible when the activities of either the principal or the 
independent contractor caused injury to a third party.  But neither party to the relationship was 
subservient to the other, nor did either acquire a property interest in the person or labor of the 
other.
 The circumstances of household servants and independent contractors have a superficial 
similarity that partially camouflages a crucial difference.  Indentured servants and apprentices 
could sometimes choose their master, even if they had little practical choice about acquiring the 
status of servant.  Even though common law rules constituted and regulated these relationships, 
indentured servants and apprentices frequently executed a document called an “indenture” that 
provided a level of specificity the common law could not.  For example, the common law 
required a master to educate a servant or apprentice, but the indenture might specify that the 
servant or apprentice be trained as a blacksmith.  While an indenture might be a type of 
agreement, it was not a contract.
 A contract is an exchange of promises. It requires a “meeting of the minds” between two 
independent individuals who negotiate their agreement privately.  Each party to a contract 
obligated himself to perform some act or confer some benefit on the other party.  But, as a 
conceptual matter, neither gave up any aspect of his independence, freedom, or personhood to do 
so.  In a status relationship - even one created through a written agreement that may look very 
much like a contract - one person becomes the property of another.  The common law had 
entirely separate and distinct rules for filling in the details of the relationships and for enforcing 
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the obligations between an owner and his property versus the relationship between two 
contracting parties.6
 One of the rules that applied to status relationships that did not originally apply to 
contractual relationships was the rule prohibiting a third party from enticing away a dependent 
member of someone else’s household.  The common law of both England and the American 
states erected a zone of privacy and protection around a property owner and his property.  A 
violation of that zone was a trespass.  Merely setting an unauthorized foot on privately owned 
land gave the landowner a claim for trespass.  The trespass that occurred when an outsider 
induced a wife, child, or servant to leave his or her husband or master was “enticement.”  If the 
enticer did not know the person belonged to the household of another, but continued to shelter 
that person after learning of the original relationship, the trespass was called “harboring.”  The 
rules against enticement and harboring applied equally to wives, children, servants and slaves.7
 During the nineteenth century, the nature of work and labor relationships changed 
dramatically.  In the colonial and early national period, northern states began to abolish slavery 
and long-term indentures so that northerners came to understand servitude as a life-stage for 
young people on their way to adult independence.  Young men would complete their 
apprenticeships or terms of service to become independent farmers, shop-owners or skilled 
craftsmen.  Women would complete their apprenticeships or terms of service to become the 
wives of independent householders.
 As the nineteenth century progressed, economic independence became increasingly out of 




they continued to work for others for wages well into adulthood.  As more adults remained wage 
laborers for longer periods, Americans came to see wage labor as something other than service.8
 The master and servant relationship remained a part of law and culture in the United 
States in the nineteenth century North, but increasingly came to be associated with youth.  One 
could justify subservience and hierarchy for young people because they did not possess the legal 
will of adults.9  But American society required that adults be free and independent.  If they were 
also wage laborers for long periods of their adulthood, then Americans needed to reconceptualize 
the social organization of work in a way that granted them that claim to freedom and 
independence.  Free labor ideology offered a way for Americans to do this.
 Free labor ideology placed contract at the center of the work relationship.  At its most 
abstract, free labor ideology envisioned two independent men meeting together in the civic 
sphere and negotiating their private employment relationship on equal terms.  Americans 
experienced the beginnings of a shift from labor performed primarily in the context of status 
relationships to labor performed pursuant to contract as a move toward greater freedom.  Amy 
Dru Stanley has written about the broad, if not universal, attraction northerners felt toward the 
concept of contract as an organizing principle for social and civic relationships.  Indeed, Stanley 
argues that Americans developed an ideology of contract as the embodiment of freedom in the 
civic sphere.10
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  For the free labor system to work, everyone had to adhere faithfully to their contracts.  
However, an inherent contradiction existed between the idea that the market should govern labor 
distribution on the one hand, and the requirement that contracts be inviolable on the other.  In 
theory, market forces regulated the terms under which workers sold and employers purchased 
labor.  In practice, the law frequently placed a thumb on the scale in favor of employers to coerce 
laborers to perform where market forces were not enough.11  
 Free labor law, as it originated in England, contained a host of coercive tools for 
employers to force workers to honor the sanctity of their contracts.  English employers could 
physically coerce their employees to finish out their contracts or go to prison.  They could also 
ask for economic remedies that could be almost as coercive as physical compulsion.   The 
American colonies and later the states looked to the laws of England as instructive, but not 
binding.  Still, American courts developed the new legal discourse of employer and employee 
contract law in a context in which almost all social and labor relationships had previously been 
authoritarian and hierarchical in both custom and law.12
 In creating employment contracts, Americans could envision themselves as free and 
independent individuals organizing their economic lives without compulsion or interference from 
the state.  However, when things went wrong they had to resort to the state courts to compel 
performance or recover damages.  As Robert Steinfeld explains:
A regime of free contract only receives its content from a detailed set of contract rules, 
and these rules cannot be deduced from any abstract idea of contract.  In most cases, the 
state develops contract rules as courts, legislatures, and other governmental bodies go 
about answering a series of difficult but unavoidable ‘policy’ questions:  What kinds of 
contracts will we enforce? What kinds of contracts will we prohibit or refuse to enforce? 
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How will duress or fraud be defined in determining whether to enforce a contract, or to 
prohibit certain species of contract?’. . . A range of quite different regimes of free contract 
can be constructed, depending on how the political entity answers these questions.13
 Certain aspects of American culture in the North imposed constraints on what coercive 
measures employers could use to force employees to perform their employment contracts.  For 
example, the language of the Northwest Ordinance prohibited involuntary servitude.  At what 
point did an employer’s remedies for breach - which involved some form of coercion - render 
service involuntary?  In other words, how much and what kinds of coercion, as a matter of policy 
and ideology, did the law allow in a free society?14
 Steinfeld identified two strands within antebellum American free labor law that 
developed competing definitions of what constituted involuntary versus voluntary servitude.  The 
first tradition, coming out of an Illinois Supreme Court decision interpreting the Northwest 
Ordinance’s prohibition against involuntary servitude, held that so long as there was no fraud or 
coercion when the worker entered the employment agreement, an agreement was enforceable 
even if it required specific performance of personal services for decades.  The Indiana Supreme 
Court articulated the second, dominant, strand of free labor law.  This held that even when an 
agreement began as voluntary, the moment a worker wanted out of the employment relationship 
it became involuntary.  An employer could not enforce the agreement through specific 
performance and had to be compensated with money damages alone.  These two strands of free 
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labor define the central unresolvable conflict within free labor law; that between liberty of person 
and liberty to contract.15
 All English and American common law courts developed rules for interpreting and 
enforcing contracts where the terms the parties wrote for themselves were missing, unclear, or 
where the meaning of the terms was the source of dispute.  However, some features were the 
same throughout the states in the industrializing North.  American courts could have expanded 
the relatively egalitarian law governing the relationship between independent contractors and 
principals to extend to all employment contracts.  Instead, courts and treatise writers 
conceptualized the employment relationship as essentially hierarchical and opted to import the 
principles of master and servant into the employment relationship.  
 The decision to enter an employment contract had to be voluntary to satisfy the 
requirements of free labor ideology but, once created, the common law of master and servant 
filled in the details where the contract was silent or ambiguous, determined what provisions 
should be enforced as a matter of policy, and provided employers and employees with remedies 
for non-performance.  As a result, employment law gave employers the authority and control that 
had accompanied a master’s property interest in his servant.  Further, it gave to the employer all 
the remedies the common law had given to masters for disobedient servants.
 According to Tomlins, employment contracts had a disciplinary and authoritarian 
character that no other contracts possessed.  Tomlins cites the importation of enticement to the 
employment relationship as the hallmark example.  Enticement was a trespass that occurred 
when an outsider interfered with the property interest a head of household possessed in his wife, 
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child, servant or slave.  Introducing this concept into a species of contract most clearly 
demonstrated that the employment relationship, though no longer grounded in status, would 
nevertheless remain hierarchical in nature.16
 Courts were explicit that the authoritarian and hierarchical features of the master and 
servant relationship were good for the social organization of work.  Employees would learn the 
importance of honoring their contracts and would learn the discipline the capitalist workplace 
required.  Within the hierarchy of work, courts also implicitly enforced a hierarchy of work 
categories.  Wages were not just for labor performed, but for a thing produced.  Those work 
categories in which the laborer produced a thing of tangible value; a carpenter, seamstress or 
blacksmith, for example, were held in higher esteem than unskilled or menial labor.
 If a worker contributed his labor to a work process, but did not himself or herself produce 
any tangible work product, wages were paid as a reward for the worker’s loyalty.  Domestic and 
agricultural workers fell within the category of worker who received wages as much for his or 
her loyalty to the process as for the labor he or she performed.17  They were not only paid less, 
but their ability to collect wages was connected to their display of loyalty.  Agricultural laborers 
were more easily conceptualized as appropriately tied to the land and thus to the household of the 
landowner, especially in cases where the agricultural laborer lived on the farm.  As a result, 
northern courts continued to enforce year-long labor contracts and continued to interpret them as 
“entire” contracts all the way up to the Civil War.18
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According to the doctrine of “entirety,” which both English and American courts 
recognized, courts interpreted employment contracts to require workers to perform their 
contracts in full before the employer became obligated to pay wages.  A worker who entered a 
contract for a term could lose all the value of his work if he were discharged or quit his 
employment before the end of the contract term.  This remedy was called forfeiture.  The 
contracting parties could include a provision for interim payments.  But if they did not, the 
doctrine of entirety would impose the interpretation that the agreement to excluded interim 
payments.  This legal doctrine could work great hardship on an unskilled worker.  In response, 
some states applied the equitable, as opposed to legal, remedy of quantum meruit which required 
the employer to pay the worker for the value the employer received from the worker’s efforts.19
Labor law and policy varied throughout the North because opinions about the nature of 
wage labor varied, as did opinions about the nature of different kinds of work.  Although they did 
so in dialogue with one another, the various court decisions and legislative enactments created 
competing regimes of free contract in the United States during the nineteenth century.  The 
contradictions within the law of free contract remained throughout the antebellum period and 
persisted even after the end of the Civil War.
During the nineteenth century, the antislavery movement promoted a free labor ideology 
of self-ownership as the morally and politically superior alternative to slavery.  Southern 
slaveowners were unpersuaded.  Indeed, they developed a proslavery ideology that held slavery 
to be the more humane system.  Slaves occupied a position within the domestic hierarchy and 
received the protections of their master even in their infancy or old age when they were unable to 
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labor productively.  The so-called free labor system produced an impoverished, permanent 
working class that received none of the protection and affection of the domestic sphere that 
slaves enjoyed.
The slave state organization of labor, grounded on the proslavery ideology of hierarchy 
and social order, also included elite whites’ authority to control non-elite whites and free blacks.  
Unemployed, unconnected, adults were a problem for states in both the North and South but for 
different ideological reasons.  In the North, free labor ideology held that work was a virtue.  
Those who refused to participate in the labor market were immoral and should be compelled to 
work through laws prohibiting vagrancy and begging.  In the South, social order required 
everyone to be under the authority of a propertied, white, householder.  Southerners used poor 
laws and apprenticeships to bind poor adults and children to a head of household who could 
support them in exchange for their labor.20  Despite the ideological differences, North and South 
shared a common belief that everyone should work and that work should take place under the 
supervision of civic society.21
 North Carolina had a predominantly agricultural economy throughout the antebellum 
period.  However, unlike states in the North, contracts for agricultural wage labor essentially did 
not exist in antebellum North Carolina. That is not to say that no one performed unskilled farm 
labor for hire.  Rather, North Carolinia law placed such labor into legal categories other than 
contract.  The work of slaves, who performed virtually all the agricultural labor on plantations, 
fell into the body of law governing masters and slaves.  On smaller farms, the landowner and his 
family performed the bulk of the labor themselves, occasionally purchasing or renting a slave or 
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two in times of need, for example, when a young wife left the fields because of pregnancy and 
infant care.22  Household workers other than slaves fell within the common law categories of 
husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward, master and apprentice.
 Tenants and croppers could also perform both skilled and unskilled agricultural labor.   
Though the work of a “cropper” might have resembled wage labor, the law regulating both 
tenants and croppers grew out of the common law of landlord and tenant.  A tenant, according to 
the common law, owned an estate in the property he leased.  He owned what he produced and 
paid rent to the landlord.  Even where the tenant agreed to pay a portion of what he produced as 
rent, the tenant owned and controlled his crops.  The landlord acquired no right to the crop until 
after the tenant divided it and paid the landlord his share.23
 A cropper, on the other hand, did not own the product of his labor.  The crops he 
produced belonged to the landlord until the land owner divided them and paid them over to the 
cropper at the end of the year.  A croppers’s relationship to his landlord resembled wage labor 
more than true tenancy.  However, whatever agreement a cropper had with his landlord would 
have been interpreted and enforced under the common law rules governing the landlord and 
tenant relationship, not contract.24
 From the summer of 1865 through the end of the year, the North Carolina constitutional 
convention met to recommend constitutional change and the General Assembly passed 
legislation to reconstruct the state on terms acceptable to the federal government.  In the 
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meantime, the Union army and the personnel of the Freedmen’s Bureau, continued to maintain 
order in the state.  Without a functioning agricultural economy everyone would suffer, especially 
the formerly enslaved. To ensure a crop for the following year, the Freedmen’s Bureau imposed 
year-long employment contracts on both freedmen and planters neither of whom was eager to 
contract with each other.25
 Historian James D. Schmidt, explains that Freedmen’s Bureau personnel had absorbed a 
popular understanding of free labor law that they applied in their efforts to reconstruct southern 
labor relationships.  As discussed above, free labor law was not uniform even across the states 
that had been developing a free labor jurisprudence for half a century.  Bureau agents had a 
variety of tools for creating and enforcing contracts, all of which could find support in one of the 
many strands of common law principles.  The year-long agricultural labor contract was one such 
tool.26
 According to Donald Neiman, the Bureau could have allowed the freedmen to work for 
landowners for wages without entering year-long contracts.  This option would have given the 
freedmen greater mobility and freedom to bargain for higher wages, but risked that they would 
abandon their labor at a critical stage in the growing process causing landowners to lose their 
crops.  The landowners could sue.  But since most freedmen had little money to pay damages 
that was an empty remedy.  Similarly, the landowner’s right to keep the back wages of the absent 
worker would not be adequate where a planter lost his entire crop because he did not have 
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enough hands at a critical time.  In any event, cash was scarce in the post-war south, which made 
this option unworkable.27
Another option, the one that most freedmen preferred after Freedmen’s Bureau Assistant 
Commissioner, Whittlesey informed them they would not gain access to land ownership, was to 
rent land.28  This gave them a measure of independence and security.  Most planters were 
opposed to renting land to freedmen.  The Bureau ultimately declined to support this option 
because, according to Neiman, the Bureau’s Commissioner, O. O. Howard, believed it would 
have been “an intolerable interference with the right of individuals to use their property as they 
see fit.”29
The third option was the year-long agricultural labor contract.  Howard believed that 
labor contracts would provide both landowners and freedmen lessons in fair labor practices and 
the importance of honoring contractual obligations.  To promote both parties’ understanding that 
contracts had to be honored for the free labor system to work, Howard allowed and even 
encouraged two deviations from the common law.  He allowed workers a first lien on the crop so 
that they would be ensured of getting paid their wages.  However, he also allowed planters to 
specifically enforce their labor contracts.30  At the end of 1865, Howard was not pleased with 
how southerners performed under the year-long labor contracts.   Employers were so closely 
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supervising workers that none of the parties to the relationship was learning the fundamentals of 
free labor.  Some assistant commissioners suggested doing away with the long term contracts 
because the purported benefit to the freedmen, that their employers had to pay them during slow 
work times, was an empty one.  When the Freedmen’s Bureau and the army began handing over 
jurisdiction to state courts, freedmen bound by contracts would be unlikely to recover unpaid 
wages.  They would not be able to afford the cost of litigation and were less likely to face a 
friendly forum.  If the newly free workers were not bound by a contract, they could leave if an 
employer mistreated them, which afforded them some independence and negotiating leverage.  
Howard decided that on balance it would be more effective to continue the long-term contracts.  
There was no trust among workers and employers.  Without a written agreement there would be 
no order.  He believed both sides remained capable of absorbing the lessons of free labor.  Once 
these lessons had been learned the contracts would no longer be needed and labor arrangements 
could revert to the more free labor oriented “at-will” employment arrangements of the North.31
Howard’s view of the freedom of employment arrangements in the North was rosier than 
the reality.  It was true that by the start of the Civil War, long-term labor contracts had fallen out 
of favor in the North, but that was not because employers no longer had need of coercive 
methods to induce worker performance.  While labor contracts ensured an employer sufficient 
labor when needed, they also committed him to pay wages to workers he might not need during a 
downturn in his business.  In the industrial - as opposed to the agricultural - labor context, 
employers no longer wanted or needed lengthy employment contracts.  Instead, northern 
industrial employers devised an assortment of worker rules that courts enforced as though they 
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were bargained-for contract terms that made quitting a job costly to the worker.  For example, 
notice requirements coupled with a lag between when employers paid wages and when the 
workers performed the labor made it possible for employers to keep weeks of wages when a 
worker left without advance notice.32  Still, to a free labor advocate such as Howard, the 
opportunity to labor under a contract instead of slavery was a lesson in freedom.33
At the same time that the Freedman’s Bureau was organizing the agricultural labor force 
for the crop years 1865 and 1866, North Carolinians were holding their state constitutional 
conventions and electing their first post-war General Assembly.  The question of the social 
organization of work after emancipation was just one aspect - albeit a significant one - of 
determining the status of the freedmen in North Carolina society.   The fact of emancipation did 
not change the cultural assumptions former masters held about blacks and their proper status in 
civic society.  Elite whites were all but incapable of imagining free blacks as anything other than 
a permanent laboring class.  At the same time, they believed blacks would not work unless 
compelled and were constitutionally inclined toward dishonesty and petty crime.  Under slavery, 
masters had exerted the kind of control over blacks they believed made good social order 
possible.  Under freedom, the state would have to pass legislation that exerted equal control or 
chaos would result.34
Freedmen, on the other hand, believed that their former masters could not be trusted to 
deal fairly with them.  They understood that for the foreseeable future they would provide most 
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of the labor of the state, but they demanded fair treatment and legislation to ensure it.  An address 
drafted by a convention of freedmen held simultaneously with the 1865 North Carolina 
constitutional convention stated:
Our first and engrossing concern in our new relation is, how we may provide 
shelter and an honorable subsistence for ourselves and families.  You will say work; but 
without your just and considerate aid, how shall we secure adequate compensation for our 
labor?  If the friendly relations which we so much desire shall prevail, must there not be 
mutual co-operation?  As our long degradation cannot add to your comfort, make us more 
obedient as servants, or more useful as citizens, will you not aid us by wise and just 
legislation to elevate ourselves?. . . [We ask for] such encouragement to our industry as 
the proper regulation of the hours of labor and the providing of the means of protection 
against rapacious and cruel employees, and for the collection of just claims. . .35
 
To the formerly enslaved, any new labor arrangements required that they labor under reasonable 
conditions and be paid a living wage.
During the second session of North Carolina’s first post-war General Assembly, the 
legislature developed its version of the South’s notorious Black Codes.  The legislature appointed 
a three person commission to draft a code to define the “exact legal status of the freedmen.”  On 
January 23, 1866, the commission presented its report to the General Assembly. The Black Code 
addressed a number of issues related to the legal status of the freedmen, including what labor 
system would replace slavery.  The Black Code assumed that the formerly enslaved would 
remain laborers, and that they would not work without coercion.  The regulations, therefore, 
centered on methods for controlling blacks and compelling them to some form of labor.  These 
methods included provisions that tied blacks to the land.  For example, as previously discussed, 
the Black Code contained provisions for apprenticing black children whose parents “do not 
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habitually employ their time in some honest, industrious occupation.” The former masters of 
these children had first claim to apprentice them.36  The Code contained a vagrancy provision.  
Although the provision in the North Carolina Black Code was facially race neutral and not unlike 
vagrancy laws in northern states, it appeared within the Code designed for the regulation of 
freedmen.  Its obvious purpose was to control freedmen and only incidentally to encompass 
whites. 
The Code also permitted landowners to pay agricultural laborers in kind rather than in 
money.  This permitted landowners to compensate their workers in nothing but food, clothing 
and shelter, which kept them bound to the land and impoverished.  Finally, the General Assembly 
included a provision prohibiting employers from enticing or harboring servants.  The threat of 
being sued by another planter greatly inhibited a planter’s willingness to hire workers who had 
done exactly what free labor tenets prescribed - move to where labor conditions were more 
favorable.37
 William Cohen, in his study of black mobility in the Reconstruction South, examined the 
seeming paradox of the coexistence of laws designed to tie blacks to the land and to a particular 
employer, and the fact of significant black mobility around the south.   He found that post-war 
southern labor laws restricted the movement of blacks, but only selectively.  Employers only 
used the coercive laws when they were convenient and efficacious, much as Tomlins found 
industrial employers did in the antebellum north.  Despite the doctrinal similarity between 
southern and northern labor laws, their application to blacks coming out of slavery gave them an 
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entirely different character than the same laws applied in the North.  Moreover, while northern 
employers were primarily interested in controlling access to the labor of its workers, southerner 
labor laws controlled not only access to the labor of the formerly enslaved, but also served to 
keep them in a caste-like status within North Carolina society.38
 In large part in response to the Black Codes enacted in former slave states, including 
North Carolina, the United States Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which 
neutralized racially discriminatory laws, and called into question facially neutral laws that were 
being applied in a discriminatory fashion.  Because North Carolina’s Black Code prohibited 
blacks from testifying against whites in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Freedmen’s 
Bureau continued to regulate and adjudicate matters between blacks and whites in the state, 
including labor relations, until the end of 1868.  Until 1868 North Carolina civil courts had yet to 
take a significant role in shaping the labor law of the state’s post-war order.
The United States Congress passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867 requiring the former 
Confederate states to extend the suffrage to black men, to hold constitutional conventions to 
write new constitutions and to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.  Black suffrage produced a 
Republican electorate in North Carolina.  It was this electorate that selected the Republican 
Supreme Court that decided Haskins v. Royster. 
On January 1, 1871, John Haskins, a Person County, North Carolina plantation owner,  
entered into a year-long agricultural labor agreement with Thomas Eastwood, Sam Wilkerson 
and Jim Wilkerson and his family.  The agreement consisted of two separate documents.  The 
first document named Haskins as the first party to the agreement and Eastwood and Sam 
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Wilkerson as the second parties to the agreement.  The terms of the agreement specified which 
fields on Haskins’ plantation Eastwood and Sam Wilkerson would farm and what they should 
plant.  It also specified what portion of each crop the parties would receive.  The agreement 
required Haskins to provide Eastwood and Sam Wilkerson with all the tools necessary for 
farming and a team of two horses.  Although Eastwood and Wilkerson would employ the horses, 
Haskins retained the authority to determine proper care of these valuable living assets at all 
times.  Eastwood and Wilkerson were responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of the tools.  
Finally, Eastwood and Sam Wilkerson agreed to feed all Haskins’ livestock and to cut and haul 
wood for entire the plantation.
 Eastwood and Sam Wilkerson agreed to “farm four and one half hands.”  In addition to 
their own labor, they were to “work” Elice Wilkerson as a full hand, Harriet and Lawyer 
Wilkerson together as one hand, and Horace Wilkerson as a half hand.”  Eastwood and Sam 
Wilkerson agreed to “work faithfully all the year and cause their hands to do the same.”  The 
workers had to follow Haskins instructions at all times because Haskins retained “the privilege of 
discharging them at any time he may think proper.”  Haskins also claimed the prerogative to 
discharge any of the hands if he judged them to be insolent or disrespectful to himself or any 
member of his family.  Any hand Haskins discharged forfeited all his or her labor and was 
required to leave the plantation immediately.  The shares he or she would have been paid were to 
be retained by Haskins.  The fact that Haskins’ arbitrary discharge of a productive worker would 
result in a greater burden to the remaining workers did not compel Haskins to increase the 
remaining workers’ shares - only his own. 
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 The agreement required the workers to feed and clothe themselves at their own expense.  
If Haskins advanced any of the hands provisions or money to get through the year, Haskins was 
entitled to retain a portion of their crop shares sufficient to repay Haskins “at a fair neighborhood 
cash price for said crops.”
 The second document was ostensibly an agreement between Eastwood and Sam 
Wilkerson on one side and Jim Wilkerson on the other, although the document was clearly 
intended for Haskins to secure the labor of Elice, Harriet, Lawyer and Horace Wilkerson through 
Jim Wilkerson.  It is unclear exactly the relationship, if any, between Sam and Jim Wilkerson.  
But the document refers to the hands Jim provided to Eastwood and Sam Wilkerson as Jim’s 
family.  The document also suggests that Haskins may have furnished Jim Haskins’ family some 
kind of housing on the plantation.  According to this second document, Jim Wilkerson agreed to 
“give up the . . . hands wholely to the Said Eastood and Wilkerson,” agreeing further that he 
would not meddle or interfere with the hands in any way or he would forfeit the shares the hands 
were to draw.  Even though the agreement was ostensibly between Eastwood and Sam 
Wilkerson, Haskins drafted it and stated at the end of the agreement that he would “hold [it] for 
his own benefit and the benefit of the above name parties.”  Eastwood and the Wilkersons signed 
the agreements with their mark.
 About two months after executing their labor agreements with Haskins, the workers left 
to work for Fabian Royster who presumably offered them better terms.  After the workers left, 
Haskins brought suit in Superior Court in Person County alleging that Royster enticed his 
workers away and asked for $2000 in damages.  Neither the historical nor the legal record 
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reflects why Haskins chose to sue Royster instead of the workers who breached their contract 
with him, but it is not difficult to guess.   
 Standard contract principles would have required Haskins to recover from the workers 
whatever damages he incurred because of the breach of their agreement with him.  But the 
workers obviously had little or no money to pay damages.  In addition, the workers left sometime 
between January and the beginning of March, which would have been the least labor-intensive 
period of the year.  So Haskins’ actual damages would have been slight.  Haskins’ only other 
option was to sue the person who hired them away, but under what theory?
 A litigant can only ask for what the law provides.  In his complaint, a plaintiff must 
describe the injury he received and the consequences that should follow in the language of 
existing legal categories.39  Haskins may no longer have been a slave owner, but he was the head 
of a household and a plantation owner.  He thus almost certainly believed he did or should retain 
some of the incidents of mastery.  Though the impoverished laborers he engaged to work his land 
could no longer be his slaves, Haskins no doubt believed they were some species of servant.  In 
his experience, the law prevented outsiders from interfering between masters and their servants.  
Making a case against Fabian Royster, the man who hired the Eastwood and Wilkerson crew, 
gave Haskins a defendant with the means to pay damages as well as a legal claim that resonated 
with the antebellum law and culture of mastery.
 Thus, Haskins couched his complaint in the language of master and servant.  His 
complaint alleged that the workers “bound themselves to serve the plaintiff as laborers. . .” on his 
farm for the year 1871.  His complaint also alleged that Royster “did unlawfully entice, persuade, 
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and procure” the workers to “unlawfully leave the service of the plaintiff.”  Haskins notably did 
not specify what principle of North Carolina law made it unlawful for Royster to hire away his 
workers.  Rather, he simply described the contract between himself and his workers as one for 
bound service.40
 John Haskins filed his complaint in the Superior Court of Person County during its fall 
term in 1872.  Superior Court Judge Albion Tourgée, decided the case in the Spring of 1873.  
Tourgee was a Radical Republican carpetbagger, who moved from Ohio to North Carolina in 
1865, and became deeply involved in North Carolina politics and law in 1867.  North Carolina’s 
1868 constitutional convention selected Tourgee to serve on a three-person committee to convert 
all of North Carolina’s laws, both statutes and common law rules, into a single written code.  The 
committee managed to draft a well-regarded code of civil procedure before it was disbanded in 
1873 by the newly-elected, Conservative-controlled General Assembly.41 
Tourgée also supported legislation in North Carolina combining law and equity so that a 
single court could hear both types of complaints.  Common law courts and courts sitting in 
equity have long parallel histories, especially in England where they originated.  Common law 
pleading requirements were strict and could lead to harsh results, for example in the case of 
entire contracts discussed above.  If a litigant could not squeeze his facts into a tightly defined 
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common law category of compensable harm, he could not recover.  However, a court sitting in 
equity or one empowered to apply equitable principles could adjust the legal outcome to avoid 
harsh or unfair results.  Again, in the case of entire contracts, some American courts alleviated 
the harsh legal outcome of forfeiture by applying the equitable principle of quantum meruit to 
allow partial recovery in cases where one party to a contract had bestowed some benefit on the 
other, even if he hadn’t fully performed under the contract.  In the United States the same judicial 
personnel could typically sit in both law and equity, just not at the same time.  Under Tourgée’s 
leadership, North Carolina was among the first states to combine law and equity, but eventually 
each of the states of the United States adopted this change.
 Judge Tourgée used his combination of legal and equitable authority to decide the case as 
a question of law without submitting it to the jury.  He determined that “the two men could not 
be bound by such an inequitable agreement.”42  Because there was no enforceable contract 
between Haskins and the workers, they were free to work for whomever they pleased.  Thus, 
Royster was not liable to Haskins for enticement.  Haskins appealed to the North Carolina 
Supreme Court.
 The issue on appeal was whether Fabian Royster injured John Haskins in some 
compensable way when he hired Thomas Eastwood and the Wilkersons away from Haskins’ 
plantation.  The case presented three specific legal questions to the North Carolina Supreme 
Court.  The first was whether there was an enforceable agreement between Haskins and the 
workers.  If so, what kind of relationship did it create among them?  Finally, if the agreement 
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was enforceable did the law that governed the agreement prohibit a third party from encouraging 
breach of the agreement?
 But the case also presented a more general question regarding what policies should 
govern the social organization of agricultural labor in the state.  As Justice Reade in dissent put 
it, “[u]nder the new regime, much of the labor of the country is performed under contract. This is 
the first case which has been before us in which the incidents of the relation of employer and 
laborer have been under discussion, and will probably be looked to as a precedent.”43  Having 
little of its own law or custom to draw on for labor relations in the context of emancipation, the 
court looked to the developments taking place in the northern states.  The common law contained 
a variety of strains from which courts could choose rules of decision to apply in novel situations.  
The lawyers in this case, the majority opinion, and the dissenting opinion presented an array of 
common law principles from which the Court could choose in deciding each of the questions the 
case raised.
 The agreement at issue had two controversial aspects.  The first was the degree to which 
Eastwood and all the Wilkersons ceded authority and control to Haskins over both the terms of 
their work and their personal conduct.  The second was that the agreement gave Haskins the sole 
ability to determine whether the workers performed their labor in a satisfactory manner or 
whether any of the workers’ behavior constituted insolence or disrespect toward Haskins or his 
family triggering his contractual authority to administer a devastatingly harsh punishment for 
breach of either of these standards.
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 The lawyers and Justices quickly dismissed any notion that the agreements at issue were 
leases or that Haskins was a landlord to Eastwood and the Wilkersons.  They agreed they were 
dealing with a contract.  The lawyers and judges next had to determine whether the contract was 
enforceable, which required an inquiry into what kind of relationship the contract created.  As 
discussed above, the common law filled in details in contracts where the parties failed to do so or 
were unclear in their intentions.  Those common law details could be very different for different 
kinds of contracts.  Nothing in the agreement itself indicated whether the parties believed they 
had created a master and servant relationship, a landlord and cropper relationship, or whether the 
agreement was between a principle and independent contractors.
 Even if the parties had categorized their agreement, the Court was not required to agree 
with their description if it thought a different category fit better.  However, the Court was 
somewhat constrained to decide the case on the terms under which it had been litigated in the 
court below.  Haskins’ complaint described his agreement with Eastwood and the Wilkersons in 
terms of bound service so the Court had to address whether such a contract was enforceable.
 On the question of whether North Carolina law permitted contracts creating a master and 
servant relationship, William A. Graham answered with a resounding “yes” in his brief on behalf 
of Haskins.  Graham was an architect of white supremacy in North Carolina and refused to 
accept that blacks would ever occupy anything but a dependent status in North Carolina society.  
In response to an invitation to speak at a Freedmen’s Convention held in Raleigh in October 
1866, Graham, instead delivered an open address.  In the address, Graham discouraged the 
freedmen from expending too many resources on education.  He reminded them several times 
that they were a people who would live by their labor.  Learning to labor faithfully and well was 
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something parents could teach their children at home at no expense.  To Graham, blacks were 
appropriately defined as a subordinate, uneducated laboring class.44
 In Haskins v. Royster he argued that master and servant relationships had existed in the 
common law since antiquity and there was no reason competent adults could not agree to enter 
into such a relationship by voluntary contract.  He also proclaimed that croppers were servants 
under North Carolina law, so that categorical distinction was without meaning.  Graham noted 
that it might be difficult at times to determine whether the parties intended to create a landlord 
and tenant relationship or master and servant relationship, but in this case it was easy because 
“[t]he direction and control of the whole operations of the year are vested in the plaintiff, with 
stringent securities, not only for obedience, but for correct and respectful behavior towards him 
and his family, of all which he is made the judge.”45  In other words, the very terms that caused 
Judge Tourgée to adjudge the agreement so inequitable as to be unenforceable, were the terms 
that Graham claimed created the voluntary master and servant status relationship.
 The brief of Haskins’ other attorneys, McCorkle and Bailey, followed Graham’s logic but 
added the justification that “[s]ociety cannot long exist without grades, and the relation of master 
and servant springs from the earliest and always continuing needs of society, without reference to 
the character of government.”46  According to McCorkle and Bailey, status and hierarchy were 
not only consistent with freedom and free contract, but natural features of it.  It may be tempting 
to dismiss these positions as entirely inconsistent with a regime of free labor.  But in fact they 
158
44 Convention of the Freedmen of North Carolina, Official Proceedings (Raleigh 1865).  North Carolina Collection. 
University of North Carolina. 
45 1874 N.C. LEXIS 295, 5. Page citations to the arguments of counsel are to the LexisNexis Academic digitial 
version. 
46 Ibid.  
reflect the positions of early nineteenth century treatise writers and courts that described the 
hierarchical nature of free labor employment relationships in salutary terms.
 Justice William B. Rodman, writing for the majority, skirted the issue as to precisely what 
kind of contract was at issue.  He addressed the enforceability of the underlying agreement to 
bolster Haskins‘ claim for enticement, but made clear that Haskins’ claim against Royster did not 
depend on the existence of an enforceable contract between Haskins and his workers.  Rodman 
claimed, as a matter of abstract principle, that enticement could arise out of contract instead of 
the property interest a master has in his servant.  But he also cited to a host of cases relating to 
contracts for personal services and void versus voidable contracts to claim that the underlying 
contract need not be enforceable, especially where the enticement was malicious.  Justice Reade 
in dissent broke through Rodman’s confusing recitation of precedent by stating plainly that “it is 
a rule of common sense, that what one may lawfully do, another may advise him to do.”47 So 
what explains Rodman’s tortured path toward supporting Haskins’ claim against Royster?
 It was not only Haskins who was acculturated into a world where it was dishonorable and 
wrong to entice away the servants of another.  Rodman’s opinion demonstrated that he remained 
committed to a social order centered around the household that conceptualized work as 
remaining within the domestic hierarchy.  According to Rodman:
There is a certain analogy among all the domestic relations, and it would be dangerous to 
the repose and happiness of families if the law permitted any man, under whatever 
professions of philanthropy or charity, to sow discontent between the head of a family 
and its various members, wife, children and servants. Interference with such relations can 
only be justified under the most special circumstances, and where there cannot be the 
slightest suspicion of a spirit of mischief-making, or self interest...48
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 At the same time Rodman considered himself committed to free labor.   He simply 
imported some of the cultural assumptions and legal incidents of property ownership in another 
person into an ostensibly free contract.  But Rodman didn’t invent this intellectual move.  He 
borrowed it from the 1871 Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in Walker v. Cronin.49
 In Walker v. Cronin, the Massachusetts Supreme Court was engaged in the process of 
developing the tort of tortious interference with a contractual relation.  This tort, or civil wrong, 
evolved out of the prohibition against enticement and fit better than enticement within a labor 
system grounded in free contract.  Tortious interference allowed employers to retain a zone of 
protection around their workers without the unsavory aspect of owning property in another 
person.  The two main differences were, first, the interference had to be malicious.  No malicious 
intent was necessary with enticement, just knowledge that the servant, wife, or child belonged to 
another.  The other difference was that the injured party had to allege and prove economic 
damage.  It was not enough to simply claim that the interfering party had committed a trespass 
and let the judge or jury determine the dollar amount of damages based on magnitude of the 
violation.  According to the Massachusetts Supreme Court, this new tort or civil wrong applied 
not just to contracts creating a master and servant relationship, but “to all contracts of 
employment, if not to contracts of every description.”50
  Rodman continued to see wage labor as a form of service.  Even if no specific law 
provided a remedy against one employer enticing away the workers of another, it still felt wrong.  
Haskins’ lawyers cited to the well-known equitable principle Ubi jus ibi remedium - “where there 
is a right there is a remedy.”  Rodman applied it to the employment relationship in North 
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Carolina because he could not conceive of blacks and poor whites in anything close to terms of 
equality.  While his position may have been driven by white privilege more than class privilege, 
he used the same analytical tools that northern industrial employers were developing to retain 
their authority and control over their industrial workers.
 Even though Rodman’s decision did not depend on the enforceability of the underlying 
contract, he acknowledged that agreements such as the one at issue were not good models for the 
future.  He even acknowledged that the agreement could “suggest an intent . . . to take some 
improper advantage, and to exact from the employees a degree of personal deference and respect, 
beyond that civil and courteous deportment which every man owes to his fellow in every relation 
in life.”51  But absent fraud or duress in entering the contract, the court could not “inquire 
whether the reward agreed to be paid to a workman is the highest that he might have got in the 
market, and to declare the contract void, or to make a new one if it thought not to be the 
highest. . . That would be an assumption inconsistent with their freedom.”52  In other words, 
under North Carolina law personal liberty had to give way to contract liberty.
 Justice Reade, in his dissenting opinion took issue with the idea that a contract could 
create a master and servant relationship. He pointed out, accurately, that master and servant was 
a clearly defined common law legal category with specific requirements for how it could be 
created and what the incidents of the relationship were.  Blackstone’s common law described 
three types of servants within the master and servant category.  The first was the menial servant.  
These servants were household laborers.  The relationship was created when the master hired the 
servant.  Reade agreed with Graham that “this is an ancient servitude, embracing duty, subjection 
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and allegiance on the part of the servant, and superiority and power on the part of the master,” 
but disagreed that such a relationship existed between Haskins and Eastwood and the 
Wilkersons.53  Another type of servant was the apprentice.  Indenture agreements  approved by 
courts created master and apprentice relationships.  Eastwood and the Wilkersons were clearly 
not apprentices.  The third category of servant in Blackstone’s common law were laborers hired 
for a term who did not live within the domestic household and who were not tradesmen or 
professionals.  This kind of servant notably did not exist in the North Carolina because English 
statutes, which had no application in North Carolina, created them.  After Justice Reade 
“divested the case of the supposed character of master and servant [he then considered it as], a 
contract between the parties.”54
 Analyzing the agreement in terms of contract principles, Reade found that Haskins’ 
complaint did not allege damages that were a consequence of the breach.  Contract law was 
about economic relationships, economic injury, and economic remedies.  The purpose of 
damages in the case of contract was to put the injured party in the same economic position he 
would have been if the breach had not occurred.  The injured party’s personal aggrievement was 
not part of the damage calculation.  The right to exclude others that was the hallmark of property 
ownership and that encompassed the prohibition on enticement, did not belong to the 
jurisprudence of contract.
 Reade also argued that there was fraud at the point of entering the agreement in contrast 
to Rodman’s assumption that there was not.  The workers were ignorant, poor and dependent.  
Haskins lawyers argued that the inequitable distribution of power in the agreement evidenced the 
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parties’ intent to enter into a master and servant relationship and Rodman implicitly agreed.   
Reade, on the other hand, argued the extremely unequal distribution of power on the two sides of 
the contract evidenced the presence of fraud or duress in the creation of the agreement.
 In addition, Reade echoed the arguments that took place in the antebellum period in the 
non-slave states regarding how much freedom a person could contract away before the service 
being contracted for became involuntary servitude.  Reade argued that it would be obviously 
against public policy for Eastwood and Wilkerson to contract to become Haskins’ slaves.  Yet the 
contract at issue was worse than slavery.  The common law imposed a duty on masters to feed, 
clothe, and house their servants.  The contract at issue gave Haskins all the power and privilege 
of a master without providing Eastwood and the Wilkersons with any of the protections to which 
servants were entitled.
 Finally, Reade argued the remedy prescribed by the agreement was against public policy.  
The agreement gave Haskins the unfettered right to discharge any or all of the workers if they 
failed to perform to suit him.  If so discharged, they forfeited all their labor.  If that were not 
sufficiently inequitable, the agreement also permitted Haskins to discharge any worker and cause 
him or her to forfeit his labor if Haskins judged that worker to be insolent or disrespectful.  
According to Reade, “no one can read the contract without being satisfied that the best interest of 
society forbid that it should be enforced or in any way countenanced in the Courts. It bears upon 
its face the evidence that the plaintiff intended to get the labor of these men and discharge them 
and keep their earnings.”55
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 Justice Rodman and Justice Reade articulated the same unresolvable tension between 
personal liberty and contract liberty that bedeviled legislators and jurists in the antebellum North. 
Rodman, a Republican who had served with Tourgée on the code commission that had drafted 
the North Carolina Code of Civil Procedure, favored liberty of contract, which at the same time 
limited personal freedom.56  E.G. Reade, who was a delegate to the planter-led constitutional 
conventions of 1865 and was appointed to the North Carolina Supreme Court that same year, 
wrote the opinion that favored personal liberty over contract liberty.57
 The North Carolina Supreme Court remanded Haskins’ case back to the Superior Court of 
Person County for trial. Judge Tourgée had been replaced by a man named McKay who presided 
over the trial of the matter.  The jury found for Haskins, an outcome all but predetermined by the 
Supreme Court’s ruling on the issue of enticement, but awarded him only $450 instead of the 
$3000 he sought.58
 Free labor, like freedom itself, was a concept with many possible meanings.  The 
common law courts of the North had been developing free labor law for three quarters of a 
century by the time the North Carolina Supreme Court entered the debate, and had not achieved 
a clear consensus.  The burgeoning labor movement in the North in the second half of the 
nineteenth century met with increasingly harsh resistance in northern courts, preventing any such 
consensus.   As complicated as free labor law was in the north, it was even more complicated in 
the south as states moved from labor based in slavery and mastery to free labor based in contract. 
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The coercive aspects of employment contracts took on a wholly different cast when applied in 
the context of emancipation, so much so that the same measures that northern courts sanctioned 
in the North looked liked a continuation of slavery in the South.
 At the same time that the states were trying to integrate and define free labor within their 
respective common law legal systems, the nation was renegotiating its understanding of 
fundamental law in light of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  On the one hand, the renegotiation of fundamental law had important implications 
for how the states could reconstruct their labor relationships under the new regime.  On the other 
hand, the renegotiation of fundamental law did not take place in a doctrinal vacuum.  The 
simultaneous developments in the common law constituted an important aspect of the context in 
which the renegotiation of fundamental law took place.
 From one perspective, the legal doctrinal conflict between personal freedom and contract
freedom existed from the beginning of the American nation. Most of the doctrinal refinement in 
employment relationships took place in the North, because the South turned more steadfastly 
toward slavery after the Revolutionary era. The South remained in dialogue with the North on 
most other common law matters. Thus, at the end of the Civil War it was not surprising that the 
Republican-dominated North Carolina Supreme Court would look for assistance from northern 
courts to establish and develop their own free labor law.
 But the North Carolina Supreme Court could not end its inquiry by determining simply 
which common law principles were good law and policy for the state because the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution had entered the conversation in an 
entirely new and more thoroughgoing way.  Haskins v. Royster shows how the development of 
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private law and the development of the meaning and application of the newly ratified 
Reconstruction amendments were part of an ongoing exchange of ideas, rather than a top-down 
process of constitutional exegesis by the Supreme Court.
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 Conclusion
 The legal history of Reconstruction tends to place the federal government at the center.  
The standard narrative focuses on federal efforts to impose on the South a new legal order of 
equality and universal individual rights.  The success or failure of Reconstruction depends to a 
large degree on the extent to which the protection of civil and political rights became federalized. 
This literature tends to give the federal judiciary a larger role than it actually had.  The Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution instantly and fundamentally 
changed both the foundational national law and the structure of federal-state relations.  Certainly 
the federal government, led by Republicans in Congress, created the blueprint for profound 
change in the nation’s legal order.  But the bulk of the work of reconstructing the nation’s legal 
system after the Civil War took place at the state and local level within an intellectual framework 
governed by the common law.
 Contemporary American legal culture still bears the imprint of the common law.  Legal 
matters are settled in an adversary proceeding on a case by case basis.  Many of the rules of 
evidence and procedure still used in both state and federal courts are common law rules only 
slightly modified by statute.  But the common law as a form of governance gave way to an 
increasingly formalized system based on legislation, administration and constitutionalized 
concepts of abstract individual rights.  This is not a story of declension.  Common law “freedom” 
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quite easily co-existed with slavery and coverture, among myriad other unfreedoms.1  However, 
the paradigm shift that resulted in the change from common law governance to the modern 
liberal and administrative state was accompanied by a loss of historical context that has made 
understanding Reconstruction legal and constitutional change difficult.
 Supreme Court Justice and legal luminary Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., taught twentieth 
century legal thinkers to see the common law as a form of politics.  Holmes’ view, which still 
holds much sway even today, obscures the historical context in which the dramatic change in 
American law and constitutionalism that occurred during the Civil War and Reconstruction took 
place.  Taking common law governance seriously as a discourse about good social order and 
examining the role of law in promoting the general welfare restores some of that context.2
 One very important aspect of historical context that is lost when we do not take common 
law governance seriously is the relative importance of constitutional law in the antebellum 
period.  Nineteenth century Americans did not generally conceive the Constitution as the source 
of their rights.  Rather, they saw their rights as emanating from pre-constitutional sources, such 
as the common law, natural law, and even religious tenets.  The Constitution did not contain the 
kind of rights that ordered the social, political and economic lives of individuals.
 In recent years historians have uncovered some of the lost historical context of the 
common law enabling them to offer new interpretations of seminal Supreme Court decisions 
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interpreting Reconstruction legal change.3  For example, Michael Ross’s biography of Supreme 
Court Justice Samuel F. Miller, the author of the majority opinion in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 
describes a jurist who supported blacks in their civil rights and right to safety, but who was also 
concerned that propertied elites would use the new authority of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
prevent states and municipalities from regulating to protect their people from the worst effects of 
industrialization, increasing economic inequality, and the concentration of capital into the hands 
of the few.  Thus, he upheld the Louisiana law challenged in The Slaughterhouse Cases as a 
legitimate expression of the long-standing common law principle that permitted regulation for 
the public good.4
 New Orleans was a filthy city in the nineteenth century.  During its occupation, the Union  
army issued orders to curb some of the worst practices of the city’s residents, which resulted in a 
significant reduction in the incidence of disease.  Animal slaughter was one of the most noxious 
industries in New Orleans or anywhere else for that matter.  New York City led the way in 
regulating this industry for the sake of public health.  Louisiana attempted to follow New York 
City’s example.  Because the state had limited public funds, it granted a monopoly to a private 
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individual, constitutional rights.  She finds that the common law might have offered a kind of contextualized set of 
rights that took into account the culturally determined role of women as wives and mothers.  While she does not 
claim that the contextualized rights of the common law would have yielded greater freedom or better conditions for 
women, she does argue that constitutional rights claims did not represent the only avenue for positive legal change.
4 Michael A. Ross, Justice of Shattered Dreams: Samuel Freeman Miller and the Supreme Court during the Civil 
War Era (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press) 2003. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
corporation to operate a slaughtering facility away from the center of the city, where all butchers 
were required to locate their operations.  The butchers paid a fee to the corporation for use of the 
facilities, but otherwise were unrestricted in practicing their trade.
 Justice Miller had been a physician before he became a lawyer.  He studied the treatment 
of cholera as part of his medical training.  His adopted home, Keokuk, Iowa, was also home to a 
large hog raising and slaughtering industry.  Miller possessed extensive knowledge of the 
slaughtering business and the diseases it could cause.  To Justice Miller, the Louisiana 
legislature’s efforts to deal with this problem were completely reasonable and entirely within the 
traditional police authority of the state.  The arguments of the white butchers’ lawyers did not 
change his position, especially since they came from an unreconstructed Confederate, John A. 
Campbell.5  Campbell had been a United States Supreme Court Justice at the start of the Civil 
War.  He resigned to join Confederacy.  During his tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court he 
concurred in Chief Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion.  He believed state Republican-led 
governments had to be destroyed at all costs.
 Justice Miller’s opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases has long been regarded as the 
Supreme Court’s first step toward the dismantling of Reconstruction.  But Ross demonstrates 
Miller’s abiding concern that if all the privileges and immunities of citizenship that existed in 
common law and custom fell within federal regulatory authority his conservative fellow Justices, 
especially Stephen J. Field, would use that power to prevent states from regulating corporations 
and financial interests to protect their citizens from their predatory practices.  Field’s dissent in 
The Slaughterhouse Cases, in which he praises the virtues of free labor, was an appeal to 
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constitutionalize the inviolability of contracts necessary to free labor law.   According to Ross, 
Miller believed that if the Supreme Court adopted Field’s position “state legislatures that 
attempted to address the problems associated with industrialization, urbanization, and the 
concentration of capital would have to adjust their legislation to the views of conservative 
justices.  Every piece of state regulatory legislation would be scrutinized by a Supreme Court 
that jealously guarded the interests of the propertied classes.”6  Miller continued to have faith in 
the ability of states to protect the rights of their citizens, both black and white.  So did 
Louisiana’s Republican state political leaders.  They fought back hard for their right to continue 
to regulate for the welfare of the people of the state without the risk of being overturned by the 
Supreme Court under the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment as would in fact happen many 
times later in the nineteenth century.7
 Uncovering the common law context that dominated legal culture in the nineteenth 
century repositions the role of the constitutional law and the Supreme Court in relation to 
American legal culture.  The dominance of the common law persisted through the Civil War and 
Reconstruction constitutional change.  By the end of the nineteenth century constitutional law 
and abstract, universal, individual rights displaced the common law and its contextualized 
concept of rights, but one cannot understand the constitutional change of the last third of the 
nineteenth century without understanding the common law context in which it existed.
   In modernist thought, legislation is legitimate the moment it is enacted by a 
democratically elected law-making body.  In common law thought, the opposite is true.  Law 
becomes law when it proves itself over the course of time. Legislation is suspect in common law 
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thought for the very reason it is legitimate in modernist thought - because a democratic majority 
created it.  To the common law thinker, majorities are transient and do not necessarily have the 
long-term needs of society in mind when they act.  Legislation that dramatically changed the 
common law was not law, it was fiat.8
 Reconstruction constitutional change dramatically changed the common law.  The states 
may have ratified the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, but it was up to local legal actors 
to give this dramatic legal change legitimacy by weaving it into the existing common law order.  
This dissertation attempts to give the common law context its rightful place at the center of the 
narrative of legal and constitutional change.  The Union army began the process of integrating 
emancipation into the law of North Carolina in its military commission trials of civilians.  The 
Union army attempted to restore social order in North Carolina and to include the formerly 
enslaved in that social order on the basis of freedom.
 When General Schofield gave legal legitimacy to black families he destabilized the 
antebellum household structure.  Former slaveholders could barely tolerate the loss of their 
mastery over the adults they formerly held as slaves.  They could not abide giving up their right 
to control black children.  When they sought to virtually re-enslave large numbers of black 
children through apprentice laws that had their antecedents in antebellum law, the Freedmen’s 
Bureau and the Union army asserted the newly enacted federal Civil Rights Act of 1866 to stop 
them.  When the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the problem of apprenticing black 
children in In re Ambrose, it did not mention the Civil Rights Act of 1866 even as it overturned 
the apprenticeship indenture at issue.  Instead, the Court reached back into common law 
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principles of due process and determined that black children had the right to notice before being 
apprenticed.  Historians have criticized the Court for its weak response to the virtual re-
enslavement of children embodied in the post-war apprentice process, but if one considers the 
common law context in which the case arose, the Court’s decision seems more canny than tepid.9
 Contemporary historians consistently view the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
as having greatly expanded the reach of federal protection over civil rights, and seek an answer 
to the question why it did not achieve its potential.10  But the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a 
product of nineteenth century legal culture - a culture suspicious of central authority and 
codification, a culture than did not typically enact even state statutes of general application.11  
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 only had the potential to expand drastically federal power if one 
assumes a legal culture and a federal judiciary that did not then exist.  The rhetorical and political 
significance of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enormous.  Its effect on the possibilities for 
litigation much less so.  Nevertheless, the statute’s rhetorical and political significance created 
the potential for incremental common law change.  In declining to base its decision explicitly on 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 - opting instead to draw on antebellum common law traditions - the 
North Carolina Supreme Court gave the Civil Rights Act of 1866 a legitimacy it would not have 
had standing on its own authority.
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 Most historians understand that the liberty of contract doctrine the U. S. Supreme Court 
articulated in Lochner v. New York was based in antebellum free labor ideology.12 But its long 
history in the common law is not nearly as well-recognized.  Free labor contract law contained 
an unresolvable tension between liberty of person and liberty to contract.  This tension persisted 
through the Civil War in the North and became a problem for southern states after emancipation. 
 In Haskins v. Royster the North Carolina Supreme Court entered the debate over where 
the balance between these two competing principles should lie.  Haskins v. Royster followed the 
trend that had begun in the North, specifically Massachusetts, to find the scales tipping in favor 
of the liberty to contract.  However, even in so doing, the North Carolina Supreme Court did not 
abandon concerns for the good order.  It condemned the oppressive contract at issue, but stopped 
short of ruling it unenforceable.
 At about the same time that the North Carolina Supreme Court was considering Haskins 
v. Royster, the United States Supreme Court was deciding the Slaughterhouse Cases.  Justice 
Field, in dissent, tried but failed to import the liberty of contract principle into constitutional law 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Within a quarter of a century, however, the Supreme Court 
in Lochner would constitutionalize the liberty of contract doctrine by essentially the same 
jurisprudential method that failed in Slaughterhouse. Much of what Justice Miller feared would 
happen if the Fourteenth Amendment became available to overturn state police power measures 
came to pass.
 The change in liberty of contract principle between its 1874 articulation in Haskins v. 
Royster and its 1905 articulation in Lochner exemplifies the change in rights discourse that 
174
12 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Beseiged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence 
(1993; repr., Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
occurred during the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction periods.  In Haskins v. Royster 
community concerns received consideration even if they do not ultimately prevail.  In Lochner, 
liberty of contract functioned as a trump that shut down any other considerations that were not 
equally constitutionally compelling.
 By the end of the nineteenth century, a paradigm shift in American legal culture had 
occurred.  Common law governance had given way to constitutionalism.  Antebellum 
developments in legal culture had begun the process of change.  The push toward greater 
uniformity, clarity and predictability that gave rise to recurring, unsuccessful, codification 
movements did produce an increasing hierarchy in the court systems.  State legislatures began to 
pass laws that applied uniformly throughout the entire state, which was an unprecedented shift 
toward centralization.  Elite lawyers pushed for greater uniformity and formality in the law.  
Novak describes a general “upward shift” in decision-making power.13  The Civil War and 
Reconstruction imposed seismic change on what had previously been an incremental process.  
However, the Civil War and Reconstruction still played out in an existing context.  The shift 
away from common law governance was not linear and was not inevitable.  Recovering the 
intellectual world of common law governance increases our understanding of Reconstruction 
legal change.
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